DEPARTMENT 29 LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
DEPARTMENT 29 - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS IMPORTANT (PLEASE SEND YOUR E-MAIL TO DEPT. 29 NOT DEPT. 2) Case Number: 22STCV30067 Hearing Date: March 13, 2025 Dept: 29
Rivera
v. Onyx Glendale Tentative The motions are granted. The requests for sanctions are granted in part. Background On September 14, 2022, Plaintiff Gisela Rivera (“Plaintiff”) filed
a complaint against Onyx Glendale and Does 1 through 50, asserting causes of
action for premises liability and general negligence arising out of an incident
on July 20, 2020, in which, Plaintiff alleges she was trapped in an elevator. On March 5, 2024, Defendant MCP Onyx, LLC (erroneously sued as
Onyx Glendale) (“Defendant”) filed an answer to the complaint. On February 18, 2025, Plaintiff these two motions: (1) to compel Defendant
to provide responses to Form Interrogatories (Set One); and (2) to compel Defendant
to provide responses to Special Interrogatories (Set One). Plaintiff also seeks
monetary sanctions. Defendant filed oppositions on February 28, and Plaintiff
filed replies on March 6. A party must
respond to interrogatories within 30 days after service. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.260,
subd.(a).) If a party to whom interrogatories are directed does not provide a timely
response, the propounding party may move for an order compelling response to
the interrogatories. (Id., § 2030.290, subd. (b).) There is no time
limit for a motion to compel initial responses, and no meet and confer efforts
are required. (See id., § 2030.290; Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting,
Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 411.)
Nor must a separate statement be filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.1345(b)(1).) In addition, a party who
fails to provide a timely response generally waives all objections. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (a).) When
a party moves to compel initial responses to interrogatories, “the court shall
impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010)
against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes [the
motion], unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with
substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of
the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2030.290, subd. (c).) In Chapter 7
of the Civil Discovery Act, Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010,
subdivision (d), defines “[m]isuses of the discovery process” to include
“[f]ailing to respond to or to submit to an authorized method of discovery.” Where
a party or attorney has engaged in misuse of the discovery process, the court
may impose a monetary sanction in the amount of “the reasonable expenses,
including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a).) “[P]roviding
untimely responses does not divest the trial court of its authority [to hear a
motion to compel responses].” (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc., supra,
148 Cal.App.4th at p. 407.) Even if the untimely response “does not contain
objections [and] substantially resolve[s] the issues raised by a motion to
compel responses … the trial court retains the authority to hear the motion.” (Id.
at pp. 408-409.) This
rule gives “an important incentive for parties to respond to discovery in a
timely fashion.” (Id.
at p. 408.) If
“the propounding party [does not] take the motion off
calendar or narrow its scope to the issue of sanctions,”
the trial court may “deny the motion to compel responses as essentially
unnecessary, in whole or in part, and just impose sanctions.” (Id.
at p. 409.) “The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of
a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to
the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the
requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed.”
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a).) Discussion On October
10, 2024, Plaintiff served Defendant with Form Interrogatories (Set One) and
Special Interrogatories (Set One). (Sarukhanyan Decls., ¶ 3 & Exhs. A.) Defendant
requested, and Plaintiff agreed to, four extensions of time for Defendant to
respond; with the extensions, Defendant’s responses were due on January 7,
2025. (Id., ¶ 4 & Exhs. B.) No responses
were received by January 7. (Id., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff offered an extension to
January 20. (Id., ¶ 5 & Exhs. C.) On January 21, Defendant emailed Plaintiff
and stated, “I am still obtaining information from in-house counsel and
anticipate I can have them to you by the end of the week.” (Id., Exhs. C.) No responses
were received that week. (Id., ¶ 5.) On February 11, Plaintiff emailed and
stated that because no responses had been served, Plaintiff intended to file a
motion to compel unless the responses were received the next day. (Id. ¶ 5
& Exhs. C.) Plaintiff
filed this motion on February 18, 2025. As of that day, no responses had been
received. (Id., ¶ 5.) Defendant’s
counsel states that he “attempted to serve” responses by email on January 27
but counsel received a message that the delivery “had been delayed” because the
email “exceeded Google’s message size limits.” (Salas Decls., ¶¶ 4-5 &
Exhs. A-B.) The message stated that this was a “warning message only” and
advised, “You do not need to resend your message.” (Id., Exhs. B.) When
Plaintiff advised Defendant that Plaintiff had not received the responses on February
11, Defendant responded that same day by resending the email with the responses
attached. (Id., ¶ 6 & Exhd. D.) Defendant received the same “warning
message.” (Id., ¶ 6 & Exhs. E.) On February
19, two days after being served with this motion to compel, Defendant sent an
email to Plaintiff with a Dropbox link to the discovery responses. (Id., ¶ 7
& Exhs. F.) Plaintiff states
that the responses received on February 19 were not verified and are not
code-compliant. (Sarukhanyan Reply Decls., ¶¶ 6-7.) On this
record, the motions to compel are granted. Plaintiff propounded discovery in
October 2024, and even now, five months later, Defendant has not provided
verified responses. A response must be verified. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.250,
subd. (a).) Unverified discovery responses “are tantamount to no responses at
all.” (Appleton v. Super. Ct. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636.) Plaintiff’s
request for sanctions is also granted in part. Failing to provide a verified
discovery response is not substantially justified, and there are no other
circumstances present that would make the imposition of a sanction unjust. Taking
into account the economies of scale associated with preparing multiple discovery
motions, the Court sets sanctions for each motion in the amount of $760, based
on two attorneys of attorney time multiplied by a reasonable billing rate of
$350 per hour for work of this nature, plus a $60 filing fee. (See Sarukhanyan Decls.,
¶ 6.) The Court
expresses no view on whether the unverified responses are or are not otherwise
code-compliant. Conclusion The Court
GRANTS Plaintiff’s motions to compel. The Court
ORDERS Defendant to provide written, verified, complete, code-compliant
responses, without objections, to Plaintiff’s Form Interrogatories (Set One)
within 10 days of notice. The Court
ORDERS Defendant to provide written, verified, complete, code-compliant
responses, without objections, to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories (Set One)
within 10 days of notice. The Court
GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s requests for sanctions. The Court
ORDERS Defendant and counsel of record Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman &
Dicker LLP, jointly and severally, to pay monetary sanctions under the Civil Discovery
Act in the amount of $1,520 to Plaintiff (through counsel of record) within 30
days of notice. Moving party
is ordered to give notice. |
DEPARTMENT 29 LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
DEPARTMENT 29 - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS IMPORTANT (PLEASE SEND YOUR E-MAIL TO DEPT. 29 NOT DEPT. 2) Case Number: 20STCV28133 Hearing Date: March 10, 2025 Dept: 29
Lopez v. Reyes Tentative The On October 22, 2024, the Court reviewed a prior petition and identified certain issues that needed to be addressed before the Court could approve the petition and set a hearing for January 8, 2025. No new petition was submitted and there was no appearance at the hearing. The Court continued the hearing to March 10, 2025. On January 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed a new petition. The new petition does not address the issues previously identified by the Court. The following issues must be addressed before the Court can approve the petition: 1. 1. Petition, Item No. 4, box a is still incorrectly checked. The minor’s claims are the subject of a pending action (this action, Case No. 20STCV28133), and so box b should be checked and properly filled out. 2. 2. Petition, Item No. 11a states that the gross amount of the settlement to be distributed on behalf of Sergio Reyes is $8,000. Item No. 12b(3) states that it is $10,000. Item No. 17a states that it is $8,000. This inconsistency must be resolved. 3. 3. Petition, Item No. 12b(3) lists the payment to Juan Duarte and claimant Sergio Reyes, but it omits any reference to Gerardo Reyes, who is also a settling plaintiff. This omission must be resolved. 4. 4. Petition, Item No. 12b(5). This box must be checked, and the petition must include an Attachment 12 setting forth the reasons for the apportionment of the settlement payments between the claimant and each other plaintiff or claimant. 5. 5. Petition, Item 14a. The attorney-client fee agreement must be attached to the petition as Attachment 14a. 6. 6. Petition, Item No. 14b. Counsel seeks $54.95 in costs but does not adequately support the request for reimbursement of these reported costs. Further, counsel’s declaration only requests $29.95 in costs. 7. 7. Petition, Attachment 19b(4). This attachment must address the requirements of Probate Code section 3401. A parent must verify under oath that the estate of the minor does not exceed $5,000. The hearing is continued for approximately 60 days. Petitioner must submit a new petition and proposed order that addresses the issues identified above. Moving party is ordered to give notice. Case Number: 21STCV05231 Hearing Date: March 10, 2025 Dept: 29
Mora v. Gasparyan Tentative The Court excuses the personal
appearance of the claimant and the guardian ad litem. Counsel may appear by
telephone or video conference call. The Court has reviewed the Petition to
Approve Minor’s Compromise filed on February 18, 2025. All substantive and procedural requirements
are satisfied. The Court finds the
proposed settlement fair and reasonable. The Petition is granted. The proposed orders are approved. The orders to show cause are discharged. The Court sets an OSC re proof of deposit
of funds into blocked account for ________________. Moving party to give notice. Case Number: 21STCV32259 Hearing Date: March 10, 2025 Dept: 29
May v. Torres Tentative The motion is
granted. Background On
August 31, 2021, Indalicia May (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint with a single
cause of action for negligence against Nicholas Torres and Heat Wave Air
Conditioning & Heating, LLC (Defendants). The Complaint stems from a motor
vehicle collision that occurred on September 9, 2019. The
motion now before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Continue Trial (the
Motion). The Motion is unopposed. Legal Standard California Rules of Court, rule
3.1332, subdivision (c) states that although disfavored, the trial date may be
continued for “good cause,” which includes (without limitation): (1) The unavailability of an essential lay or expert
witness because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (2) The unavailability of a party because of death,
illness, or other excusable circumstances; (3) The unavailability of trial counsel because of
death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (4) The substitution of trial counsel, but only where
there is an affirmative showing that the substitution is required in the
interests of justice; (5) The addition of a new party if: (A) The new
party has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for
trial; or (B) The
other parties have not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and
prepare for trial in regard to the new party's involvement in the case; (6) A party's excused inability to obtain essential
testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts; or (7) A significant, unanticipated change in the status
of the case as a result of which the case is not ready for trial. (Id., Rule 3.1332(c).) The court may also consider the
following factors: “(1) The proximity of the trial date; (2) Whether there was
any previous continuance, extension of time, or delay of trial due to any
party; (3) The length of the continuance requested; (4) The availability of
alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion or
application for a continuance; (5) The prejudice that parties or witnesses will
suffer as a result of the continuance; (6) If the case is entitled to a
preferential trial setting, the reasons for that status and whether the need
for a continuance outweighs the need to avoid delay; (7) The court's calendar
and the impact of granting a continuance on other pending trials; (8) Whether
trial counsel is engaged in another trial; (9) Whether all parties have
stipulated to a continuance; (10) Whether the interests of justice are best
served by a continuance, by the trial of the matter, or by imposing conditions
on the continuance; and (11) Any other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair
determination of the motion or application.” (Cal. Rules of Court 3.1332(d).)
Code of Civil Procedure section
2024.050 allows a court to grant leave to complete discovery proceedings. In
doing so, a court shall consider matters relevant to the leave requested,
including, but not limited to: (1) the necessity of the discovery, (2) the
diligence in seeking the discovery or discovery motion, (3) the likelihood of
interference with the trial calendar or prejudice to a party, and (4) the
length of time that has elapsed between previous trial dates. (Code Civ. Proc.
§ 2024.050.) Discussion With
this Motion, Plaintiff requests a four-month trial continuance from the
currently scheduled trial for April 25, 2025 to August 15, 2025. Plaintiff
files the Motion arguing good cause exists here for several reasons. First,
Plaintiff’s counsel will be out of the country from April 20, 2025 to April 30,
2025. The current trial is scheduled for April 25, 2025; therefore, Plaintiff’s
counsel would be unavailable. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c)(2).)
Additionally, Defense counsel will be engaged in jury trials on April 22, 2025
and April 23, 2025 and will likely be unavailable for the currently scheduled
trial for the instant case. Second, necessary discovery for both
parties has not been completed. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c)(6).) Plaintiff alleges a traumatic brain
injury (TBI) along with other injuries for which she is still receiving
treatment for. Additionally, Plaintiff is in the process of scheduling a
cervical epidural steroid injection for March of 2025. Moreover, because
Plaintiff is still undergoing significant treatment for her injuries, the
requested four-month continuance will allow the parties to conduct adequate
additional discovery, including obtaining updated medical records. Finally, the
parties are also considering mediation, which if successful could alleviate the
need for trial altogether. Although there have been five prior continuances,
Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for a sixth. Conclusion The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to
Continue Trial. The Court CONTINUES trial to a date on or
after August 15, 2025. The Final Status Conference and all deadlines are reset
based on the new trial date. The Court ADVISES COUNSEL AND PARTIS TO TREAT
THE TRIAL DATE AS FIRM. Given the age of the case and the number of
continuances that have already been granted, the Court will look with disfavor
on any further request to continue trial. Moving party is ordered to give notice. Case Number: 21STCV36211 Hearing Date: March 10, 2025 Dept: 29
Espindola v. Getaround, Inc. Tentative The motion is granted. Background On October 1, 2021, Plaintiff Xochitl Alvarez Espindola
(“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants GetAround, Inc.
(“Getaround”), Luke Mitchell Crawford (“Crawford”), and Does 1 through 50 for
negligence, negligence per se, and statutory liability. Plaintiff alleges that
on January 15, 2021, she was injured in a vehicle accident; Defendant Crawford
was the other driver, and he was driving a vehicle procured through a rideshare
program operated by Defendant GetAround. On January 19, 2022, GetAround filed an answer. On July 27, 2022, Plaintiff amended the complaint to name Max
Cherniavsky Nobel as Doe 1. On January 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed a request to
dismiss this defendant. On May 17, 2023, Plaintiff amended the complaint to name Tatiana
Ikonnikova (“Defendant”) as Doe 2. On January 22, 2024, the Court denied Getaround’s motion for
summary judgment. On February 27, 2024, Defendant and Crawford each filed an answer. On August 29, 2024, Plaintiff substituted in as her own counsel of
record. As it relates to the matter set for hearing on March 10,
2025, Defendant Getaround served Plaintiff with Requests for Admission (Set
Two) on September 16, 2024. (Zicarelli Decl., ¶ 2 & Exh. A.) Plaintiff did
not respond. (Id., ¶ 3.) On February 4, 2025, Defendant Getaround filed and served this
motion for an order deeming Plaintiff to have admitted the truth of the matters
specified in Requests for Admission (Set Two). No opposition has been filed. Legal Standard A party must respond to requests for admission within
30 days after service. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.250, subd.(a).) If a party to
whom requests for admission are directed does not provide a timely response,
the propounding party “may move for an order that … the truth of [the] matters
specified in the requests be deemed admitted.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280,
subd. (b).) There is no time limit for such a motion, and no meet and confer
efforts are required. (See id., § 2033.280; Sinaiko Healthcare
Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th
390, 411.) Nor must a separate statement be filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.1345(b)(1).) In addition, a party who fails to provide a timely response
generally waives all objections. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (a).) The court “shall” make the order that the truth of the
matters specified in the request be deemed admitted unless the court “finds
that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has
served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests
for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c);
see St. Mary v. Super. Ct. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 778-780.) Discussion On September 16, 2024, Getaround served Plaintiff with Requests
for Admission (Set Two). (Zicarelli Decl., ¶ 2 & Exh. A.) Plaintiff did not
respond. (Id., ¶ 3.) Defendant Getaround need not show anything more. The motion for a
deemed-admitted order is granted. Getaround does not seek sanctions. Conclusion The Court GRANTS the motion of Defendant Getaround for a deemed-admitted
order. The Court ORDERS that Plaintiff is DEEMED TO HAVE ADMITTED THE
TRUTH of the matters specified in Getaround’s Requests for Admission (Set Two). Moving party is ordered to give notice. Case Number: 22STCV22020 Hearing Date: March 10, 2025 Dept: 29
Contreras v. Cha Tentative The Court excuses the
personal appearance of the claimant and the guardian ad litem. Counsel may
appear by telephone or video conference call. On January 4, 2024, Plaintiff
failed to appear at trial, and the Court dismissed this case pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 581,
subdivision (b)(3). “A
dismissal terminates an action.” (Hagan Engineering, Inc. v. Mills
(2003) 115 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1007.) The
entry of dismissal of an entire action divests the trial court of jurisdiction
to enter further orders in that action,
except for the limited purpose of awarding costs and statutory attorney fees or
entertaining a motion to vacate this dismissal.
(Gogri v. Jack in the Box Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 255, 261; Hagan
Engineering, Inc. v. Mills (2003) 115 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1008; see also Code
Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).). Any other
subsequent orders made by the court are void. (Paniagua v. Orange County
Fire Authority (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 83, 89.) As counsel has not moved to
set aside the dismissal, and only moves to confirm the petition for minor’s
compromise, the Court cannot grant this requested relief. The petition is denied
without prejudice. Moving party to give notice. Case Number: 22STCV38570 Hearing Date: March 10, 2025 Dept: 29
Kemper
Insurance Company v. Ferguson Petition
for Order Striking and Releasing Lien or Other Encumbrance on Property of
Public Officer or Employee filed by Petitioner Neenah A. Ferguson Tentative The hearing on the petition is
continued. Petitioner is ordered to serve
all parties and to file proof of service with the Court. Background On December 12, 2022, Kemper Insurance Company
(“Plaintiff”) filed this subrogation action against Defendant Neenah Ferguson
(“Defendant”) and Does 1 to 20, inclusive, asserting one cause of action for
general negligence. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff insured Jonathan
Little (“Little”) under a homeowner’s policy and made payments to Little under
the policy for damages that Plaintiff alleges were caused by Defendant. On February 13, 2024, default was entered against
Defendant. On April 25, 2024, Plaintiff dismissed the Doe
defendants. On September 10, 2024, the Court entered default judgment
against Defendant for $35,177.73, consisting of $33,354.96 in damages,
$1,202.60 in prejudgment interest, and $620.17 in costs. On February 13, 2025, Defendant filed the instant
Petition for Order Striking and Releasing Lien or Other Encumbrance on Property
of Public Officer or Employee. Defendant also appealed the order entering
default judgment. “A person shall not
file or record, or direct another to file or record, a lawsuit, lien, or other
encumbrance, including a notice of lis pendens, against another person or
entity knowing it is false, with the intent to harass the person or entity or
to influence or hinder the person in discharging his or her official duties if
the person is a public officer or employee.”
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 765.010, subd. (b).) “‘Harass’ means engage in
knowing and willful conduct that serves no legitimate purpose.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 765.010, subd. (a)(1).) “A person or entity whose property is subject to a lien or
encumbrance in violation of this section [i.e., Code Civ. Proc., § 765.010] may
petition the superior court of the county in which the person or entity resides
or in which the property is located for an order, which may be granted ex
parte, directing the lien or other encumbrance claimant to appear at a hearing
before the court and show cause why the lien or other encumbrance should not be
stricken and other relief provided by this article should not be granted.’’
(Code Civ. Proc., § 765.010, subd. (c)(1).) “A petition under this article shall state the grounds upon
which relief is requested, and shall be supported by the affidavit of the
petitioner or the petitioner’s attorney setting forth a concise statement of
the facts upon which the motion is based.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 765.020.) “The court shall schedule the hearing no earlier than 14 days
after the date of the order. The scheduled date of the hearing shall allow
adequate time for notice of the hearing.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 765.010, subd.
(c)(2).) “If the court determines that the lien or other encumbrance is
in violation of Section 765.010, the court shall issue an order striking and
releasing the lien or other encumbrance and may award costs and reasonable
attorney’s fees to the petitioner to be paid by the lien or other encumbrance
claimant. If the court determines that the lien or other encumbrance is valid,
the court shall issue an order so stating and may award costs and reasonable
attorney’s fees to the encumbrance claimant to be paid by the petitioner. The
court may direct that an order issued pursuant to this section be recorded.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 765.030.) Discussion Defendant has filed a petition for Order Striking and
Releasing Lien or Other Encumbrance on Property of Public Officer or Employee,
arguing that the lien on a property known as 6428 Blaisdell Ave. S. Richfield,
MN 55423 is illegal because that property does not belong to the Defendant. In
the petition, Defendant asks the Court to (1) set an Order to Show Cause why
the lien should not be stricken and released, and (2) enter an order striking
and releasing that lien. (Petition, Item 9.) However, the Court notes that Defendant did not file
proof of service of the petition with the Court. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.1300(c) [“Proof of service of the moving papers must be filed no later than
five court days before the time appointed for the hearing”].) Therefore, the Court will continue the hearing and
require Defendant to serve her petition on Plaintiff and file a proof of
service before the next hearing date. Conclusion The Petition
for Order Striking and Releasing Lien or Other Encumbrance on Property of
Public Officer or Employee filed by Petitioner Neenah A. Ferguson is CONTINUED for
approximately 30 days to 4/__/ 25, at 1:30 PM, Dept. 29, Spring Street
Courthouse. Defendant Neenah Ferguson is ordered to serve her petition on
Plaintiff Kemper Insurance Company. Defendant is further ordered to file, at
least 5 days before the next hearing, proof of service of that petition. Case Number: 23STCV08115 Hearing Date: March 10, 2025 Dept: 29
Ramirez v. Uber Technologies, Inc. Tentative The motion is DENIED without prejudice. Background On
April 12, 2023, Plaintiff Jose Miguel Ramirez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action
against Defendants Uber Technologies, Inc., Raiser, LLC, Raiser-CA, LLC
(collectively, “Uber Defendants”), Jose Carbajal (“Carbajal”), and DOES 1 to 50
for injuries Plaintiff sustained when a ride-share vehicle allegedly controlled
by Defendants collided with Plaintiff.
Trial
is currently set for March 18, 2025.
On
February 6, 2025, Defendant Carbajal filed this instant motion to bifurcate the
issues of liability and damages. On February 10, 2025, Uber Defendants filed a
joinder to the motion. On February 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On
March 3, 2025, Carbajal filed a reply.
Discussion Defendants’ motion to bifurcate is denied
without prejudice to Defendants raising this issue for the trial judge to
consider, on its own motion, at the time that the judge rules upon motions in
limine. The Court orders that the bifurcation briefing be included in the
trial binders in Tab B along with any motions in limine filed in the
case. The Court recognizes that CRC Rule 3.57(c) states, “A motion in
limine may not be used for the purpose of seeking an order to try an issue
before the trial of another issue or issues,” and thus this order should not be
construed in a way that contradicts this rule. Defendant may direct the
trial court to this order, which should not be construed to in any way bind the
trial court in making a bifurcation decision on its own motion. Defendant properly sought a bifurcation order
in advance of the trial date. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 598 (court to issue
order bifurcating case on noticed motion by the pretrial conference or, absent
a pretrial conference, no later than 30 days in advance of trial).)
However, a trial court may also “on its own motion . . . make such an order at
any time.” (Ibid.) On the facts of this case and given that in
the Personal Injury Court system this case will be tried by a different court
than the court ruling on this motion, the Court finds it appropriate for the
trial judge to determine whether bifurcation is warranted. In the PI
Court system, the trial court rules on motions in limine, even those that
significantly affect trial preparation. While this bifurcation request is
not a motion in limine, the logic of having the trial judge determine it here
is similar. The request for bifurcation here appears to be one for which
the trial judge should make a discretionary determination based on its
experience and role in managing the trial. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the motion to
bifurcate is DENIED without prejudice. |