DEPARTMENT H LAW AND MOTION RULINGS Case Number: 22PSCV00103 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: H Mickey’s Liquor & Market Inc. v. Shin, et al., Case No. 22PSCV00103 The Court has reviewed Defendant John JoonHyo Shin’s Status Report and understands that Plaintiff has indicated there are no additional responsive documents relating to the instant motion, despite entering into a stipulation that suggested a further production of documents would be made. The Court will hear further from the parties in this regard at the time of hearing. Background Plaintiff Mickey’s Liquor & Market Inc. (“Mickey’s Liquor”) alleges as follows: Mickey’s Liquor is the current tenant of a commercial property located at 13512 East Valley Boulevard, La Puente, CA 91746 (“Premises”) via the May 2012 assignment/amendment (“2012 Amendment”) of a 2006 lease (“2006 Lease”); Joon Hyo Shin and Seung Ok Shin are the landlords and co-trustees of the Joon Hyo Shin Family Trust dated May 20, 2003, which is the actual owner of the Premises. The 2012 Amendment extended the lease term to June 5, 2022 and provided Mickey’s Liquor with a right to exercise an option to further extend the lease term for 5 more years provided Mickey’s Liquor was in compliance with its obligations at the time of the exercise. Mickey’s Liquor exercised this option via a notice dated November 16, 2021, but it was denied. On January 31, 2022, Mickey’s Liquor filed a complaint, asserting causes of action against John JoonHyo Shin (erroneously sued as Joon Hyo Shin) (“J. Shin”) and Seung Ok Shin, individually and as co-trustees of The Joon Hyo Shin Family Trust dated May 20, 2003 (together, “the Shins”) and Does 1-10 for: (1) Declaratory Relief, (2) Breach of Lease, (3) Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, (4) Fraud (Deceit/False Promise), and (5) Breach of Statute On November 13, 2023, the Shins filed a cross-complaint against Mickey’s Liquor, Elias Kai (“Kai”) and Roes 1-50 for: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, (3) Intentional Misrepresentation, (4) Negligent Misrepresentation, (5) Declaratory Relief, (6) Elder Abuse, (7) Trespass, (8) Unjust Enrichment, and (9) Ejectment. On June 10, 2024, Mickey’s Liquor dismissed the second through fifth causes of action in its complaint, without prejudice. The Final Status Conference is set for May 30, 2025. Trial is set for June 10, 2025. Pending before the Court is J. Shin’s motion to compel responses to requests for production of documents. Discussion J. Shin moves the Court for an order compelling Mickey’s Liquor to provide responses, without objections, and to produce responsive documents to J. Shin’s Requests for Production of Documents, Set No. One within 10 calendar days. J. Shin also seeks monetary sanctions against Mickey’s Liquor and its counsel Robert Goldman (“Goldman”) in the amount of $10,894.93, including $2,000.00 in statutory sanctions. The instant motion was originally scheduled for hearing on February 4, 2025. On February 3, 2025, J. Shin and Mickey’s Liquor submitted a “Joint Stipulation to Submit on Modified Tentative Ruling” (the “Stipulation”), wherein Mickey’s Liquor agreed, inter alia, to provide “verifications that comply with Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.250 to Exhibits C and E of the Declaration of James P. Maniscalco In Support Of Defendant’s Motion to Compel Responses, Without Objection, to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One” by February 4, 2025 and to provide “all documents consistent with [its] . . . statement[] of compliance in response to Defendant’s Requests for Production of Documents, Set One . . . to Plaintiff, . . . including identifying all documents produced with the specific request number to which the documents respond and producing all electronically stored information (“ESI”) in the form in which it is ordinarily maintained.” The Stipulation also provided that J. Shin would file “a status report on Plaintiff’s service of additional verifications and production of additional discovery responsive to Defendant’s Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, no later than February 10, 2025.” On February 4, 2025, the Court’s “Order on Motions to Compel” was entered, providing therein, in relevant part, as follows: “Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation to Submit on Modified Tentative Ruling filed on February 3, 2025 (the ‘Stipulation’), the hearing on Defendant/Cross-Complainant John JoonHyo Shin’s Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Production of Documents is CONTINUED to March 7, 2025, at 9:00 a.m. Mickey’s Liquor’s counsel is directed to provide Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.250, subdivision (b) compliant verifications to Exhibits C and E by February 4, 2025. Mickey’s Liquor’s counsel is further ordered to produce all non-privileged documents requested in Request Nos. 1-5, 10, 20-26, 29-32, and 35-36 by February 7, 2025. J. Shin’s counsel is directed to file a status report no later than February 10, 2025, advising as to whether or not Mickey’s Liquor complied with the Court’s directive. . .” On February 10, 2025, J. Shin filed a “Status Report on Plaintiff’s Failure to Comply with Court Order” (the “Status Report”) advising therein that, while Plaintiff provided the verifications as referenced above, Plaintiff failed to produce any documents. The Status Report further advises, as it pertains to this instant motion, that Plaintiff’s counsel “wrote [on February 8, 2025] to say there are no additional documents responsive to . . . the requests in Motion 1.” (Status Report, 2:11-12.) The Court will hear from counsel further in this regard at the time of the hearing. Case Number: 23PSCV01829 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: H City of West Covina v. 1415 Garvey, LLC, et al., Case No. 23PSCV01829 TENTATIVE RULING Defendants Qualfax, Inc. and Sepulveda LA Partners, LLC’s Motion to Vacate Appointment of Receiver, Expunge Receiver’s Certificate, and Dismiss Complaint as Against Qualfax and Sepulveda LA is DENIED. Background Plaintiff City of West Covina (the “City”) alleges that the property located at 1415 W. Garvey Avenue North in West Covina (the “subject property”) presented public health and safety concerns due to significant and ongoing building code violations. Specifically, the City alleges that, beginning in approximately February 2022, the subject property stood in violation of several state and building code provisions; the subject property was occupied by trespassers and/or homeless individuals, was covered in trash and debris, and even caught fire on two separate occasions. After a structure fire occurred on the subject property on May 16, 2022, the City instructed a representative of the then-owner, 1415 Garvey, LLC (“Garvey”), to board up the property and have a security officer present until the property was appropriately boarded up. Between August 2022 and March 2023, the City conducted a number of inspections at the property and issued several official notices to Garvey in an attempt to secure the property from trespassers and clean up the trash and debris. On January 26, 2023, there was another structure fire upon the subject property; after the fire was contained, an inspection revealed the interior of the subject property was littered with trash and debris and was being occupied by trespassers. When the owner failed to appear for a conference scheduled with the City prosecutor on March 29, 2023, the City issued a Notice to Abate pursuant to Health and Safety code section 17980.6. The conditions were not abated within the time frame specified in the notice. On June 20, 2023, the City commenced this lawsuit and filed a complaint against the defendants it believed were either owners or lienholders. Specifically, the City’s complaint named as defendants: Garvey (the owner of the subject property at the time the lawsuit was commenced), as well as other entities and individuals identified by the City as holding recorded interests in the subject property, including Hillfoot, LLC, Natan Tishrey Projects 2016 Limited Partnership, Tnuvot Sivan Projects 2016 Limited Partnership, Marom Kislev 8 Loans Limited Partnership, Heng Li, Jie Lie, and Ning Jiang. In the complaint, the City asserted that due to the numerous code violations, including violations of the City of West Covina Municipal Codes, the California Building Code, the California Fire Code, the California Residential Code, and the Health and Safety Code, the subject property constituted a per se public nuisance such that the City was entitled to abate the nuisance. To abate the nuisance, the City sought the appointment of a receiver to take control of the subject property, manage and pay expenses toward the subject property, secure a cost estimation to bring the subject property into compliance with the various codes, and to borrow funds to pay for the repairs and secure its debt with a recorded first lien on the subject property, first in priority to all other liens. On November 15, 2023, the Court entered an “Order Granting Ex Parte Application for Appointment of a Receiver.” On January 22, 2024, the Court issued an “Order Approving the Receivership Plan and Request for an Increase in the Receiver’s Certificate.” Six months after the appointment of the receiver, on May 15, 2024, the City filed three amendments to its complaint, wherein it named Lone Oak Fund, LLC, Qualfax, Inc., and Sepulveda LA Partners, LLC in lieu of Does 1 through 3, respectively. On June 13, 2024, an “Order Granting Increased Funding of Receivership Certificate” was entered. On July 8, 2024, a “Stipulation & Order to Modify Scope of Receivership” was entered. On August 20, 2024, Intervenor Southern California Second, Inc. filed a Complaint in Intervention, asserting a cause of action for Declaratory Relief. Pending before the Court is the motion filed by Qualfax, Inc. and Sepulveda LA Partners, LLC (together, “Qualfax”) to vacate the appointment of the receiver, expunge the receiver’s certificate, and dismiss the complaint against Qualfax and Sepulveda. Discussion Qualfax contends that because it held a recorded interest in the property and was never given notice of these proceedings, the Court should vacate the November 15, 2023 order appointing a receiver over the subject property, expunge the receiver’s certificate as a lien against the subject property, and dismiss the City’s complaint against them. At the outset, the Court rules on Qualfax’s Request for Judicial Notice as follows: Granted as to No. 1 (i.e., “Deed of Trust with Absolute Assignment of Leases and Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing” recorded September 18, 2020, attached as part of Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Kevin Sinclair); Granted as to No. 2 (i.e., “Assignment of Deed of Trust” recorded April 16, 2024, attached as part of Exhibit 1 to the Sinclair Declaration); Granted as to No. 3 (i.e., “Trustee’s Deed” recorded April 16, 2024, attached as part of Exhibit 1 to the Sinclair Declaration); Granted as No. 4, to the extent that the Court takes judicial notice that Exhibit 2 to the Sinclair Declaration (i.e., A “Notice of Intent to File an Action with the Court Petitioning for the Appointment of Receiver and Order to Abate Substandard Building” dated May 16, 2023) was attached as Exhibit E to Plaintiff’s complaint); Granted as to No. 5 (i.e., “Order Granting Ex Parte Application for Appointment of Receiver” entered November 15, 2023, attached as Exhibit 4 to the Sinclair Declaration); and Granted as to No. 6 (i.e., Order entered January 22, 2024, attached as Exhibit 5 to the Sinclair Declaration). Turning to the merits, Qualfax asserts that the City violated Qualfax’s due process rights by failing to provide Qualfax pre-litigation notice of its intention to file this action, as required by Health & Safety Code section 17980.7, failing to name Qualfax as a defendant, and by seeking ex parte relief that purported to affect Qualfax’s rights in the property. When a building stands in violation of state or municipal code provisions or constitutes a public nuisance, the appropriate enforcement agency may initiate a lawsuit to abate the code violations or nuisance, after providing the owner with notice to abate the nuisance or violation. (Health & Safety Code sections 17980(a), 17980.6.) “If the owner fails to comply within a reasonable time with the terms of the . . . notice, the enforcement agency “may seek[,] and the court may order, the appointment of a receiver for the substandard building.” (Health & Safety Code section 17980.7(c).) “In its petition to the court, the enforcement agency . . . shall include proof that notice of the petition was posted in a prominent place on the substandard building and mailed first-class mail to all persons with a recorded interest in the real property upon which the substandard building exists not less than three days prior to filing the petition.” (Id.) In addition, the petition “shall be served on the owner pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 415.10) of Chapter 4 of Title 5 of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” (Id.; see also Code Civ. Pro. 415.10 [“A summons may be served by personal delivery of a copy of the summons and the of the complaint to the person to be served.”].) In deciding whether to appoint a receiver, “the court shall consider whether the owner has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to correct the conditions cited in the notice of violation.” (Health & Safety Code section 17980.7(c)(1).) In this case, there is no dispute that the City provided appropriate notice to Garvey, the owner of the subject property at the time. Long before the lawsuit commenced, over a period of several months, the City served Garvey with multiple violation notices, each of which gave Garvey a period of time to abate the violations. It was only after Garvey repeatedly failed to abate the violations and failed to appear for a conference with the city prosecutor that the City commenced this lawsuit, at which point it personally served Garvey with the summons and complaint.[FN1] There similarly is no dispute that the City did not provide the required three-day pre-litigation notice to Qualfax, Inc. and Lone Oak Fund, LLC,, despite the fact that both entities held recorded interests in the property. (Health & Safety Code section 17980.7(c).) The principal issue presented by the instant motion is whether the failure to provide pre-litigation notice to these lienholders requires that the Court vacate its receivership order.[FN2] “[A]n enforcement agency’s failure to fully comply with the requirements specified in section 17980.6 does not necessarily invalidate a receiver’s appointment under section 17980.7.” (City of Santa Monica v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal. 4th 905, 913.) “[W]hether the City’s purported noncompliance [with section 17980.7] invalidates the [receivership order]” is an issue “that must be resolved by ascertaining the legislative intent.” (Id. at 919.)[FN3] Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzalez, the Court determines that the principal purposes of sections 17980.6 and 17980.7 are “to provide meaningful enforcement mechanisms in situations where the substandard condition of a residential building is found to substantially endanger the health and safety of the occupants or the public” and “to ensure that property owners are afforded due process before judicial appointment of a receiver.” (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal. 4th at p. 913; see also 6 Witkin, Cal. Proc. 6th Prov Rem § 494 (2024) [“The primary objective of receivership under Health & Saf.C. 17980.7 is to remediate code violations to protect health and safety.”].) The statutory provisions themselves demonstrate that the legislature was principally concerned with providing notice to property owners. Under section 17980.6, while the abatement notice has to be posted in a prominent place on the property and mailed to or posted on the units of individual tenants, there is no requirement that the abatement notice be furnished to lienholders. The only statutory notice requirement that applies to lienholders appears under section 17980.7(c); under that section, while the enforcement agency is required to personally serve a petition seeking a receivership on the property owner, it is only required to mail the petition to lienholders at least three days before the petition is filed.[4] That section also provides that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to deprive an owner of a substandard building of all procedural due process rights guaranteed by the California Constitution and the United States Constitution,” again demonstrating a central focus on the rights of property owners. (Health & Safety Code section 17980.7(c)(14) [emphasis added].) Once the petition seeking a receivership is filed, in considering whether to appoint a receiver, while the court is required to consider “whether the owner has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to correct the conditions,” the statute is silent as to what considerations the court ought to give to those with recorded interests in the property.[FN5] In view of the overall statutory scheme and the primary statutory purposes, the Court determines that the failure to provide notice to a lienholder under section 17980.7(c) does not per se require invalidation of a receivership order.[FN6] In determining whether invalidation of the order is appropriate in this case, the Court considers the underlying facts and circumstances, including the fact that the City substantially complied with section 17980.7(c) and acted in good faith to identify all lienholders. Specifically, in commencing this litigation, the City engaged Stewart Title Guaranty Company to prepare what is called a “Litigation Guarantee,” a title report prepared by a professional title company that is accompanied by an insurance policy ($50,000 in this case). (Declaration of Amanda Pope (8/30/24), ¶¶ 5-6.) While the title report identified deeds of trusts held by a total of seven lienholders, the title report did not list Qualfax’s deed of trust. (Id., ¶ 6.) The City’s attorney explains that in her past 17 years practicing receivership law, this is the first time a litigation guarantee report has failed to identify a record interest holder. (Pope Decl., ¶ 7.) The Court also considers the dangerous conditions posed by the subject property that were not being addressed by any owner or lienholder and warranted intervention by the City.[FN7] (Order Appointing Receiver (11/15/23), ¶ 8 [“The violations and substandard conditions are so extensive and of such a nature that the health and safety of the occupants, neighboring residents, and the general public is substantially endangered.”].) Among other things, the subject property had “suffered two structure fires” between May 2022 and January 2023, was “vacant and abandoned and overrun with illegal squatters,” had been targeted by vandals (as evidenced by graffiti, broken glass, and drug paraphernalia), was covered in trash and debris, and was a “drain on City taxpayer resources due to calls for service to the City Fire, Police and Code Enforcement Departments complaining about the transients and substandard building conditions.” (Declaration of Code Enforcement Director Milan M. Mrakick (11/2/23), ¶¶ 4, 9, 16, 22, 24-25, 28, 35.) Under these circumstances, the Court declines to vacate the receivership.[FN8] For similar reasons, the Court rejects the request to expunge the lien at this juncture. However, the Court will reserve judgment on the appropriate allocation of costs until the time of the final accounting.[FN9] Finally, the Court denies Qualfax’s motion to dismiss the complaint against them. While the abatement process is now complete, the Court still needs to consider whether to approve the receiver’s final accounting and discharge the receiver and whether to award attorney’s fees and costs to the City—issues that implicate the current property owner. (Health & Safety Code sections 17992.) Because Qualfax foreclosed on the property in April 2024, it is the current owner, such that it cannot be dismissed before the time of the final accounting. [FN1] As noted above, the City also personally served the other entities or individuals it identified as holding a recording interest in the subject property. [FN2] The Court rejects Qualfax’s argument that Qualfax was required to be named as a defendant in the lawsuit, since at the time the lawsuit commenced, Qualfax was a lienholder and not an owner. [FN3] Even in the case of an obligatory statutory provision, the failure to comply with “a particular procedural step” may not “have the effect of invalidating the governmental action to which the procedural requirement relates.” (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal. 4th at pp. 923-924 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted].) “In California, it is not uncommon for obligatory statutory provisions to be accorded only directory effect.” (Id.) [FN4] Notably, in recent years, the legislature has eased the notice requirement as to lenders. While it used to be the case that enforcement agencies had to personally serve those with recorded property interests with receivership petitions, in 2019, the legislature amended the statute to permit service to lenders by first-class mail. (See HOUSING, 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 620 (A.B. 957) [“Existing law requires a petition to the court for the appointment of a receiver to include proof that notice of the petition was served not less than 3 days prior to filing the petition to all persons with a recorded interest in the real property upon which the substandard building exists. This bill would instead require the petition to include proof that notice of the petition was posted in a prominent place on the substandard building and mailed first-class mail to all persons with a recorded interest in the real property upon which the substandard building exists not less than 3 days prior to filing the petition, and would require the petition to be served on the owner, as specified.”].) [FN5] The Court is unpersuaded by Qualfax’s position that the receivership order would have been unnecessary had it received notice of the lawsuit because it could have abated the issues at the subject property. The subject property stood in violation of various building code provisions for a year and a half, such that a court-ordered receivership was appropriate, given that neither the owner nor any lienholder had taken any action to remedy the violations at the point where the City commenced the lawsuit. Moreover, the abatement process in this case was not completed until at least December 2024—nearly a year after the initial receivership order and five months after Qualfax took over the abatement process. Thus, while the Court acknowledges that Qualfax may have objected to the receivership and the super-priority lien, the Court is not persuaded that the receivership order would not have issued at all had Qualfax been given notice. [FN6] The Court similarly concludes that the statutory notice defect does not require invalidation of the receivership order under the United States Constitution or the California State Constitution, in light of the fact that Qualfax was not the property owner at the time. However, as noted below, the Court will permit Qualfax to raise arguments about costs and the super-priority lien at the time of the final accounting. [FN7] Under the terms of Qualfax’s loan with the previous owner, the previous owner was obligated to, among other things, “keep the Property . . . in good condition and repair” and “comply with all laws, ordinances, regulations and standards which affect the Property.” (2020 Deed of Trust, ¶ 3.6 (attached as Exhibit 1 to the Sinclair Declaration).) Qualfax also had the right to inspect the property to insurance the owner’s compliance with the terms of the loan. (Id., ¶¶ 3.16 and 4.2(e).) (See City of Sierra Madre v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc. (2019) 32 Cal. App. 5th 648, 660 (upholding trial court’s decision to secure receivership loan with super-priority lien over SunTrust’s objection, noting, among other things, that “SunTrust chose to take no action against the Hildreths, despite the fact the Hildreths were plainly in breach of the deed of trust”). [FN8] The Court reserves judgment on how to appropriately allocate the costs associated with the receivership until the time of the final accounting. However, the Court is concerned that Qualfax’s proposal that the City bear the full costs of the receivership would undermine the statute’s primary purpose by discouraging cities from taking action to abate properties that endanger public safety. [FN9] Qualfax will be permitted to revisit arguments about the super-priority lien and who should bear the costs of the receivership at the time of the final accounting. At the time of the final accounting, the Court also will ask the City for confirmation that it received the $50,000 under the title insurance policy; the Court also will seek the parties’ views on where to allocate that $50,000. Case Number: 23PSCV02942 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: H Chavez Serna v. American Honda Motor Co., Case No. 23PSCV02942 Tentative Ruling The Court will hear further from the parties at the time of the hearing but is inclined to continue the hearing on the motion to enforce settlement, as well as the Order to Show Cause Re Dismissal (Settlement), for a period of 45-60 days. Background Plaintiff Maria E. Chavez Serna (“Plaintiff”) alleges as follows: On June 28, 2020, Plaintiff purchased a 2020 Honda CR-V (the “subject vehicle”). The subject vehicle suffers from various defects and has not been repaired after a reasonable number of attempts. On September 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint, asserting causes of action against American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“Defendant”) and Does 1-10 for: (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act—Breach of Express Warranty, (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act—Breach of Implied Warranty, and (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2. On May 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed a conditional “Notice of Settlement of Entire Case.” An Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal (Settlement) is set for March 7, 2025. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to enforce the settlement. Legal Standard “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6, subd. (a).) Discussion Plaintiff moves the Court for an order, per Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, enforcing the settlement between Plaintiff and Defendant. Plaintiff also seeks sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5. Sanctions Request At the outset, the Court declines to entertain Plaintiff’s request for section 128.5 sanctions, inasmuch as this must be “made separately from other motions or requests. . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.5, subd. (f)(1)(A).)[FN] Merits On May 30, 2024, Plaintiff signed the Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer to compromise (“Agreement”) from Defendant; that day, the executed copy was emailed to Defendant’s counsel. (Ordaz Decl., ¶ 4, Exh. 1.) The Agreement provides, in relevant part, as follows: “1. AHM will pay the total amount of $69,600.00 (the ‘Sum’) to Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s lender for the Subject Vehicle, if any (if there is an outstanding loan on the Subject Vehicle, AHM shall pay the lender the amount necessary to pay off the loan for the Subject Vehicle from the Sum, and Plaintiff shall receive the entire remaining amount). 2. It is an express condition of this Offer that, if accepted, AHM will perform its obligations within 65 days of acceptance on a mutually agreeable date and location, with Plaintiff returning the Subject Vehicle to a mutually agreeable authorized Honda dealership and on or before that same date executing all required California Department of Motor Vehicle forms, including but not limited to, DMV Form 262, necessary to transfer title of the Subject Vehicle to AHM free and clear of all liens and encumbrances (except for any loan for the purchase or refinance of the Subject Vehicle, which will be paid by AHM as stated above), and AHM thereafter providing Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s lender, if any, with the check or checks necessary to obtain clear title for the Subject Vehicle. It is a further express condition of this Offer that, if accepted, Plaintiff will promptly provide to AHM current loan payoff information, a copy of the current registration of the Subject Vehicle, and a copy of the front and back sides of the Subject Vehicle’s title (if available). . . 4. AHM will waive its fees, costs, and expenses in this action. 5. . . . AHM will allow the Court to determine, in a noticed motion filed pursuant to Civil Code Section 1794(d) and/or by Plaintiff’s filing of a memorandum of costs, the attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses recoverable under Civil Code Section 1794(d). There is no admission of liability by this Offer. However, if this Offer is accepted, AHM will stipulate that Plaintiff is the prevailing party for purposes of any motion for attorney's fees, expenses and costs and/or memorandum of costs. 6. Plaintiff will dismiss this entire action with prejudice. 7. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 998(b), this Offer can be accepted by filling out and signing the acceptance statement on the next page.” (Id.) Plaintiff complains that, while she has provided all required documentation to complete the settlement, Defendant has failed to provide her with the settlement check(s) and with information regarding the subject vehicle’s surrender. (Id., ¶¶ 3, 5-7.) Defendant’s counsel Kevin Zipser (“Zipser”), in turn, represents that, while a check request has been submitted to Defendant, it is still being processed due to a significant backlog which resulted from the settlement of several hundred “lemon law” cases during the second half of 2024. (Zipser Decl., ¶¶ 5-6.) Zipser represents that this fact was communicated to the Court and to opposing counsel at the time of the January 10, 2025 Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal (Settlement) (“OSC”), such that the OSC was continued to March 7, 2025. (Id., ¶ 7.) The opposition notes that counsel also telephonically met and conferred on February 24, 2025 regarding status and anticipated deadline. (Opp., 1:12-14.) Defendant estimates that the check will be finalized and mailed within 4-5 weeks. The Court will hear further from the parties at the time of the hearing; however, based on the above information, the Court is inclined to continue the hearing on the instant motion, as well as the OSC, out for a period of 45-60 days. [FN] The Court notes that Plaintiff also makes reference to section 128.7 (see Motion, 2:12, 5:10 and 7.7); however, section 128.7, subdivision (c)(1) likewise provides that “[a] motion for sanctions under this section shall be made separately from other motions or requests. . .” (Emphasis added).

DEPARTMENT H LAW AND MOTION RULINGS

Case Number: 22PSCV00103 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: H

Mickey’s Liquor & Market Inc. v. Shin, et al., Case No. 22PSCV00103

The Court has reviewed Defendant John JoonHyo Shin’s Status Report and understands that Plaintiff has indicated there are no additional responsive documents relating to the instant motion, despite entering into a stipulation that suggested a further production of documents would be made. The Court will hear further from the parties in this regard at the time of hearing.

Background

Plaintiff Mickey’s Liquor & Market Inc. (“Mickey’s Liquor”) alleges as follows:

Mickey’s Liquor is the current tenant of a commercial property located at 13512 East Valley Boulevard, La Puente, CA 91746 (“Premises”) via the May 2012 assignment/amendment (“2012 Amendment”) of a 2006 lease (“2006 Lease”); Joon Hyo Shin and Seung Ok Shin are the landlords and co-trustees of the Joon Hyo Shin Family Trust dated May 20, 2003, which is the actual owner of the Premises. The 2012 Amendment extended the lease term to June 5, 2022 and provided Mickey’s Liquor with a right to exercise an option to further extend the lease term for 5 more years provided Mickey’s Liquor was in compliance with its obligations at the time of the exercise. Mickey’s Liquor exercised this option via a notice dated November 16, 2021, but it was denied.

On January 31, 2022, Mickey’s Liquor filed a complaint, asserting causes of action

against John JoonHyo Shin (erroneously sued as Joon Hyo Shin) (“J. Shin”) and Seung Ok Shin, individually and as co-trustees of The Joon Hyo Shin Family Trust dated May 20, 2003 (together, “the Shins”) and Does 1-10 for: (1) Declaratory Relief, (2) Breach of Lease, (3) Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, (4) Fraud (Deceit/False Promise), and (5) Breach of Statute

On November 13, 2023, the Shins filed a cross-complaint against Mickey’s Liquor, Elias Kai (“Kai”) and Roes 1-50 for: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, (3) Intentional Misrepresentation, (4) Negligent Misrepresentation, (5) Declaratory Relief, (6) Elder Abuse, (7) Trespass, (8) Unjust Enrichment, and (9) Ejectment.

On June 10, 2024, Mickey’s Liquor dismissed the second through fifth causes of action in its complaint, without prejudice.

The Final Status Conference is set for May 30, 2025. Trial is set for June 10, 2025.

Pending before the Court is J. Shin’s motion to compel responses to requests for production of documents.

Discussion

J. Shin moves the Court for an order compelling Mickey’s Liquor to provide responses, without objections, and to produce responsive documents to J. Shin’s Requests for Production of Documents, Set No. One within 10 calendar days. J. Shin also seeks monetary sanctions against Mickey’s Liquor and its counsel Robert Goldman (“Goldman”) in the amount of $10,894.93, including $2,000.00 in statutory sanctions.

The instant motion was originally scheduled for hearing on February 4, 2025. On February 3, 2025, J. Shin and Mickey’s Liquor submitted a “Joint Stipulation to Submit on Modified Tentative Ruling” (the “Stipulation”), wherein Mickey’s Liquor agreed, inter alia, to provide “verifications that comply with Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.250 to Exhibits C and E of the Declaration of James P. Maniscalco In Support Of Defendant’s Motion to Compel Responses, Without Objection, to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One” by February 4, 2025 and to provide “all documents consistent with [its] . . . statement[] of compliance in response to Defendant’s Requests for Production of Documents, Set One . . . to Plaintiff, . . . including identifying all documents produced with the specific request number to which the documents respond and producing all electronically stored information (“ESI”) in the form in which it is ordinarily maintained.” The Stipulation also provided that J. Shin would file “a status report on Plaintiff’s service of additional verifications and production of additional discovery responsive to Defendant’s Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, no later than February 10, 2025.”

On February 4, 2025, the Court’s “Order on Motions to Compel” was entered, providing therein, in relevant part, as follows:

“Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation to Submit on Modified Tentative Ruling filed on February 3, 2025 (the ‘Stipulation’), the hearing on Defendant/Cross-Complainant John JoonHyo Shin’s Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Production of Documents is CONTINUED to March 7, 2025, at 9:00 a.m. Mickey’s Liquor’s counsel is directed to provide Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.250, subdivision (b) compliant verifications to Exhibits C and E by February 4, 2025. Mickey’s Liquor’s counsel is further ordered to produce all non-privileged documents requested in Request Nos. 1-5, 10, 20-26, 29-32, and 35-36 by February 7, 2025. J. Shin’s counsel is directed to file a status report no later than February 10, 2025, advising as to whether or not Mickey’s Liquor complied with the Court’s directive. . .”

On February 10, 2025, J. Shin filed a “Status Report on Plaintiff’s Failure to Comply with Court Order” (the “Status Report”) advising therein that, while Plaintiff provided the verifications as referenced above, Plaintiff failed to produce any documents. The Status Report further advises, as it pertains to this instant motion, that Plaintiff’s counsel “wrote [on February 8, 2025] to say there are no additional documents responsive to . . . the requests in Motion 1.” (Status Report, 2:11-12.)

The Court will hear from counsel further in this regard at the time of the hearing.

Case Number: 23PSCV01829 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: H

City of West Covina v. 1415 Garvey, LLC, et al., Case No. 23PSCV01829

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Qualfax, Inc. and Sepulveda LA Partners, LLC’s Motion to Vacate Appointment of Receiver, Expunge Receiver’s Certificate, and Dismiss Complaint as Against Qualfax and Sepulveda LA is DENIED.

Background

Plaintiff City of West Covina (the “City”) alleges that the property located at 1415 W. Garvey Avenue North in West Covina (the “subject property”) presented public health and safety concerns due to significant and ongoing building code violations. Specifically, the City alleges that, beginning in approximately February 2022, the subject property stood in violation of several state and building code provisions; the subject property was occupied by trespassers and/or homeless individuals, was covered in trash and debris, and even caught fire on two separate occasions. After a structure fire occurred on the subject property on May 16, 2022, the City instructed a representative of the then-owner, 1415 Garvey, LLC (“Garvey”), to board up the property and have a security officer present until the property was appropriately boarded up. Between August 2022 and March 2023, the City conducted a number of inspections at the property and issued several official notices to Garvey in an attempt to secure the property from trespassers and clean up the trash and debris. On January 26, 2023, there was another structure fire upon the subject property; after the fire was contained, an inspection revealed the interior of the subject property was littered with trash and debris and was being occupied by trespassers. When the owner failed to appear for a conference scheduled with the City prosecutor on March 29, 2023, the City issued a Notice to Abate pursuant to Health and Safety code section 17980.6. The conditions were not abated within the time frame specified in the notice.

On June 20, 2023, the City commenced this lawsuit and filed a complaint against the defendants it believed were either owners or lienholders. Specifically, the City’s complaint named as defendants: Garvey (the owner of the subject property at the time the lawsuit was commenced), as well as other entities and individuals identified by the City as holding recorded interests in the subject property, including Hillfoot, LLC, Natan Tishrey Projects 2016 Limited Partnership, Tnuvot Sivan Projects 2016 Limited Partnership, Marom Kislev 8 Loans Limited Partnership, Heng Li, Jie Lie, and Ning Jiang.

In the complaint, the City asserted that due to the numerous code violations, including violations of the City of West Covina Municipal Codes, the California Building Code, the California Fire Code, the California Residential Code, and the Health and Safety Code, the subject property constituted a per se public nuisance such that the City was entitled to abate the nuisance. To abate the nuisance, the City sought the appointment of a receiver to take control of the subject property, manage and pay expenses toward the subject property, secure a cost estimation to bring the subject property into compliance with the various codes, and to borrow funds to pay for the repairs and secure its debt with a recorded first lien on the subject property, first in priority to all other liens.

On November 15, 2023, the Court entered an “Order Granting Ex Parte Application for Appointment of a Receiver.” On January 22, 2024, the Court issued an “Order Approving the Receivership Plan and Request for an Increase in the Receiver’s Certificate.”

Six months after the appointment of the receiver, on May 15, 2024, the City filed three amendments to its complaint, wherein it named Lone Oak Fund, LLC, Qualfax, Inc., and Sepulveda LA Partners, LLC in lieu of Does 1 through 3, respectively.

On June 13, 2024, an “Order Granting Increased Funding of Receivership Certificate” was entered. On July 8, 2024, a “Stipulation & Order to Modify Scope of Receivership” was entered.

On August 20, 2024, Intervenor Southern California Second, Inc. filed a Complaint in Intervention, asserting a cause of action for Declaratory Relief.

Pending before the Court is the motion filed by Qualfax, Inc. and Sepulveda LA Partners, LLC (together, “Qualfax”) to vacate the appointment of the receiver, expunge the receiver’s certificate, and dismiss the complaint against Qualfax and Sepulveda.

Discussion

Qualfax contends that because it held a recorded interest in the property and was never given notice of these proceedings, the Court should vacate the November 15, 2023 order appointing a receiver over the subject property, expunge the receiver’s certificate as a lien against the subject property, and dismiss the City’s complaint against them.

At the outset, the Court rules on Qualfax’s Request for Judicial Notice as follows: Granted as to No. 1 (i.e., “Deed of Trust with Absolute Assignment of Leases and Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing” recorded September 18, 2020, attached as part of Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Kevin Sinclair); Granted as to No. 2 (i.e., “Assignment of Deed of Trust” recorded April 16, 2024, attached as part of Exhibit 1 to the Sinclair Declaration); Granted as to No. 3 (i.e., “Trustee’s Deed” recorded April 16, 2024, attached as part of Exhibit 1 to the Sinclair Declaration); Granted as No. 4, to the extent that the Court takes judicial notice that Exhibit 2 to the Sinclair Declaration (i.e., A “Notice of Intent to File an Action with the Court Petitioning for the Appointment of Receiver and Order to Abate Substandard Building” dated May 16, 2023) was attached as Exhibit E to Plaintiff’s complaint); Granted as to No. 5 (i.e., “Order Granting Ex Parte Application for Appointment of Receiver” entered November 15, 2023, attached as Exhibit 4 to the Sinclair Declaration); and Granted as to No. 6 (i.e., Order entered January 22, 2024, attached as Exhibit 5 to the Sinclair Declaration).

Turning to the merits, Qualfax asserts that the City violated Qualfax’s due process rights by failing to provide Qualfax pre-litigation notice of its intention to file this action, as required by Health & Safety Code section 17980.7, failing to name Qualfax as a defendant, and by seeking ex parte relief that purported to affect Qualfax’s rights in the property.

When a building stands in violation of state or municipal code provisions or constitutes a public nuisance, the appropriate enforcement agency may initiate a lawsuit to abate the code violations or nuisance, after providing the owner with notice to abate the nuisance or violation. (Health & Safety Code sections 17980(a), 17980.6.) “If the owner fails to comply within a reasonable time with the terms of the . . . notice, the enforcement agency “may seek[,] and the court may order, the appointment of a receiver for the substandard building.” (Health & Safety Code section 17980.7(c).) “In its petition to the court, the enforcement agency . . . shall include proof that notice of the petition was posted in a prominent place on the substandard building and mailed first-class mail to all persons with a recorded interest in the real property upon which the substandard building exists not less than three days prior to filing the petition.” (Id.) In addition, the petition “shall be served on the owner pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 415.10) of Chapter 4 of Title 5 of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” (Id.; see also Code Civ. Pro. 415.10 [“A summons may be served by personal delivery of a copy of the summons and the of the complaint to the person to be served.”].) In deciding whether to appoint a receiver, “the court shall consider whether the owner has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to correct the conditions cited in the notice of violation.” (Health & Safety Code section 17980.7(c)(1).)

In this case, there is no dispute that the City provided appropriate notice to Garvey, the owner of the subject property at the time. Long before the lawsuit commenced, over a period of several months, the City served Garvey with multiple violation notices, each of which gave Garvey a period of time to abate the violations. It was only after Garvey repeatedly failed to abate the violations and failed to appear for a conference with the city prosecutor that the City commenced this lawsuit, at which point it personally served Garvey with the summons and complaint.[FN1]

There similarly is no dispute that the City did not provide the required three-day pre-litigation notice to Qualfax, Inc. and Lone Oak Fund, LLC,, despite the fact that both entities held recorded interests in the property. (Health & Safety Code section 17980.7(c).) The principal issue presented by the instant motion is whether the failure to provide pre-litigation notice to these lienholders requires that the Court vacate its receivership order.[FN2]

“[A]n enforcement agency’s failure to fully comply with the requirements specified in section 17980.6 does not necessarily invalidate a receiver’s appointment under section 17980.7.” (City of Santa Monica v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal. 4th 905, 913.) “[W]hether the City’s purported noncompliance [with section 17980.7] invalidates the [receivership order]” is an issue “that must be resolved by ascertaining the legislative intent.” (Id. at 919.)[FN3]

Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzalez, the Court determines that the principal purposes of sections 17980.6 and 17980.7 are “to provide meaningful enforcement mechanisms in situations where the substandard condition of a residential building is found to substantially endanger the health and safety of the occupants or the public” and “to ensure that property owners are afforded due process before judicial appointment of a receiver.” (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal. 4th at p. 913; see also 6 Witkin, Cal. Proc. 6th Prov Rem § 494 (2024) [“The primary objective of receivership under Health & Saf.C. 17980.7 is to remediate code violations to protect health and safety.”].)

The statutory provisions themselves demonstrate that the legislature was principally concerned with providing notice to property owners. Under section 17980.6, while the abatement notice has to be posted in a prominent place on the property and mailed to or posted on the units of individual tenants, there is no requirement that the abatement notice be furnished to lienholders. The only statutory notice requirement that applies to lienholders appears under section 17980.7(c); under that section, while the enforcement agency is required to personally serve a petition seeking a receivership on the property owner, it is only required to mail the petition to lienholders at least three days before the petition is filed.[4] That section also provides that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to deprive an owner of a substandard building of all procedural due process rights guaranteed by the California Constitution and the United States Constitution,” again demonstrating a central focus on the rights of property owners. (Health & Safety Code section 17980.7(c)(14) [emphasis added].) Once the petition seeking a receivership is filed, in considering whether to appoint a receiver, while the court is required to consider “whether the owner has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to correct the conditions,” the statute is silent as to what considerations the court ought to give to those with recorded interests in the property.[FN5]

In view of the overall statutory scheme and the primary statutory purposes, the Court determines that the failure to provide notice to a lienholder under section 17980.7(c) does not per se require invalidation of a receivership order.[FN6]

In determining whether invalidation of the order is appropriate in this case, the Court considers the underlying facts and circumstances, including the fact that the City substantially complied with section 17980.7(c) and acted in good faith to identify all lienholders. Specifically, in commencing this litigation, the City engaged Stewart Title Guaranty Company to prepare what is called a “Litigation Guarantee,” a title report prepared by a professional title company that is accompanied by an insurance policy ($50,000 in this case). (Declaration of Amanda Pope (8/30/24), ¶¶ 5-6.) While the title report identified deeds of trusts held by a total of seven lienholders, the title report did not list Qualfax’s deed of trust. (Id., ¶ 6.) The City’s attorney explains that in her past 17 years practicing receivership law, this is the first time a litigation guarantee report has failed to identify a record interest holder. (Pope Decl., ¶ 7.)

The Court also considers the dangerous conditions posed by the subject property that were not being addressed by any owner or lienholder and warranted intervention by the City.[FN7] (Order Appointing Receiver (11/15/23), ¶ 8 [“The violations and substandard conditions are so extensive and of such a nature that the health and safety of the occupants, neighboring residents, and the general public is substantially endangered.”].) Among other things, the subject property had “suffered two structure fires” between May 2022 and January 2023, was “vacant and abandoned and overrun with illegal squatters,” had been targeted by vandals (as evidenced by graffiti, broken glass, and drug paraphernalia), was covered in trash and debris, and was a “drain on City taxpayer resources due to calls for service to the City Fire, Police and Code Enforcement Departments complaining about the transients and substandard building conditions.” (Declaration of Code Enforcement Director Milan M. Mrakick (11/2/23), ¶¶ 4, 9, 16, 22, 24-25, 28, 35.) Under these circumstances, the Court declines to vacate the receivership.[FN8]

For similar reasons, the Court rejects the request to expunge the lien at this juncture. However, the Court will reserve judgment on the appropriate allocation of costs until the time of the final accounting.[FN9]

Finally, the Court denies Qualfax’s motion to dismiss the complaint against them. While the abatement process is now complete, the Court still needs to consider whether to approve the receiver’s final accounting and discharge the receiver and whether to award attorney’s fees and costs to the City—issues that implicate the current property owner. (Health & Safety Code sections 17992.) Because Qualfax foreclosed on the property in April 2024, it is the current owner, such that it cannot be dismissed before the time of the final accounting.

[FN1] As noted above, the City also personally served the other entities or individuals it identified as holding a recording interest in the subject property.

[FN2] The Court rejects Qualfax’s argument that Qualfax was required to be named as a defendant in the lawsuit, since at the time the lawsuit commenced, Qualfax was a lienholder and not an owner.

[FN3] Even in the case of an obligatory statutory provision, the failure to comply with “a particular procedural step” may not “have the effect of invalidating the governmental action to which the procedural requirement relates.” (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal. 4th at pp. 923-924 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted].) “In California, it is not uncommon for obligatory statutory provisions to be accorded only directory effect.” (Id.)

[FN4] Notably, in recent years, the legislature has eased the notice requirement as to lenders. While it used to be the case that enforcement agencies had to personally serve those with recorded property interests with receivership petitions, in 2019, the legislature amended the statute to permit service to lenders by first-class mail. (See HOUSING, 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 620 (A.B. 957) [“Existing law requires a petition to the court for the appointment of a receiver to include proof that notice of the petition was served not less than 3 days prior to filing the petition to all persons with a recorded interest in the real property upon which the substandard building exists. This bill would instead require the petition to include proof that notice of the petition was posted in a prominent place on the substandard building and mailed first-class mail to all persons with a recorded interest in the real property upon which the substandard building exists not less than 3 days prior to filing the petition, and would require the petition to be served on the owner, as specified.”].)

[FN5] The Court is unpersuaded by Qualfax’s position that the receivership order would have been unnecessary had it received notice of the lawsuit because it could have abated the issues at the subject property. The subject property stood in violation of various building code provisions for a year and a half, such that a court-ordered receivership was appropriate, given that neither the owner nor any lienholder had taken any action to remedy the violations at the point where the City commenced the lawsuit. Moreover, the abatement process in this case was not completed until at least December 2024—nearly a year after the initial receivership order and five months after Qualfax took over the abatement process. Thus, while the Court acknowledges that Qualfax may have objected to the receivership and the super-priority lien, the Court is not persuaded that the receivership order would not have issued at all had Qualfax been given notice.

[FN6] The Court similarly concludes that the statutory notice defect does not require invalidation of the receivership order under the United States Constitution or the California State Constitution, in light of the fact that Qualfax was not the property owner at the time. However, as noted below, the Court will permit Qualfax to raise arguments about costs and the super-priority lien at the time of the final accounting.

[FN7] Under the terms of Qualfax’s loan with the previous owner, the previous owner was obligated to, among other things, “keep the Property . . . in good condition and repair” and “comply with all laws, ordinances, regulations and standards which affect the Property.” (2020 Deed of Trust, ¶ 3.6 (attached as Exhibit 1 to the Sinclair Declaration).) Qualfax also had the right to inspect the property to insurance the owner’s compliance with the terms of the loan. (Id., ¶¶ 3.16 and 4.2(e).) (See City of Sierra Madre v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc. (2019) 32 Cal. App. 5th 648, 660 (upholding trial court’s decision to secure receivership loan with super-priority lien over SunTrust’s objection, noting, among other things, that “SunTrust chose to take no action against the Hildreths, despite the fact the Hildreths were plainly in breach of the deed of trust”).

[FN8] The Court reserves judgment on how to appropriately allocate the costs associated with the receivership until the time of the final accounting. However, the Court is concerned that Qualfax’s proposal that the City bear the full costs of the receivership would undermine the statute’s primary purpose by discouraging cities from taking action to abate properties that endanger public safety.

[FN9] Qualfax will be permitted to revisit arguments about the super-priority lien and who should bear the costs of the receivership at the time of the final accounting. At the time of the final accounting, the Court also will ask the City for confirmation that it received the $50,000 under the title insurance policy; the Court also will seek the parties’ views on where to allocate that $50,000.

Case Number: 23PSCV02942 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: H

Chavez Serna v. American Honda Motor Co., Case No. 23PSCV02942

Tentative Ruling

The Court will hear further from the parties at the time of the hearing but is inclined to continue the hearing on the motion to enforce settlement, as well as the Order to Show Cause Re Dismissal (Settlement), for a period of 45-60 days.

Background

Plaintiff Maria E. Chavez Serna (“Plaintiff”) alleges as follows:

On June 28, 2020, Plaintiff purchased a 2020 Honda CR-V (the “subject vehicle”). The subject vehicle suffers from various defects and has not been repaired after a reasonable number of attempts.

On September 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint, asserting causes of action against American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“Defendant”) and Does 1-10 for: (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act—Breach of Express Warranty, (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act—Breach of Implied Warranty, and (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2.

On May 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed a conditional “Notice of Settlement of Entire Case.”

An Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal (Settlement) is set for March 7, 2025.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to enforce the settlement.

Legal Standard

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6, subd. (a).)

Discussion

Plaintiff moves the Court for an order, per Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, enforcing the settlement between Plaintiff and Defendant. Plaintiff also seeks sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5.

Sanctions Request

At the outset, the Court declines to entertain Plaintiff’s request for section 128.5 sanctions, inasmuch as this must be “made separately from other motions or requests. . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.5, subd. (f)(1)(A).)[FN]

Merits

On May 30, 2024, Plaintiff signed the Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer to compromise (“Agreement”) from Defendant; that day, the executed copy was emailed to Defendant’s counsel. (Ordaz Decl., ¶ 4, Exh. 1.) The Agreement provides, in relevant part, as follows:

“1. AHM will pay the total amount of $69,600.00 (the ‘Sum’) to Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s lender for the Subject Vehicle, if any (if there is an outstanding loan on the Subject Vehicle, AHM shall pay the lender the amount necessary to pay off the loan for the Subject Vehicle from the Sum, and Plaintiff shall receive the entire remaining amount).

2. It is an express condition of this Offer that, if accepted, AHM will perform its obligations within 65 days of acceptance on a mutually agreeable date and location, with Plaintiff returning the Subject Vehicle to a mutually agreeable authorized Honda dealership and on or before that same date executing all required California Department of Motor Vehicle forms, including but not limited to, DMV Form 262, necessary to transfer title of the Subject Vehicle to AHM free and clear of all liens and encumbrances (except for any loan for the purchase or refinance of the Subject Vehicle, which will be paid by AHM as stated above), and AHM thereafter providing Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s lender, if any, with the check or checks necessary to obtain clear title for the Subject Vehicle. It is a further express condition of this Offer that, if accepted, Plaintiff will promptly provide to AHM current loan payoff information, a copy of the current registration of the Subject Vehicle, and a copy of the front and back sides of the Subject Vehicle’s title (if available). . .

4. AHM will waive its fees, costs, and expenses in this action.

5. . . . AHM will allow the Court to determine, in a noticed motion filed pursuant to Civil Code Section 1794(d) and/or by Plaintiff’s filing of a memorandum of costs, the attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses recoverable under Civil Code Section 1794(d). There is no admission of liability by this Offer. However, if this Offer is accepted, AHM will stipulate that Plaintiff is the prevailing party for purposes of any motion for attorney's fees, expenses and costs and/or memorandum of costs.

6. Plaintiff will dismiss this entire action with prejudice.

7. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 998(b), this Offer can be accepted by filling out and signing the acceptance statement on the next page.” (Id.)

Plaintiff complains that, while she has provided all required documentation to complete the settlement, Defendant has failed to provide her with the settlement check(s) and with information regarding the subject vehicle’s surrender. (Id., ¶¶ 3, 5-7.)

Defendant’s counsel Kevin Zipser (“Zipser”), in turn, represents that, while a check request has been submitted to Defendant, it is still being processed due to a significant backlog which resulted from the settlement of several hundred “lemon law” cases during the second half of 2024. (Zipser Decl., ¶¶ 5-6.) Zipser represents that this fact was communicated to the Court and to opposing counsel at the time of the January 10, 2025 Order to Show Cause Re: Dismissal (Settlement) (“OSC”), such that the OSC was continued to March 7, 2025. (Id., ¶ 7.) The opposition notes that counsel also telephonically met and conferred on February 24, 2025 regarding status and anticipated deadline. (Opp., 1:12-14.) Defendant estimates that the check will be finalized and mailed within 4-5 weeks.

The Court will hear further from the parties at the time of the hearing; however, based on the above information, the Court is inclined to continue the hearing on the instant motion, as well as the OSC, out for a period of 45-60 days.

[FN] The Court notes that Plaintiff also makes reference to section 128.7 (see Motion, 2:12, 5:10 and 7.7); however, section 128.7, subdivision (c)(1) likewise provides that “[a] motion for sanctions under this section shall be made separately from other motions or requests. . .” (Emphasis added).

DEPARTMENT H LAW AND MOTION RULINGS Case Number: KC069896 Hearing Date: March 12, 2025 Dept: H Joseph Samec v. Guy Griffithe, Case No. KC069896 ORDER ON MOTIONS TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL Annigan Ryan LLP’s Motions to be Relieved as Counsel for Defendants Guy Griffithe, Bridgegate Entertainment, Inc., Bridgegate Pictures Corp., and Bridgegate Management are GRANTED, effective upon the filing of the proofs of service showing service of the signed order upon the Clients at the Clients’ last known addresses. Background Plaintiff alleges as follows: On March 30, 2017, Plaintiff and Defendant Bridgegate Pictures Corp. executed a promissory note whereby Plaintiff agreed to lend Bridgegate Pictures $100,000 until June 30, 2017, at which time the note would be repaid in full. Griffithe signed and personally guaranteed the note. The note provided that interest would accrue as follows: $20,000 by June 30, 2017, and for every month thereafter, $6,500 penalty would accrue or $206.67 per day, plus all costs, expenses and expenditures incurred enforcing the note. On June 30, 2017, Defendant Bridgegate Pictures breached the terms of the note by failing to repay in full, continuing to this day. On April 25, 2018, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, the operative complaint, asserting causes of action against Bridgegate Pictures Corp., Guy Griffithe, Bridgegate Management, Bridgegate Entertainment, Inc., and Does 1-50 for: (1) Breach of Promissory Note, (2) Enforcement of Personal Guarantee, and (3) Account Stated. Discussion Annigan Ryan LLP (“Firm”) seeks to be relieved as counsel of record for Defendants Guy Griffithe, Bridgegate Entertainment, Inc., Bridgegate Pictures Corp., and Bridgegate Management (the “Clients”). The Court has discretion to allow an attorney to withdraw, and such a motion should be granted provided that there is no prejudice to the client and it does not disrupt the orderly process of justice. (See Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 904, 915; People v. Prince (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 398.) California Rule of Court (“CRC”) Rule 3.1362 requires (1) a notice of motion and motion directed to the client (made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel—Civil form (MC-051)); (2) a declaration stating in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure § 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under section 284(1) (made on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel—Civil form (MC-052)); (3) service of the notice of motion and motion, the declaration, and the proposed order on the client and on all other parties who have appeared in the case; and (4) a proposed order relieving counsel (prepared on the Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel—Civil form (MC-053)). The court may delay the effective date of the order relieving counsel until proof of service of a copy of the signed order on the client has been filed with the court. As to each of the four Clients, Attorney Jason D. Annigian (“Annigian”) represents that each “represented party has breached the Retainer Agreement” and Annigian cannot represent them without “incurring significant financial hardship.” Annigian states that he has served the Clients by mail at the Clients’ last known addresses with copies of the motion papers served with his declaration; Annigian confirmed, within the past 30 days, that the addresses are current as to Guy Griffithe (confirmed via telephone) and Bridgegate Pictures Corp. (now GBX International Group) (confirmed via the Records of the Nevada Secretary of State). Annigan attempted to confirm current addresses for Bridgegate Entertainment, Inc. and Bridgegate Management, including by contacting Guy Griffithe and searching the records of the California Secretary of State, but Annigan submits that to the best of his knowledge, these entities are no longer in business (as Bridgegate Entertainment Inc. “has been FTB Suspended with the California Secretary of State since January 2, 2019” and Bridgegate Management has been “Inactive-Administratively Dissolved with the Wyoming Secretary of State since November 2021.” The Court determines that the requirements of Rules of Court Rule 3.1362 enumerated above have been sufficiently met. Accordingly, the motions are granted, effective upon the filing of the proofs of service showing service of the signed order upon the Clients at the Clients’ last known addresses. As to the three entity defendants (Bridgegate Entertainment, Inc., Bridgegate Pictures Corp., and Bridgegate Management), the Court will set an Order to Show Cause Re Representation Status of Corporation. The Court will hear from the parties as to an appropriate date for that hearing.

DEPARTMENT H LAW AND MOTION RULINGS Case Number: 22PSCV00887 Hearing Date: March 11, 2025 Dept: H Vargas, et al. v. Zhao, et al., Case No. 22PSCV00887 ORDER ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES As explained below, the Court, on its own motion, will set aside the dismissal of Zhao’s cross-complaint and deny Cross-Defendant Diamond Bar Village Association’s MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES as not ripe. Background This is a landlord/tenant breach of habitability lawsuit involving the leased premises located at 23653 Golden Springs Drive, Unit D-6 in Diamond Bar (the “Premises”). On August 18, 2022, Plaintiffs Fernando Vargas, Adriana Uribe Velez and Gisela Vargas-Uribe (together, “Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint, asserting causes of action against Yi Zhao (“Zhao”), National Progressive Real Estate (“NPRE”), and Does 1-50 for: (1) Private Nuisance, (2) Negligence, (3) Breach of Warranty of Habitability, (4) Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, (5) Breach of Implied Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, (6) Violation of California Civil Code § 1942.4; Wrongful Rent Collection/Increase and/or Notice to Pay or Quit, and (7) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. On January 4, 2023, Plaintiffs filed an “Amendment to Complaint,” wherein Walter Ponce (“Ponce”) was named in lieu of Doe 1. On April 14, 2023, Zhao filed a cross-complaint, asserting causes of action against Diamond Bar Village Association (erroneously sued as “Diamond Village Bar Association”) (the “HOA”) and Does 1-20 for: (1) Indemnity and (2) Contribution. On August 7, 2023, NPRE’s default was entered on Plaintiffs’ complaint. On March 11, 2024, the Court ordered NPRE and Ponce dismissed without prejudice, per Plaintiffs’ counsel’s oral request. On October 22, 2024, Plaintiffs dismissed the entire action, with prejudice. Pending before the Court is the HOA’s motion for attorneys’ fees. Discussion The HOA moves the Court for an ordering determining that it is the prevailing party in this case and awarding it attorney’s fees in the amount of $20,579.50 (plus $1,975.00) in anticipated attorney fees) against Zhao. Zhao, in turn, points out that her cross-complaint was not properly dismissed, as her counsel never signed the October 22, 2024 request for dismissal as is required for dismissal of the cross-complaint. The Court notes Paragraph 3 of Judicial Council Form CIV-110 reads “TO THE CLERK: Consent to the above dismissal is hereby given., with a line reading Date:________________ immediately underneath. Paragraph 3 also contains the following language: “ If a cross-complaint - or Response (Family Law) seeking affirmative relief - is on file, the attorney or cross-complainant (respondent) must sign this consent if required by Code of Civil Procedure section 581. . .” Code of Civil Procedure section 581 provides, in relevant part, as follows: “(b) An action may be dismissed in any of the following instances: . . . (1) With or without prejudice, upon written request of the plaintiff to the clerk, filed with papers in the case, or by oral or written request to the court at any time before the actual commencement of trial, upon payment of the costs, if any. (2) With or without prejudice, by any party upon the written consent of all other parties. . . (i) No dismissal of an action may be made or entered, or both, under paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) where affirmative relief has been sought by the cross-complaint of a defendant . . . (j) No dismissal may be made or entered, or both, under paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b) except upon the written consent of the attorney for the party or parties applying therefor, or if consent of the attorney is not obtained, upon order of dismissal by the court after notice to the attorney. . .” The Court, on its own motion, will set aside the dismissal of Zhao’s cross-complaint on this basis and deny the instant motion as not ripe.

DEPARTMENT H LAW AND MOTION RULINGS Case Number: 23PSCV01168 Hearing Date: April 16, 2025 Dept: H Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club v. Leal, Case No. 23PSCV01168 ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT *Plaintiff Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club’s Application for Default Judgment is DENIED without prejudice.* Background Plaintiff Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (“Plaintiff”) seeks subrogation against Defendant Santos Leal (“Defendant”) for damages sustained by its insured, James Albert Chinchilla, in an April 9, 2021 motor vehicle collision. On April 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint, asserting a subrogation cause of action against Defendant and Does 1-10. On June 27, 2024, Defendant’s default was entered. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s application for default judgment. Discussion Plaintiff’s Application for Default Judgment is denied without prejudice. The following defects are noted: 1. Plaintiff has not provided the Court with a summary of the case, as per California Rules of Court, rule 3.1800(a)(1). 2. Tara Murray (“Murray”) represents that the total amount paid to Plaintiff’s insured was $43,776.14 (Murray Decl., ¶ 3), which is comprised of $17,565.14 for collision damages ($27,940.14 minus the salvage recovery of $10,375.00), plus $25,000.00 for bodily injuries sustained by the insured, plus $211.00 in towing and storage expenses, and plus $1,000.00 for the collision deductible assigned by the insured to Plaintiff. Murray is directed to explain where the $1,000.00 and $17,565.14 amounts are located on Exhibit B to her declaration or to otherwise explain how these amounts are shown on Exhibit B. 3. The medical bills attached as Exhibit G to Murray’s declaration total $6,270.00, yet $25,000.00 was apparently paid to the insured for medical expenses. Murray is directed to explain this discrepancy to the Court. Accordingly, the application is denied without prejudice, and Plaintiff is directed to submit a revised and complete default judgment packet[FN] that addresses the aforementioned issues. [FN] The Court will not entertain piecemeal submissions.

[FN] The Court will not entertain piecemeal submissions.