DEPARTMENT 14 LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
Case Number: 21STCV17531 Hearing Date: March 6, 2025 Dept: 14 #4 Case Background This is an action for negligence. Plaintiffs allege
that they were injured while they were passengers on a bus owned and operated
by Defendant LACMTA. The driver slammed on the breaks, causing Plaintiffs to
slam their backs and shoulders into the bus wall. On May 10, 2021, Plaintiffs Maurice and Stephanie
Stewart filed their Complaint against Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (LACMTA). On February 19, 2025, Plaintiffs filed this motion to
continue trial. Instant Pleading Plaintiffs move to continue trial at least 90 days. Decision Discussion Plaintiffs move to continue trial by at least 90 days.
Plaintiffs argue that good cause exists for a continuance because the parties
require more time to complete discovery due to ongoing discovery disputes.
(Motion, ¶¶2-28.) Plaintiffs scheduled new motions to compel Defendant’s
discovery responses and were only able to secure hearing dates in May and June
2025. (Id., ¶30.) Plaintiffs have had no opportunity to take Defendant’s
deposition and cannot be ready for the current April 2025 trial date. (Id.,
¶¶31-32.) The current trial date also conflict with religious holidays. (Id.,
¶33.) The Court finds that good cause exists for a
continuance of trial under the circumstances. The interests of justice would be
served if the parties are allowed to complete discovery. A continuance of 90
days to July 2025 is reasonable to allow the parties to complete discovery. Conclusion Plaintiffs’ motion to continue trial is GRANTED. Trial
is continued to June 9, 2025 at 9:00 a.m. and FSC is set on May 28, 2025 at
10:00 a.m. Discovery and other trial related dates are to track with the new
trial date. Case Number: 23STCV24457 Hearing Date: March 6, 2025 Dept: 14 #10 Case Background This is a lemon law case. On October 9, 2023, Plaintiff Ricardo Chavez filed his
Complaint against Defendant General Motors, LLC. On December 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed this motion for
leave to file a First Amended Complaint (FAC). On February 27, 2025, Defendant filed this motion to
continue trial. Instant Pleading Defendant moves to continue trial 180 days. Discussion The Court finds good cause to continue the motion.
Additionally, the motion is unopposed. Decision Defendant’s motion to continue trial is GRANTED. Trial
is continued to August 18, 2025 at 9 a.m. The Final Status Conference is August
7, 2025 at 10 a.m. |
DEPARTMENT 14 LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
Case Number: 23STCP00464 Hearing Date: March 11, 2025 Dept: 14 #13 Case Background This is an action to dissolve a limited liability
company, for an order for production of documents, fraud, breach of contract,
indemnity, and avoidance of transaction. Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff made
loans to Defendant OSHER Bar & Grill (OSHER), an LLC of which he was a
member. In June 2019, Defendants Oren Ben Elisha and Yosef Ben Elisha began
using OSHER’s assets and checks to pay for services performed for another
restaurant they owned. The Ben Elishas also transferred money to themselves or
their creditors. The Ben Elishas ceased operate OSHER, causing its landlord to
serve a notice of default for abandoning the premises. On February 17, 2023, Plaintiff Joseph Kamelgard filed
his Complaint against Defendants OSHER, Oren and Yosef Ben Elisha, Blvd. Café,
Ben Construction, Inc., LA Construction Services, Inc., and the Boulevard Café.
On January 28, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiff’s
motions to compel answers to requests for production and awarded Plaintiff
sanctions. On February 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed this motion for
reconsideration. Instant Pleading Plaintiff moves for the Court to reconsider its January
28, 2025 order denying his motions to compel discovery. Decision Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The Court’s January 28, 2025 ruling denying his motions
to compel discovery is stricken. Plaintiff’s motions to compel Defendants Oren
and Yosef Ben Elisha’s responses to requests for production originally heard on
January 27, 2025 are GRANTED. The Court awards Plaintiff sanctions in the amount of
$560 total for two hours of attorney time at a rate of $250 per hour plus
filing fees. Sanctions are imposed against the Ben Elishas and their counsel. Defendants
Oren and Yosef Ben Elisha are ordered to serve responses to Plaintiff’s
Requests for Production, Set Two and pay all sanctions within 30 days of this
order. Discussion On January 28, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiff’s
motions to compel Oren and Yosef Ben Elisha’s responses to requests for
production because the Ben Elishas counsel represented at the hearing on this
matter that he had served responses before the hearing on the matter, albeit
late. Plaintiff now moves for reconsideration on the grounds that the Ben
Elishas responses contained only documents with no responses to the requests
for production. Code Civ. Proc.,
section 1008 states: (a)
When
an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and
refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms,
any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the
party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different
facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that
made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior
order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what
application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions
were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed
to be shown. Here,
Plaintiff’s counsel alleges the Ben Elishas’ responses submitted the evening
before the hearing on the motions to compel contained only documents without
responses to the requests for production. (Marcus Decl., ¶7, Exh. B.) Plaintiff
provides the email from the Ben Elishas’ counsel which includes excel
attachments and a pdf of other unorganized documents. (Id.) The email
does not appear to contain verifications. Because the motion is based on new
facts the Court did not have before it at the original hearing, the Court will
reconsider the motions to compel discovery. Code Civ.
Proc., section 2031.210 provides in relevant part that a response to a demand
for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling must contain (1) a statement that
the party will comply with the particular demand, (2) a representation that the
party lacks the ability to comply with the demand, or (3) an objection to the
particular demand. Here, the
Ben Elishas’ responses contained only unorganized documents with no responses
to Plaintiff’s requests for production. The Ben Elishas’ response does not meet
any of the requirements for the form and content of a response to a request for
inspection, copying, and testing. The Court finds that the Ben Elishas have not
responded to Plaintiff’s requests for production because the email was not a
response as defined by statute. Additionally, the response did not contain
verifications, meaning the response is tantamount to no response at all. Plaintiff’s motions to compel the Ben Elishas’
responses to his requests for production, set two are GRANTED. Conclusion Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The Court’s January 28, 2025 ruling denying his motions
to compel discovery is stricken. Plaintiff’s motions to compel Defendants Oren
and Yosef Ben Elisha’s responses to requests for production originally heard on
January 27, 2025 are GRANTED. The Court awards Plaintiff sanctions in the amount of
$560 total for two hours of attorney time at a rate of $250 per hour plus
filing fees. Sanctions are imposed against the Ben Elishas and their counsel. Defendants
Oren and Yosef Ben Elisha are ordered to serve responses to Plaintiff’s
Requests for Production, Set Two and pay all sanctions within 30 days of this
order. Case Number: 24STCV06929 Hearing Date: March 11, 2025 Dept: 14 #14 Case Background This is an action for breach of contract, breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, interference with business
relationship, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage,
violation of California law, and preliminary injunction. Plaintiff alleges that
it entered into a lease agreement with Online Edugo. In January 2024, Open Bank
foreclosed on the property without giving Plaintiff the opportunity to purchase
the building from the new owner at the bidding price. Open Bank changed the
locks to the building and entered the school premises during school hours,
disrupting Plaintiff’s business. On March 20, 2024, Ivyi, Inc. (erroneously named Ivy,
Inc.) (Ivyi) filed its Complaint against Open Bank, Min J. Kim, Jeff Kim, and
Eric Jiang. On May 7, 2024, Open Bank filed its Cross-Complaint
against Ivyi, Inc., Ki Hyon Kim (A. Kim), and Hee Jung Kim (C. Kim). On October 25, 2024, the Court sustained Open Bank’s
demurrer in part and granted Open Bank’s motion to strike. The Court allowed Plaintiff’s
bankruptcy Trustee leave to amend. On January 23, 2025, Open Bank filed this motion to
dismiss the Complaint. On February 25, 2025, the Court heard this motion and
ordered Open Bank to submit supplemental briefing on whether the Complaint
should be dismissed with or without prejudice. Instant Pleading Open Bank moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with
prejudice. Decision Open Bank’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part.
Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed as to Open Bank only with prejudice. Discussion Open Bank moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on the
grounds that Plaintiff’s Bankruptcy Trustee failed to amend the Complaint after
the Court sustained Open Bank’s demurrer and granted its motion to strike. The Court may dismiss a complaint as to a particular
defendant if, after a demurrer or motion to strike to the complaint is
sustained with leave to amend, the plaintiff fails to amend within the time
allowed by the court and either party moves for dismissal. (Code Civ. Proc.
section 581, subd. (f)(2) and (f)(4).) Here, the Court sustained in part Open Bank’s demurrer
and granted its motion to strike with 15 days leave to amend. Because Plaintiff
is in Bankruptcy, its Bankruptcy Trustee alone had standing to continue
litigating this matter. After the Court issued its October 2024 orders
sustaining the demurrer and granting the motion to strike, Open Bank’s counsel
served the Bankruptcy Trustee with notice of the order. (Crowell Decl., ¶3.)
The Trustee did not file an amended complaint within 15 days after the Court’s
order. Because the Trustee did not file an amended complaint in the time
allotted, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The Court notes that Open Bank requests dismissal with
prejudice. The Court is aware of Cano v. Glover (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th
326, 329 and other cases discussing whether a case dismissed under Cod Civ.
Proc., section 581(f)(2) may be dismissed with or without prejudice. Cano
did not rule one way or another whether dismissal must be with or without
prejudice. Rather, the court there noted that the section is silent on the
issue. The court determined dismissal with prejudice was proper because the
plaintiff there was unable to amend the allegations of his complaint to state a
cause of action despite multiple opportunities to do so. (Id., at
p.330.) It was proper to dismiss the case with prejudice because to do
otherwise would have placed the defendant in perpetual limbo. (Id.)
Thus, under the reasoning in Cano, dismissal with or without prejudice
will depend on the circumstances of the case. Here, in its supplemental briefing, Open Bank
represented that Ivy no longer has standing to file an amended Complaint
because its bankruptcy Trustee did not administer or abandon Ivy’s causes of
action and Ivy did not schedule them. Open Bank cites 11 U.S.C., section
554(c), which provides that property scheduled and not otherwise administered
when the case is closed is abandoned to the debtor. Additionally, 11 U.S.C.,
section 554(d) provides that property of the estate that is not abandoned or
administered in the case remains property of the estate. Open Bank also cites In
re Kreisel (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008) 399 B.R. 679, 687, wherein debtors whose
claims were not scheduled, formally abandoned, or administered remained part of
the bankruptcy estate, depriving the debtors of standing to continue litigating
his claims. The Court is satisfied that Ivy’s claims remained part
of the bankruptcy estate and that Ivy no longer has standing to litigate these
claims. Therefore, the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Conclusion Open Bank’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part.
Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed as to Open Bank only with prejudice. |