DEPARTMENT N LAW AND MOTION RULINGS Case Number: 24SMCV02377 Hearing Date: March 12, 2025 Dept: N TENTATIVE ORDER Defendant National Debt Relief LLC’s Motion to (1) Reconsider or Renew Its Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff’s Individual PAGA Claim and Stay Action; and (2) Reconsider Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application to Dismiss His Individual PAGA Claim is DENIED. Defendant National Debt Relief LLC to give notice. REASONING Request for Judicial Notice Plaintiff Tyler Standard (“Plaintiff”) requests judicial notice of the case Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services Ltd. (Feb. 26, 2025, D083400) ___ Cal.Rptr.3d ___ [2025 WL 615064]. Plaintiff’s request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (a). Analysis Defendant National Debt Relief LLC (“Defendant”) moves the Court to reconsider and reverse its December 19, 2024 order denying Defendant National Debt Relief LLC’s Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff’s Individual PAGA Claims and Stay Representative PAGA Claims and granting Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application for an Order Dismissing Plaintiff’s Individual Claims against Defendant. Defendant argues that the Second District Court of Appeal decision in Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001 constitutes new persuasive law that directly contradicts the Court’s prior order and requires the Court to reverse its order. Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a), allows a Court to reconsider a prior order as follows: When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown. In the order, the Court denied Defendant’s motion seeking to compel Plaintiff to submit his individual claims under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”) alleged in his complaint to binding arbitration in accordance with an Agreement to Employment Arbitration Program, and staying the proceedings regarding Plaintiff’s representative PAGA claim until the arbitration of the individual PAGA claim concludes. The Court found that a valid arbitration agreement existed, but the Court found that Plaintiff had not asserted an “individual PAGA claim” because a plaintiff who asserts a claim under PAGA asserts the claim as proxy and agent of the Labor Workforce Development Agency, not in an individual capacity. In so ruling, the Court noted that in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that under California law “there is no individual component to a PAGA action” while also stating that “‘individual’ PAGA claims, which are premised on Labor Code violations actually sustained by the plaintiff,” can be distinguished “from ‘representative’ (or perhaps quasi-representative) PAGA claims arising out of events involving other employees.” (Id. at pp. 648-649, brackets omitted.) In Gavriiloglou v. Prime Healthcare Management, Inc. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 595, the Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected the concept of “individual PAGA claims,” stating that “an ‘individual PAGA claim’ is not actually a PAGA claim at all,” i.e., “[i]t would exist even if PAGA had never been enacted,” and “[i]t is what we are calling, more accurately, an individual Labor Code claim.” (Id. at p. 605.) In Adolph v. Uber Technologies (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, the California Supreme Court again stated that “[a] PAGA claim for civil penalties is fundamentally a law enforcement action,” and “[t]he government entity on whose behalf the plaintiff files suit is the real party in interest.” (Id. at p. 1117, quotation marks and ellipses omitted.) Insofar as Defendant argued that “California does not provide for a representative-only PAGA action” (Reply, p. 11, ll. 5-6), the Court found that the cases cited provided that an action under PAGA is a law enforcement action, and under PAGA, an employee acts merely as a proxy and agent for the Labor Workforce Development Agency. (Barrera v. Apple American Group LLC (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 63, 79.) Further, the Court noted that it “is not bound by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of PAGA” (id. at p. 90), particularly when there is California appellate case law to the contrary. The Court also dismissed Plaintiff’s “individual” claims against Defendant. Defendant asks the Court to reconsider and reverse its prior order based on Leeper v. Shipt, Inc., supra, 107 Cal.App.5th 1001, in which the Second District Court of Appeal held that “any PAGA action necessarily includes both an individual PAGA claim and a representative PAGA claim.” (Id. at p. 1009.) Put simply, Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. and Adolph v. Uber Technologies, supra, 14 Cal.5th 1104, are inconsistent, and this Court can evaluate which lines of cases is persuasive. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456 [when appellate decisions are in conflict, trial court can and must make a choice between the conflicting decisions].) The Court opts to stay with its original line of reasoning, which is supported by Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services Ltd., supra, ___ Cal.Rptr.3d ___ [2025 WL 615064], cited by Plaintiff. In that decision, the Fourth District Court of Appeal acknowledged Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. but found that its logic did not withstand scrutiny because it improperly concluded that just because a PAGA action must include an individual claim does not mean that any action brought under PAGA does contain one, and it was requiring the plaintiff to arbitrate a claim she had not chosen to assert, as she had expressly disavowed bringing any individual claims. (Id. at 6.) The appellate court stated that the trial court should examine the complaint to determine whether the action includes an individual claim. (Ibid.) In this action, Plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed his individual claims, such that the Court finds that arbitration is improper. Accordingly, Defendant National Debt Relief LLC’s Motion to (1) Reconsider or Renew Its Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff’s Individual PAGA Claim and Stay Action; and (2) Reconsider Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application to Dismiss His Individual PAGA Claim is DENIED. Case Number:* BC576925 Hearing Date: March 12, 2025 Dept: N TENTATIVE RULING Defendant/Judgment Debtor Philip W. Gearhart aka Philip Gearhart’s Motion to Vacate Renewal of Default Judgment Against Philip W. Gearhart is DENIED. Defendant/Judgment Debtor Philip W. Gearhart aka Philip Gearhart to give notice. REASONING Request for Judicial Notice Assignee of Record HSN Capital Holdings, LLC (“HSN”) requests judicial notice of six records filed in this action, the public attorney profile of Defendant/Judgment Debtor Philip W. Gearhart aka Philip Gearhart (“Gearhart”), and a quitclaim deed as to 8916 Carson Street in Culver City. HSN’s request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions, (c), (d), and (h). Analysis Gearhart moves the Court to vacate HSN’s renewal of the June 27, 2017 judgment in this action on the ground that he was not given notice of the entry of the default judgment or the application for the renewal of the default judgment. A money judgment is enforceable for 10 years after the date of entry. (Code Civ. Proc., § 683.020.) “The judgment creditor may renew a judgment” for a period of 10 years “by filing an application for renewal with the court in which the judgment was entered” before the expiration of the 10-year period of enforceability. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 683.120, 683.130, subd. (a).) Code of Civil Procedure section 683.170, subdivision (a), provides that “[t]he renewal of a judgment . . . may be vacated on any ground that would be a defense to an action on the judgment,” and the judgment “shall be vacated if the application for renewal was filed within five years from the time the judgment was previously renewed under this article.” Code of Civil Procedure section 683.170, subdivision (b), allows a judgment debtor to apply by noticed motion for an order vacating the renewal of judgment “[n]ot later than 30 days after service of the notice of renewal.” First, it is axiomatic that a notice of renewal of judgment must be served on the judgment debtor, either personally or by first class mail, and proof of service must be filed with the court clerk. (Code Civ. Proc., § 683.160, subd. (a).) However, “there is no statutory requirement that the notice of renewal be served on the judgment debtor in order for the renewal to be effective”; rather, the renewed judgment cannot be enforced until the notice of renewal has been served. (Goldman v. Simpson (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 255, 262, fn. 4.) It follows that any failure to provide notice of the renewal of judgment does not go to the validity of the renewal of the judgment itself. Moreover, HSN provides evidence that the notice of renewal was sent to Gearhart at both 8916 Carson Street in Culver City and 2518 Wilshire Boulevard in Santa Monica, the first of which Gearhart is said to be owner, and the second being the address identified in Gearhart’s attorney profile. (Opp’n, Jacobs Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 7; Friedrichs Decl. ¶¶ 6, 12; Exs. 2, 8.) Gearhart states that he “did not receive a copy of the request for renewal either at the restaurants’ prior address nor at my [C]entury [C]ity [sic] address” (Mot., Gearhart Decl. ¶ 9), but it is not clear how this relates to the two addresses at which the notice was served, such that the Court finds that notice was properly provided. Second, as to notice of the default judgment itself, in the event service did not result in notice of the action to a party, section 473.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, subdivision (a), provides, in relevant part: When service of a summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to defend the action and a default or default judgment has been entered against him or her in the action, he or she may serve and file a notice of motion to set aside the default or default judgment and for leave to defend the action. The notice of motion shall be served and filed within a reasonable time, but in no event exceeding the earlier of: (i) two years after entry of a default judgment against him or her; or (ii) 180 days after service on him or her of a written notice that the default or default judgment has been entered. Further, “a default judgment entered against a defendant who was not served with a summons in the manner prescribed by statute,” thus failing to establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant, “is void.” (Dill v. Bernquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444.) Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), the Court may “set aside any void judgment or order,” and “a void judgment may be set aside at any time” (Milrot v. Stamper Medical Corp. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 182, 188). Notably, Gearhart makes no argument that he did not have notice of the action; he simply argues that he relied on an insurance carrier for coverage, but this does not make the judgment void in any way, and he makes no argument as to notice of the entry of default judgment or lack thereof in his declaration. For these reasons, Defendant/Judgment Debtor Philip W. Gearhart aka Philip Gearhart’s Motion.

DEPARTMENT N LAW AND MOTION RULINGS

Case Number: 24SMCV02377 Hearing Date: March 12, 2025 Dept: N

TENTATIVE ORDER

Defendant National Debt Relief LLC’s Motion to (1) Reconsider or Renew Its Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff’s Individual PAGA Claim and Stay Action; and (2) Reconsider Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application to Dismiss His Individual PAGA Claim is DENIED.

Defendant National Debt Relief LLC to give notice.

REASONING

Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff Tyler Standard (“Plaintiff”) requests judicial notice of the case Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services Ltd. (Feb. 26, 2025, D083400) ___ Cal.Rptr.3d ___ [2025 WL 615064]. Plaintiff’s request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (a).

Analysis

Defendant National Debt Relief LLC (“Defendant”) moves the Court to reconsider and reverse its December 19, 2024 order denying Defendant National Debt Relief LLC’s Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff’s Individual PAGA Claims and Stay Representative PAGA Claims and granting Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application for an Order Dismissing Plaintiff’s Individual Claims against Defendant. Defendant argues that the Second District Court of Appeal decision in Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001 constitutes new persuasive law that directly contradicts the Court’s prior order and requires the Court to reverse its order.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a), allows a Court to reconsider a prior order as follows:

When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.

In the order, the Court denied Defendant’s motion seeking to compel Plaintiff to submit his individual claims under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”) alleged in his complaint to binding arbitration in accordance with an Agreement to Employment Arbitration Program, and staying the proceedings regarding Plaintiff’s representative PAGA claim until the arbitration of the individual PAGA claim concludes. The Court found that a valid arbitration agreement existed, but the Court found that Plaintiff had not asserted an “individual PAGA claim” because a plaintiff who asserts a claim under PAGA asserts the claim as proxy and agent of the Labor Workforce Development Agency, not in an individual capacity.

In so ruling, the Court noted that in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that under California law “there is no individual component to a PAGA action” while also stating that “‘individual’ PAGA claims, which are premised on Labor Code violations actually sustained by the plaintiff,” can be distinguished “from ‘representative’ (or perhaps quasi-representative) PAGA claims arising out of events involving other employees.” (Id. at pp. 648-649, brackets omitted.) In Gavriiloglou v. Prime Healthcare Management, Inc. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 595, the Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected the concept of “individual PAGA claims,” stating that “an ‘individual PAGA claim’ is not actually a PAGA claim at all,” i.e., “[i]t would exist even if PAGA had never been enacted,” and “[i]t is what we are calling, more accurately, an individual Labor Code claim.” (Id. at p. 605.) In Adolph v. Uber Technologies (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, the California Supreme Court again stated that “[a] PAGA claim for civil penalties is fundamentally a law enforcement action,” and “[t]he government entity on whose behalf the plaintiff files suit is the real party in interest.” (Id. at p. 1117, quotation marks and ellipses omitted.)

Insofar as Defendant argued that “California does not provide for a representative-only PAGA action” (Reply, p. 11, ll. 5-6), the Court found that the cases cited provided that an action under PAGA is a law enforcement action, and under PAGA, an employee acts merely as a proxy and agent for the Labor Workforce Development Agency. (Barrera v. Apple American Group LLC (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 63, 79.) Further, the Court noted that it “is not bound by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of PAGA” (id. at p. 90), particularly when there is California appellate case law to the contrary. The Court also dismissed Plaintiff’s “individual” claims against Defendant.

Defendant asks the Court to reconsider and reverse its prior order based on Leeper v. Shipt, Inc., supra, 107 Cal.App.5th 1001, in which the Second District Court of Appeal held that “any PAGA action necessarily includes both an individual PAGA claim and a representative PAGA claim.” (Id. at p. 1009.) Put simply, Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. and Adolph v. Uber Technologies, supra, 14 Cal.5th 1104, are inconsistent, and this Court can evaluate which lines of cases is persuasive. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456 [when appellate decisions are in conflict, trial court can and must make a choice between the conflicting decisions].) The Court opts to stay with its original line of reasoning, which is supported by Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services Ltd., supra, ___ Cal.Rptr.3d ___ [2025 WL 615064], cited by Plaintiff. In that decision, the Fourth District Court of Appeal acknowledged Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. but found that its logic did not withstand scrutiny because it improperly concluded that just because a PAGA action must include an individual claim does not mean that any action brought under PAGA does contain one, and it was requiring the plaintiff to arbitrate a claim she had not chosen to assert, as she had expressly disavowed bringing any individual claims. (Id. at *6.) The appellate court stated that the trial court should examine the complaint to determine whether the action includes an individual claim. (Ibid.) In this action, Plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed his individual claims, such that the Court finds that arbitration is improper. Accordingly, Defendant National Debt Relief LLC’s Motion to (1) Reconsider or Renew Its Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff’s Individual PAGA Claim and Stay Action; and (2) Reconsider Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application to Dismiss His Individual PAGA Claim is DENIED.

Case Number: BC576925 Hearing Date: March 12, 2025 Dept: N

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant/Judgment Debtor Philip W. Gearhart aka Philip Gearhart’s Motion to Vacate Renewal of Default Judgment Against Philip W. Gearhart is DENIED.

Defendant/Judgment Debtor Philip W. Gearhart aka Philip Gearhart to give notice.

REASONING

Request for Judicial Notice

Assignee of Record HSN Capital Holdings, LLC (“HSN”) requests judicial notice of six records filed in this action, the public attorney profile of Defendant/Judgment Debtor Philip W. Gearhart aka Philip Gearhart (“Gearhart”), and a quitclaim deed as to 8916 Carson Street in Culver City. HSN’s request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions, (c), (d), and (h).

Analysis

Gearhart moves the Court to vacate HSN’s renewal of the June 27, 2017 judgment in this action on the ground that he was not given notice of the entry of the default judgment or the application for the renewal of the default judgment.

A money judgment is enforceable for 10 years after the date of entry. (Code Civ. Proc., § 683.020.) “The judgment creditor may renew a judgment” for a period of 10 years “by filing an application for renewal with the court in which the judgment was entered” before the expiration of the 10-year period of enforceability. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 683.120, 683.130, subd. (a).) Code of Civil Procedure section 683.170, subdivision (a), provides that “[t]he renewal of a judgment . . . may be vacated on any ground that would be a defense to an action on the judgment,” and the judgment “shall be vacated if the application for renewal was filed within five years from the time the judgment was previously renewed under this article.” Code of Civil Procedure section 683.170, subdivision (b), allows a judgment debtor to apply by noticed motion for an order vacating the renewal of judgment “[n]ot later than 30 days after service of the notice of renewal.”

First, it is axiomatic that a notice of renewal of judgment must be served on the judgment debtor, either personally or by first class mail, and proof of service must be filed with the court clerk. (Code Civ. Proc., § 683.160, subd. (a).) However, “there is no statutory requirement that the notice of renewal be served on the judgment debtor in order for the renewal to be effective”; rather, the renewed judgment cannot be enforced until the notice of renewal has been served. (Goldman v. Simpson (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 255, 262, fn. 4.) It follows that any failure to provide notice of the renewal of judgment does not go to the validity of the renewal of the judgment itself. Moreover, HSN provides evidence that the notice of renewal was sent to Gearhart at both 8916 Carson Street in Culver City and 2518 Wilshire Boulevard in Santa Monica, the first of which Gearhart is said to be owner, and the second being the address identified in Gearhart’s attorney profile. (Opp’n, Jacobs Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 7; Friedrichs Decl. ¶¶ 6, 12; Exs. 2, 8.) Gearhart states that he “did not receive a copy of the request for renewal either at the restaurants’ prior address nor at my [C]entury [C]ity [sic] address” (Mot., Gearhart Decl. ¶ 9), but it is not clear how this relates to the two addresses at which the notice was served, such that the Court finds that notice was properly provided.

Second, as to notice of the default judgment itself, in the event service did not result in notice of the action to a party, section 473.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, subdivision (a), provides, in relevant part:

When service of a summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to defend the action and a default or default judgment has been entered against him or her in the action, he or she may serve and file a notice of motion to set aside the default or default judgment and for leave to defend the action. The notice of motion shall be served and filed within a reasonable time, but in no event exceeding the earlier of: (i) two years after entry of a default judgment against him or her; or (ii) 180 days after service on him or her of a written notice that the default or default judgment has been entered.

Further, “a default judgment entered against a defendant who was not served with a summons in the manner prescribed by statute,” thus failing to establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant, “is void.” (Dill v. Bernquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444.) Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), the Court may “set aside any void judgment or order,” and “a void judgment may be set aside at any time” (Milrot v. Stamper Medical Corp. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 182, 188). Notably, Gearhart makes no argument that he did not have notice of the action; he simply argues that he relied on an insurance carrier for coverage, but this does not make the judgment void in any way, and he makes no argument as to notice of the entry of default judgment or lack thereof in his declaration.

For these reasons, Defendant/Judgment Debtor Philip W. Gearhart aka Philip Gearhart’s Motion.