DEPARTMENT 27 LAW AND MOTION RULINGS

Case Number: 20STCV41794 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

DEEANNA LINSMAIER,

Plaintiff,

vs.

WAIL BUSHARA, et al.,

Defendants.

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CASE NO.: 20STCV41794

[TENTATIVE RULING]

THE COURT WILL HEAR FROM THE PARTIES RE RFA MOTION

MOTION TO WITHDRAW IS GRANTED

Dept. 27

1:30 p.m.

March 7, 2025

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER

On January 31, 2025, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Admission, Set 5, was partially granted. The Court ordered Defendant Wail Bushara to provide further responses to RFA Nos. 30, 31, 32, 33, and 35 by February 20, 2025, and set a hearing for February 21, 2025.

On February 21, 2025, pursuant to Plaintiff’s request, the Hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Request for Admissions, Set 5, Admitted was continued to March 7, 2025, at 1:30 PM. Additionally, Defendant’s application to extend the deadline to respond to Plaintiff’s RFAs, Set 5, was granted. The Court further indicated that at the hearing on the motion to withdraw, it would schedule the due date for Defendant’s responses to the RFAs.

On March 3, 2025, Defendant filed a supplemental brief, and on March 5, 2025, Defendant filed an opposition. Defendant reargues the original motion, disputing its filing, service, and claiming that it is premature.

Furthermore, Defendant contends in the supplemental briefing that unserved responses have no evidentiary value in the motion for summary adjudication and that discovery requests alone cannot establish undisputed facts. However, this argument should be made in an opposition to the MSA, not in an opposition to a motion to compel further.

Nevertheless, the Court will hear from the parties and issue a due date for the RFAs.

MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL

As to the motion to be relieved as counsel, the Court finds that there is an irreconcilable conflict between Wail Bushara and his counsel. Counsel has fulfilled the service requirement by serving the motion on Bushara’s personal counsel pursuant to his filed consent.

The Court notes that Defendant already has personal counsel in this matter.

Accordingly, Defendant will not be prejudiced by the withdrawal, and therefore the motion is granted as of today’s date, with counsel to give further notice to his former client by serving the order granting the withdrawal on Defendant.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Hon. Lee S. Arian

Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 22STCV33792 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

RYAN TAYLOR,

Plaintiff,

vs.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, et al.,

Defendants.

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CASE NO.: 22STCV33792

[TENTATIVE RULING]

MOTION FOR GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT IS GRANTED

Dept. 27

1:30 p.m.

March 7, 2025

Background

On March 15, 2022, Defendant Rane was involved in a car-to-car collision with a Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LACMTA) bus. On October 18, 2022, Plaintiff Taylor, a passenger on the bus, filed a personal injury lawsuit against LACMTA and Rane. Defendant Rane, in the consolidated case 22STCV37815, also filed suit against LACMTA for the subject incident. On November 18, 2024, a global mediation facilitated by mediator Troy Roe took place. During the mediation, Rane and Taylor reached a mutually acceptable settlement agreement for $100,000.00. Defendant Rane now moves the Court for a determination of good faith settlement. Defendant LACMTA (“Defendant”) opposes.

Legal Standard

In a case involving two or more alleged joint tortfeasors, a party may seek a court order under Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 determining that a settlement between the plaintiff and one or more of the alleged tortfeasors is in good faith. A judicial determination of good faith “bar[s] any other joint tortfeasor … from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor … for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 877.6(c).)

In evaluating whether a settlement has been made in good faith, courts consider the following factors, as set forth by the California Supreme Court in the landmark case Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488:

1) “a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery”;

2) “the settlor’s proportionate liability”;

3) “the amount paid in settlement”;

4) “the allocation of the settlement proceeds among plaintiffs”;

5) “a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial”;

6) the settling party's “financial conditions and insurance policy limits”;

7) any evidence of “collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.”

(Id. at 499.)

“Practical considerations obviously require that the evaluation be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement.” (Ibid.)

The “good faith” concept in Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 is a flexible principle imposing on reviewing courts the obligation to guard against the numerous ways in which the interests of nonsettling defendants may be unfairly prejudiced. (Rankin v. Curtis (1986) 183 Cal. App. 3d 939, 945.) Accordingly, under Tech-Bilt, the party asserting the lack of “good faith” may meet this burden by demonstrating that the settlement is so far "out of the ballpark" as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute. (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499-500.) Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a “settlement made in good faith” within the terms of section 877.6. (Ibid.)

The Supreme Court explained that Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 is designed to further two equitable policies:

1) encouragement of settlements; and

2) equitable allocation of costs among joint tortfeasors.

(Ibid.)

Those policies would not be served by an approach which emphasizes one to the virtual exclusion of the other. (Ibid.) Accordingly, a settlement will not be found in good faith unless the amount is reasonable in light of the settling tortfeasor's proportionate share of liability. (Std. Pac. of San Diego v. A. A. Baxter Corp. (1986) 176 Cal. App. 3d 577, 589.) Or, as the California Supreme Court has stated, a “defendant’s settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant’s liability to be.” (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499.)

When a motion seeking a determination under Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 is not opposed, the burden on the moving parties to show that the settlement was made in good faith is slight. (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261 [holding that a “barebones motion” including a declaration setting forth “a brief background of the case is sufficient”].)

When a good faith motion is contested, however, the moving parties have the initial burden of producing evidence in support of the requested good faith determination. (Id. at pp. 1261-1262.) “Section 877.6 and Tech-Bilt require an evidentiary showing, through expert declarations or other means, that the proposed settlement is within the reasonable range permitted by the criterion of good faith.” (Mattco Forge v. Arthur Young & Co. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1351.) “Substantial evidence” is required. (Id. at p. 1352.) A declaration from a settling defendant’s attorney that states, in conclusory fashion, that the client has little, or no share of the liability may not be sufficient. (Greshko v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 822, 834-35; see also 3 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶¶ 12:774, 12:872-873.)

The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the party opposing the good faith determination. The “party asserting a lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 877.6(d); see also 3 Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 12:875.)

Discussion

The settling parties, Taylor and Rane, adequately discussed the Tech-Bilt factors. Rane is paying Taylor $100,000, which constitutes the full limit of her insurance policy, to settle her case. Taylor’s current medical specials are approximately $100,000, with an additional $50,000 in future medical specials, plus general damages. Rane alleges minimal liability, citing evidence that at the time of impact, the bus driver was unlawfully driving in a center divider, swerving around traffic, and violating traffic laws. There is no evidence of collusion, as this settlement resulted from a global mediation with Tory Roe.

Defendant LACMTA argues that Rane’s liability is not minimal, citing Officer Hester’s deposition, where he testified that a left-turning driver has a duty to ensure that all lanes, including the median, are clear before executing the turn. Defendant contends that Rane failed to do so and is substantially liable. However, this does not negate the fact that the bus driver was unlawfully driving in the center divider and violating traffic laws, which LACMTA does not dispute in the opposition. Even if Rane’s liability is not minimal, defendant has not presented any evidence that Rane was primarily responsible for the incident. A conservative estimate of Rane’s liability based on the evidence presented by the parties falls at about 20-40%.

Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff’s total damages amount to approximately $150,000 in special damages. Applying a typical multiplier of 3 for general damages, the estimated case value reaches $600,000. Rane’s $100,000 settlement of about 17% of a $600,000 is sufficiently close to the low end of the 20-40% liability range. At the same time, Tech-Bilt explicitly recognizes that a settling defendant should pay less in settlement than if found liable at trial because of the certainty and benefits of early resolution. This principle exists because damages are speculative, and liability is often uncertain or remote (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499). Moreover, courts have found settlements to be in good faith with significantly lower settlement to value ratio than the present case. See, e.g., Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 969-970 ($25,000 settlement on a $40 million estimated value.); Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1028 (finding a $30,000 settlement reasonable in a litigation involving a claim for $1 million in damages); Horton v. Superior Court (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 727 (value of the case was estimated to be $320,000; judge determined the case was worth less than $150,000 and a $50,000 settlement was not "out of the ballpark.”); Kohn v. Superior Court (1983) 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 328) (trial court properly found a settlement of $6,000 from each joint tortfeasor to be in good faith even though plaintiffs sought $500,000 in general damages from all defendants; amounts paid not grossly disproportionate to what the trial court might have considered the probable recovery).

Here, Rane’s settlement is not grossly disproportionate to her estimated liability. Given that courts have approved settlements where defendants paid less than 10% of their estimated liability, Rane’s settlement amount is clearly within the ballpark and is considered to be made in good faith.

Furthermore, in evaluating the amount of the settlement, the Court is to take into account insurance policy limits. Rane is paying her insurance policy limit.

Defendant argues that Rane is expected to receive some funds as a plaintiff in her case against LAMTA, thereby increasing her ability to pay beyond her policy limit. However, this would only occur if she prevails in her claim against Defendant, which would, in turn, weaken Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff was significantly liable for causing the accident. Additionally, there is no need to consider Plaintiff’s ability to pay when the settlement amount is within the reasonable range. A settling party’s ability to pay only becomes relevant when the settlement amount is substantially lower than their estimated liability and when there is no other way for them to contribute. Here, that is not the case, as the settlement amount is within the ballpark.

Defendant also argues that the settlement resulted from collusion, but the only evidence cited is the fact that both Taylor and Rane are plaintiffs in this case. This is pure speculation without any supporting evidence. On the contrary, the settlement was reached during a global mediation, and the amount of the settlement does not indicate any sign of collusion. The court does not find indication of collusion.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED.

Hon. Lee S. Arian

Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV17421 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

JUAN CRUZ,

Plaintiff,

vs.

EDGAR VALLECHE, et al.,

Defendants.

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CASE NO.: 23STCV17421

[TENTATIVE RULING]

MOTION TO INTERVENE IS DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Dept. 27

1:30 p.m.

March 7, 2025

Legal Standard

Generally, a liability insurer cannot intervene in a tort action against its insured. The judgment in the tort action collaterally estops the insurer only on issues necessarily adjudicated—namely, the insured's liability and the amount of damages. It does not bind the insurer on coverage issues. (Western Heritage Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (Parks) (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1212.)

However, under CCP §387(a), permissive intervention is allowed if: (1) the nonparty has a direct and immediate interest in the litigation; (2) the intervention will not enlarge the issues in the case; and (3) the reasons for intervention outweigh any opposition by the existing parties. Since a liability insurer agrees to pay any judgment against its insured (Ins. Code §11580(b)(2)), intervention becomes necessary to protect the insurer’s interests when the insured refuses to participate in the litigation because the insured may be obligated to satisfy any judgment rendered against the insured. (Reliance Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (Wells) (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 383, 386–387.)

Typically, in circumstances where a defendant cannot be found and there is insurance coverage for the defendant, the insurer is permitted to intervene, as this ensures that the insurer’s interests are represented and heard.

Discussion

On July 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed this case arising from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on June 29, 2021, at Etiwanda Street near Hatteras Street in Los Angeles, California. Plaintiff’s operative Complaint alleges that Mr. Valleche negligently struck Plaintiff with his vehicle while acting within the course and scope of his employment with Defendant Prime Global Express, Inc. Plaintiff claims that the collision caused unspecified severe injuries and damages.

At the time of the incident, Prime Global Express, Inc. had liability insurance coverage for itself and its employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment through Old Republic Insurance Company. On August 15, 2024, Defendant Valleche was served. The insurer now moves the court for intervention, alleging that it has been unable to locate Defendant Valleche.

The insurer presents evidence that defense counsel and independent adjusters retained on behalf of Old Republic made multiple attempts to locate and secure Valleche’s cooperation, including numerous phone calls to four separate numbers and visits to multiple addresses associated with Valleche.

Plaintiff contends that Defendant is misrepresenting its inability to contact Valleche, asserting that the insurer recently settled a workers’ compensation claim related to this case with Valleche during the same period it claims it was unable to reach him. Plaintiff argues that Valleche could not have settled the claim without his signature and cooperation, implying that Defendant has, in fact, been in contact with him. directly or indirectly.

In reply, the insurer argues that any workers’ compensation claim involving Valleche is unrelated to this lawsuit and has no bearing on his cooperation in this matter. The insurer asserts that resolving a prior workers’ compensation matter through Valleche’s attorney does not prove that Old Republic has current communication with or the cooperation of Valleche.

However, the insurer does not dispute that it settled the workers’ compensation claim related to this matter or that the settlement required Valleche’s cooperation and signature. Nor does the insurer deny that it has had at least indirect contact with Valleche through his workers’ compensation attorney. The Court finds Defendant’s argument that the workers’ compensation matter is unrelated to the present action unpersuasive, as the ability to resolve that claim suggests that Defendant had, at minimum, some level of communication with Valleche. Regardless of whether the two matters are related, this avenue provides a potential means for Defendant to reach Valleche. Whether Valleche refuses to participate in this lawsuit is a separate issue that has not been raised in the moving papers.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the insurer has a viable method to attempt contact with Valleche and has, in fact, been in contact with him either directly or indirectly. The motion is denied without prejudice.

Hon. Lee S. Arian

Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV19129 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

ENEDINO ESPINOZA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

TARGET CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

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CASE NO.: 23STCV19129

[TENTATIVE RULING]
MOTION TO COMPEL FURHTER RESPONSES IS GRANTED IN PART

Dept. 27

1:30 p.m.

March 7, 2025

Background

On March 6, 2025, the Court heard Defendant Target’s motion to compel further responses to Requests for Admission (RFA) and Requests for Production (RFP), Set One. On calendar today is Target's motion to compel further responses to Target’s Special Interrogatories, Set One.

Similar to yesterday’s motions, Plaintiff argues that Defendant did not adequately meet and confer and that the motion was filed one day late. The Court excuses this procedural defect, as Plaintiff has opposed the motion on the merits. Furthermore, although the meet and confer process could have been more extensive, considering Defendant’s urgency in obtaining the responses to file a motion for summary judgment, the fact that the parties have already attended an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC), the Court finds that the present motion is ready to be heard and rules as follows:

Social Security Number & SSDI Benefits (Nos. 1-5)

Special Interrogatory No. 1: State YOUR Social Security Number.
Special Interrogatory No. 2: Have YOU ever applied for SSDI benefits?
Special Interrogatory No. 3: If YOU applied for SSDI, state the date of each application and disabilities claimed.
Special Interrogatory No. 4: Are YOU currently receiving SSDI benefits?
Special Interrogatory No. 5: If YOU receive SSDI, state the disability for which YOU are receiving benefits.

Medicare/Medi-Cal Status & Payments (Nos. 6-9, 17)

Special Interrogatory No. 6: Are YOU a Medicare beneficiary?
Special Interrogatory No. 7: If YOU are a Medicare beneficiary, state whether Medicare has paid for any medical services related to the INCIDENT.
Special Interrogatory No. 8: Are YOU a Medi-Cal beneficiary?
Special Interrogatory No. 9: If YOU are a Medi-Cal beneficiary, state whether Medi-Cal has paid for medical services related to the INCIDENT.
Special Interrogatory No. 17: Provide YOUR Medicare/Medi-Cal Health Insurance Claim Number (HICN). (

Plaintiff’s Social Security Number is private and not directly relevant to any claim or defense in this case. Courts have consistently recognized a strong privacy interest in Social Security Numbers, and there is no compelling reason to disclose this information. (See Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 [recognizing heightened privacy protections].) The same applies to Plaintiff’s Medicare/Medi-Cal Health Insurance Claim Number, which is a confidential, government-issued identifier.

The collateral source rule prevents a defendant from reducing a plaintiff's damages by introducing evidence that the plaintiff received compensation from an independent source. (McKinney v. California Portland Cement Co. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1222.) Examples of collateral sources that may not be used to decrease a plaintiff's recovery include medical insurance, pension and disability benefits, and continued wages paid by an employer. (Id.) The rationale behind the rule is that tortfeasors should not benefit from the thrift and foresight of individuals who secure insurance, pension, or disability benefits to protect themselves and their families. A contrary rule would improperly shift liability for tort-related losses and discourage people from obtaining benefits from independent sources. (Id.)

Defendant argues that the information is necessary to evaluate Plaintiff’s damages and potential medical expenses, but this does not address the collateral source doctrine, which precludes reducing damages based on payments from independent sources. While Defendant claims that it is not seeking to reduce liability based on these payments but rather to determine whether Medi-Cal has paid or will pay for Plaintiff’s treatment, Defendant has not demonstrated a legitimate need for the information, whether Medi-Cal has paid for Plaintiff’s treatment, beyond an attempt to reduce damages from these sources.

To the extent that Defendant argues that the information will lead to admissible evidence to assess Plaintiff’s damages, the Court finds that alternative sources, such as medical records and billing statements, provide the necessary information without implicating the collateral source rule. Accordingly, the interrogatories at issue are denied.

Special Interrogatory No. 10: Identify all witnesses (excluding treating physicians) to YOUR alleged damages.

This interrogatory is clearly relevant to the claims at issue. Defendant is entitled to know who, aside from medical providers, has firsthand knowledge of Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.

Plaintiff argues that the interrogatory is duplicative but fails to provide any evidence or specific explanation as to why this is the case. The mere assertion of duplicativeness is insufficient to sustain an objection. Accordingly, this interrogatory is granted, but restricted to non-expert witnesses only.

Firearm Training & Security Guard Duties (Nos. 11-12, 18-19)

Special Interrogatory No. 11: Describe YOUR qualifications for using a firearm at the time of the INCIDENT.
Special Interrogatory No. 12: Describe YOUR duties as an armed security guard at the time of the INCIDENT.
Special Interrogatory No. 18: Have YOU ever used YOUR service weapon prior to the SUBJECT INCIDENT?
Special Interrogatory No. 19: If YOU answered yes to No. 18, describe each incident.

Plaintiff claims emotional distress arising from the use of his firearm during the incident. Given this claim, his firearm training, security guard duties, and prior firearm use are directly relevant to several key issues, including foreseeability, causation, and the extent of damages. Accordingly, the interrogatories at issue are granted.

Medical Providers & Treatment History (Nos. 13-14, 20-21)

Special Interrogatory No. 13: Identify YOUR primary care physician at the time of the INCIDENT.
Special Interrogatory No. 14: Identify YOUR primary care physicians for the five years prior to the INCIDENT.
Special Interrogatory No. 20: Have YOU attended counseling or mental health treatment unrelated to the INCIDENT in the past ten years?
Special Interrogatory No. 21: If YOU answered yes to No. 20, identify the provider(s).

The identification of Plaintiff’s primary care physician(s) and mental health treatment history is relevant to assessing Plaintiff’s claimed damages, including the nature and extent of Plaintiff’s injuries and emotional distress. Defendant is entitled to explore preexisting conditions and prior medical history that may impact Plaintiff’s allegations of physical and emotional harm caused by the INCIDENT.

Plaintiff’s objections based on the collateral source rule are inapplicable here because these interrogatories do not seek to reduce damages by introducing evidence of third-party payments but rather to assess Plaintiff’s medical history, potential preexisting conditions.

While Plaintiff objects that the requests are vague and harassing, the court does not find them overly broad. However, to balance relevance and privacy concerns, the court limits the scope to the five years preceding the INCIDENT rather than ten years.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to compel responses to these interrogatories is granted, but limited to the five years prior to the incident.

Pharmacy Records (Nos. 15-16)

Special Interrogatory No. 15: Identify all pharmacies YOU have used since the INCIDENT.
Special Interrogatory No. 16: Identify all pharmacies YOU used in the five years prior to the INCIDENT.

These interrogatories are relevant and reasonably calculated to assess damages, as they may reveal information regarding Plaintiff’s medical treatment, prescriptions, and potential preexisting conditions. The collateral source rule does not apply because Defendant is not seeking to reduce damages based on payments from third-party sources but rather to obtain relevant information regarding Plaintiff’s medical history and treatment. The Court does not find these interrogatories to be vague or harassing and grants the motion.

Conclusion

Special Interrogatories Nos. 11-12, 15-16, and 18-19 are granted in full.

Special Interrogatory No. 10 is granted but limited to non-expert and non-treating physician witnesses.

Special Interrogatories Nos. 20-21 are granted but limited to the past five years.

Plaintiff is to serve further responses within 20 days of today. Sanctions are denied as the meet and confer efforts should have been more extensive.

Hon. Lee S. Arian

Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV26017 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

JUAN C. CHACON, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

RANDY M. SMITH, et al.,

Defendants.

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CASE NO.: 23STCV26017

[TENTATIVE RULING]

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE CROSS COMPLAINT IS GRANTED

Dept. 27

1:30 p.m.

March 7, 2025

Background

On October 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed the present action against Defendants, including Defendant Randy Smith. Defendant Randy Smith filed his answer on August 26, 2024. Defendant Randy Smith now moves for leave to file a cross-complaint for indemnity and contribution against co-defendant Miguel Sanchez. Defendant Sanchez and Plaintiff opposes.

Legal Standard

A cross-complaint against any of the parties who filed the initial complaint or cross-complaint against the cross-complainant must be filed before or at the same time as the answer to the initial complaint or cross-complaint, which answer must be filed within 30 days of service of the complaint or cross-complaint.(CCP §§ 412.20(a)(3), 428.50(a), 432.10.)Any other cross-complaint may be filed at any time before the court has set a trial date.(CCP §428.50(b).)

The proposed cross-complaint is mandatory when it arises out of the same transaction as plaintiff’s claim. The court must grant leave to file the mandatory cross-complaint absent bad faith. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.50, Silver Organizations, Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 99.)

Any party who failed to bring a compulsory cross-complaint, “whether through oversight, inadvertence, mistake, neglect, or other cause,” may apply for leave to file a cross-complaint, and as long as the party acted in “good faith,” the court must grant leave. (§ 426.50.) This mandatory standard applies regardless of factors such as surprise or undue burden. (See Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 98-99 [section 426.50 leave was mandatory, not discretionary, even when requested only five days before trial].)

Although Defendant’s motion was made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 428.50, based on the allegations in the proposed cross-complaint and the facts alleged, it should properly be considered a motion for leave to file a mandatory cross-complaint. The cross-complaint arises from the same transaction as Plaintiff’s claim, specifically involving a third vehicle in the car collision. As the court in Time for Living, Inc. v. Guy Hatfield Homes/All American Develop. Co. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 30, 38 stated, “Cross-complaints for comparative equitable indemnity would appear virtually always transactionally related to the main action.”

Based on both the moving and opposing papers, there is no indication of bad faith. Defendant Randy Smith filed his answer on August 26, 2024, but did not immediately move to file a cross-complaint, instead waiting until January 27, 2025, to file the present motion. This delay is consistent with defense counsel’s contention of inadvertence, and case law does not support denying a mandatory cross-complaint on that basis. (See Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 98-99 [holding that leave under § 426.50 was mandatory, not discretionary, even when requested only five days before trial].) Furthermore, a copy of the cross complaint is attached to the moving papers.

Accordingly, the motion is granted, and Defendant Smith is ordered to serve the cross-complaint within 20 days of today. The Court notes that trial is currently set for April 22, 2025. Given that this case was filed on October 24, 2023, the Court will continue the trial date to June ___, 2025, and the Final Status Conference to June ___, 2025. All trial related deadline is to follow the new trial date.

Hon. Lee S. Arian

Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV31766 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

CARMEN JONES BUTLER,

Plaintiff,

vs.

BELLA VISTA PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

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CASE NO.: 23STCV31766

[TENTATIVE RULING]

MOTION TO DEEM RFA ADMITTED IS GRANTED

Dept. 27

1:30 p.m.

March 7, 2025

On November 19, 2024, Defendants Bella Vista Property Management, Kevin Hirai, and Victoria Hirai served their Requests for Admission (RFA), Set Two, on Plaintiff. The parties met and conferred, and Defendants agreed to extend Plaintiff’s deadline to respond to January 21, 2025. However, as of February 7, 2025, the date of filing the present motion, Plaintiff has failed to provide responses. Defendants now move the Court to deem the contents of its RFA, Set two, admitted.

No opposition has been filed, nor is there any indication that responses were served prior to the hearing. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is granted, and the contents of Defendants’ RFA, Set Two, are deemed admitted against Plaintiff.

Furthermore, the Court does not find that Plaintiff acted with substantial justification, as no responses were provided even after the agreed-upon extension. Accordingly, sanctions in the amount of $896 are granted against Plaintiff and her counsel, jointly and severally, payable to Defendants within 20 days of today’s date.

Hon. Lee S. Arian

Judge of the Superior Court