DEPARTMENT 1 LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
Case Number: 23TRCV03999 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: 1
Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles – SOUTHWEST District Department
1
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, Rosalie Fierro RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants, Stadco LA, LLC, Pincay Re, LLC, and Hollywood Park
Management Company, LLC (1)
Plaintiff’s
Demurrer to Defendants’ Amended Answer is OVERRULED. (2)
Plaintiff’s
Motion to Strike Portions of Defendants’ Amended Answer is DENIED I.
DEMURRER
A.
Legal
Standard A plaintiff may demur to a
defendant’s answer within 10 days of being served with the answer (Code Civ.
Proc., § 430.40, subd. (b)) on three grounds: (1) failure to state facts
sufficient to constitute a defense; (2) uncertainty; or (3) failure to state whether
a contract alleged in the answer is written or oral. (Code Civ. Proc., §
430.20). The demurrer may be to the whole answer or to any one or more of the
several defenses set up in the answer. (Code Civ. Proc., §430.50, subd. (b).)
The plaintiff may not demur to part of a defense. Each defense must be
considered separately without regard to any other defense, and one defense does
not become insufficient because it is inconsistent with other parts of the
answer. (South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725,
733.) “[W]hether an answer states a defense is
governed by the same principles which are applicable in determining if a
complaint states a cause of action.” (Id. at 732.) “[T]he demurrer to
the answer admits all issuable facts pleaded therein and eliminates all
allegations of the complaint denied by the answer.” (Id. at 733.) But
unlike a demurrer to a complaint, “the defect in question need not appear on
the fact of the answer” as “[t]he determination of the sufficiency of the
answer requires an examination of the complaint because its adequacy is with
reference to the complaint it purports to answer.” (Ibid.) B.
Discussion Here, Plaintiff demurs to
Defendants’ Amended Answer on the grounds that she argues the first, second,
third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth affirmative
defenses failed to state sufficient facts to constitute a defense and is
uncertain.
i.
Timeliness Preliminarily, the Court notes
that Defendants’ opposition brief correctly states that Plaintiff’s demurrer
and motion to strike are untimely. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
430.40, subdivision (b) states: “[a] party who has filed a complaint or
cross-complaint may, within 10 days after service of the answer to his
pleading, demur to the answer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.40, subd. (b).)
Defendants filed their amended answer on January 13, 2025 and assert it was
served on Plaintiff the same date. Because Defendants served their amended
answer by email, Plaintiffs had an additional two days to file a demurrer. That
day fell on a Saturday, so Plaintiff had until Monday, January 27, 2025, to
file the demurrer. However, Plaintiff’s moving papers were not filed until
February 11, 2025. Therefore, demurrer is
OVERRULED as it is untimely. The Motion to Strike is DENIED.
ii.
Statutory Notice Requirement Moreover, Defendants’
opposition also states that Plaintiff failed to provide Defendants with the
requisite minimum statutory notice. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
1005, a party must serve a demurrer and motion to strike 16 court days prior to
the hearing. Defendants assert that Plaintiff served the demurrer and motion to
strike on February 11, 2025, and chose the hearing date of March 7, 2025. Defendants
acknowledge that between those dates, there were two holidays, and thus, there
were precisely 16 court days between the date of service and the hearing date.
Defendants state that if Plaintiff served the demurrer by hand, this amount of
time would have constituted proper service. However, because the proof of
service was served by email, the notice period should have been extended by two
court days. Thus, the Plaintiff’s moving papers are procedurally defective. II.
ORDER Plaintiff’s demurrer is OVERRULED and the Motion to Strike is DENIED. Defendants are ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: _____________________________ Tamara
Hall Judge
of the Superior Court |
|||||||||||||||
DEPARTMENT 1 LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
Case Number: 24TRCV03082 Hearing Date: March 12, 2025 Dept: 1
Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles – SOUTHWEST District Department
1
MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Tesla Motors, Inc. RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Mohsen Zohrab (1)
Tesla’s
Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
Section 1281. (2)
The
Court Takes Judicial Notice pursuant to Evidence Code Section 452(a) of
Plaintiff Mohsen Zohrab’s Compliant filed on or about September 16, 2024
(Exhibit 2 of Ali Ameripour’s Declaration). The Court has considered the moving papers
filed on November 5, 2024, opposition papers filed on February 27, 2025, and
reply papers filed on March 5, 2025. ANALYSIS A.
Legal
Standard California Code of Civil
Procedure, Section 1281 provides that “[a] written agreement to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is
valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the
revocation of any contract.” “California law, like federal law, favors
enforcement of valid arbitration agreements.” (Armendariz v. Foundation
Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 97.) “On petition of
a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written
agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses
to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the
respondent to arbitrate the controversy” unless grounds exist not to compel
arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2.) The Song-Beverly Act also favors
arbitration of Lemon Law disputes with a series of “carrot and stick”
provisions that immunize a warrantors from a species of civil penalty if they
have a certified lemon arbitration program in place. The AAA arbitration provision in Tesla’s
contract is not the pre-litigation lemon arbitration program contemplated by
Song-Beverly, but rather is a litigation diversion provision contemplated by
the Federal Arbitration Act and by the California Arbitration Act. Tesla’s provisions do not indicate that
federal law controls, so this Tentative Ruling will rest on California law. “There is no public policy
favoring arbitration of disputes which the parties have not agreed to
arbitrate.” (Engineers & Architects Assn. v. Community Development
Dept.(1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 644, 653.) Nevertheless, the strong public
policy promoting private arbitration of civil disputes gives rise to a
presumption in favor of arbitrability and compels the Court to construe
liberally the terms of the arbitration agreement. (Vianna v. Doctors’
Management Co.(1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1189). B.
Discussion
i.
Existence
of Arbitration Agreement Here, the parties do not
dispute that there was a written agreement between them, Motor Vehicle Order
Agreement (“Order Agreement”) as well as the Motor Vehicle Purchase Agreement
(“Purchase Agreement”), and that they included an arbitration agreement. However,
Plaintiff argues that Plaintiff’s claims are independent from the Order and
Purchase Agreement and that the contract between the parties is adhesive,
unconscionable, and/or otherwise revocable. The Order Agreement contained
an arbitration agreement which stated: Agreement to Arbitrate. Please carefully read this
provision, which applies to any dispute between you and Tesla, Inc. and its
affiliates, (together “Tesla”). If you have a concern or dispute, please send a written notice
describing it and your desired resolution to resolutions@tesla.com. If not resolved within 60 days, you agree that any dispute arising
out of or relating to any aspect of the relationship between you and Tesla will
not be decided by a judge or jury but instead by a single arbitrator in an
arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) under
its Consumer Arbitration Rules. This includes claims arising before this
Agreement, such as claims related to statements about our products. We will pay all AAA fees for any arbitration, which will be held in
the city or county of your residence. To learn more about the Rules and how to
begin an arbitration, you may call any AAA office or go to www.adr.org The arbitrator may only resolve disputes between you and Tesla, and
may not consolidate claims without the consent of all parties. The arbitrator
cannot hear class or representative claims or requests for relief on behalf of
others purchasing or leasing Tesla vehicles. In other words, you and Tesla may
bring claims against the other only in your or its individual capacity and not
as a Plaintiff or class member in any class or representative action. If a
court or arbitrator decides that any part of this agreement to arbitrate cannot
be enforced as to a particular claim for relief or remedy, then that
claim or remedy (and only that claim or remedy) must be brought in court and
any other claims must be arbitrated. If you prefer, you may
instead take an individual dispute to small claims court. You may opt out of arbitration within 30 days after signing this
Agreement by sending a letter to: Tesla, Inc.; P.O. Box 15430; Fremont, CA
94539-7970, stating your name, Vehicle Identification Number, and intent to opt
out of the arbitration provision. If you do not opt out, this agreement to
arbitrate overrides any different arbitration agreement between us, including
any arbitration agreement in a lease or finance contract. (Declaration of Raymond Kim (“Kim Decl.”), ¶ 7, Exhibit 1, p. 3.) This Court finds that
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges various statutory violations for alleged vehicle
defects. The Court also acknowledges that the Arbitration Agreement applies to,
“any dispute between [Plaintiff] and Tesla, Inc. and its affiliates…” (Kim
Decl., ¶ 7, Exhibit 1, p. 3.) Thus, the Court finds that on the face of the agreement between the parties, the claims
in Plaintiff’s complaint are covered within the scope of the arbitration
agreement.
ii.
Application
of Ford Motor Warranty Cases Generally, only signatories to
an arbitration agreement may enforce it. (Rowe v. Exline (2007) 153
Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284.) However, there are several exceptions to the
nonsignatory enforcement rule. (Bouton v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. (2008) 167
Cal.App.4th 412, 424.) In Plaintiff’s opposition
brief, Plaintiff relied in part on the recent Second District nonsignatory
exception case of Ochoa vs. Ford, also cited as Ford Motor Warranty
Cases (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324.
Plaintiff’s reliance is misplaced. In Ochoa, the Second converged
from the First District in Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th
486 as to the equitable estoppel exception to the general rule that
nonsignatory parties to an arbitration agreement cannot compel a signatory
party to arbitrate a suit filed in the court system. Regardless of the
appellate district’s analysis of the equitable estoppel exception, both Felisilda
and Ochoa discuss a manufacturer’s ability to enforce an arbitration
provision given to the buyer by the selling dealership as opposed to the
manufacturer’s own arbitration agreement.
This case is distinguishably different. Here, Tesla is not only the
manufacturer, but also sells its vehicles directly to the consumer. Tesla is
one of the signatories to the arbitration agreements at issue and does not have
third-party dealerships that handle the ordering and selling of its vehicles.
As such, Plaintiff’s reliance on the nonsignatory exception case of Ochoa
is unavailing. Because Tesla does not use third-party dealerships to order and
sell their vehicles, and because they directly contract and sell their vehicles
to consumers, there is no nonsignatory seeking to enforce a dealer’s
arbitration agreement. Tesla is a signatory to the contract with Plaintiff. No
exception to a rule regarding non-signatories is needed or even relevant
here.
iii.
Unconscionability
Plaintiff’s main argument in the
opposition is that the contract drafted by Tesla is one of adhesion and is
unconscionable and/or otherwise revocable.
Unconscionability is a valid defense to a petition to compel
arbitration. (Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109,
1143.) State law governs the “unconscionability” defense. (Doctor’s Assocs.,
Inc. v. Casarotto (1996) 517 US 681, 687.) The core concern of the
unconscionability doctrine is the “absence of meaningful choice on the part of
one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably
favorable to the other party.” (Sonic-Calabasas, supra, 57 Cal.4th at
1145.) The unconscionability doctrine ensures that contracts—particularly
contracts of adhesion—do not impose terms that have been variously described as
overly harsh, unduly oppressive, so one-sided as to shock the conscience, or
unfairly one-sided. (Id.) Here,
Plaintiff has not identified any overly harsh or unduly oppressive provisions,
other than depriving Plaintiff of the court system to resolve Plaintiff’s
dispute without any other option. The
Court finds that such a deprivation, without much more, is not overly harsh,
unduly oppressive, nor shocking of the conscience. “The procedural element of
unconscionability focuses on whether the contract is one of adhesion. (Armendariz,
supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 113; Mercuro v. Superior Court, supra, 96
Cal.App.4th at p. 174.) Procedural unconscionability focuses on whether there
is “oppression” arising from an inequality of bargaining power or “surprise”
arising from buried terms in a complex printed form. (Armendariz, supra,
24 Cal.4th at p. 114; Mercuro v. Superior Court, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p.
174.) The substantive element addresses the existence of overly harsh or
one-sided terms. (Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064,
1071 [130 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 63 P.3d 979]; Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th
at p. 114.) An agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable only if both the
procedural and substantive elements are satisfied. (Armendariz, supra,
24 Cal.4th at p. 113; Mercuro v. Superior Court, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th
at p. 174.) However, Armendariz held, “[T]he more substantively
oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability
is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice
versa.” (Armendariz, at p. 114; see also Kinney v. United HealthCare
Services, Inc., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1329.).” McManus v. CIBC
World Markets Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 76, 87.) 1. Procedural Unconscionability Plaintiff argues that the Order
Agreement is adhesive and therefore procedurally unconscionable. Plaintiff bases
the argument on the fact that the Order Agreement is a ‘take it or leave it’
contract that gave Plaintiffs no meaningful opportunity to negotiate or discuss
any of the terms outlined in the Agreements. In Plaintiff’s unconscionability
argument, Plaintiff reference the case of Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc.
(2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 77. In Gutierrez, a plaintiff entered into an
automobile lease agreement with the defendant, an automobile dealer. The
plaintiff subsequently sued the dealer over alleged fraud in the transaction,
and the adhesive agreement contained an inconspicuous arbitration clause. (Id.
at 83-84.) There, based on the AAA rules in effect at the time the defendant
moved to compel arbitration, the Plaintiff would have had to pay $8,000 in
administrative fees to initiate arbitration. . (Id. at 90-91.) The Gutierrez
Court held that “where a consumer enters into an adhesive contract that
mandates arbitration, it is unconscionable to condition that process on the
consumer posting fees he or she cannot pay.” (Id. at 89-90.) Here, Plaintiffs attempt to
draw an analogy to Gutierrez, by claiming that the take it or leave it
contract was adhesive, and consequently procedurally unconscionable. However,
the contract in Gutierrez was not found to be unconscionable because
it was adhesive. In fact, the Gutierrez court noted that “simply
because a provision within a contract of adhesion is not read or understood by
the nondrafting party does not justify a refusal to enforce it.” (Id. at
88.) Instead, the Court reasoned that the unbargained-for term may only be
denied enforcement if it is also substantively unreasonable. (Ibid.)
Here, although not specifically argued by Plaintiff, the adhesive nature of the
arbitration agreements arguably flows in part from the digital nature of the
Agreement. A Tesla buyer must click on
the hyperlink to visualize the arbitration agreements, and if they did so on
the screen would appear five pages of an easy-to-read document with prominently
displayed agreement with distinctive border on page three (3) of the Order
Agreement. When there is no other indication of oppression other than the
adhesive aspect of an agreement, the degree of procedural unconscionability is
low. (Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. (2013) 215
Cal.App.4th 695, 704.) As
such, this Court finds that the procedural unconscionability is low. 2. Substantive Unconscionability Next, Plaintiff argues that
the arbitration provisions are substantively unconscionable because the
exclusive requirement of AAA in the Arbitration Provision is substantively
unconscionable due to its unfairness. An arbitration agreement is generally enforceable,
if it (1) provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal
discovery, (3) requires a written award, (4) provides for all of the types of
relief that would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not require the
parties to pay unreasonable costs and fees as a condition of access to an
arbitration forum. (See Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services,
Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 102.) Plaintiff
argues that Tesla’s Arbitration Agreement severely limits discovery, including
a lack of any depositions. (See AAA Rules, R-22.) Further, beyond a very
ambiguous description of the exchange of information (i.e., “specific documents
and other information”), the AAA rules state: “No other exchange of information
beyond what is provided for in section (a) above is contemplated under these
rules, unless an arbitrator determines further information exchange is needed
to provide for a fundamentally fair process.”
What Plaintiff fails to acknowledge is that these discovery limitations
apply equally to both sides. Tesla also will be deprived of the right to take
depositions, but it will be required to exchange specific documents and, on
application to the arbitrator, both sides may be required to exchange other
information such as exchanging expert reports. Here, the Court finds that
Plaintiff failed to carry his burden in showing how the arbitration provisions
are unconscionable or against public policy. Absent any argument as to waiver
by Tesla under the recent decision in Quach, the court GRANTS Tesla’s
Motion to Compel Arbitration. ORDERS For the foregoing reasons, Tesla’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED.
Tesla is ordered to give notice of the Court’s ruling. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: _____________________________ Tamara
Hall Judge
of the Superior Court |
|||||||||||||||
DEPARTMENT 1 LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
Case Number: 23TRCV00445 Hearing Date: March 11, 2025 Dept: 1
Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles – SOUTHWEST District Department
1
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, Gabriella Morgan RESPONDING
PARTY: Defendant, American Honda
Motor Co., Inc. (1)
Plaintiff’s
Motion to Compel Compliance with the Court’s June 26, 2024, Order is MOOTED in
part and GRANTED in part pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128,
subdivision (a)(4). (2)
Plaintiff’s
Request for Monetary Sanctions is GRANTED in the amount of $1,560.00. The Court considered the moving papers filed on December 13, 2024,
opposition papers filed January 30, 2025, and reply papers filed February 5,
2025. I.
ANALYSIS A.
Legal Standard A motion to compel
further responses to a demand for inspection or production of documents (“RFP”)
may be brought based on: (1) incomplete statements of compliance; (2)
inadequate, evasive, or incomplete claims of inability to comply; or (3)
unmerited or overly generalized objections.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(c).) A motion to compel further production
must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery
sought by the inspection demand. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1).) In Digital
Music News LLC v Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216 at 224, the Court
defined “good cause” as a showing that there “a disputed fact that is of
consequence in the action and the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove
or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or
disprove the fact.” If the moving party has shown good cause for the requests
for production, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections.
(Kirkland v. Sup.Ct (2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.) "The court shall
limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or
intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the
information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
(Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 2017.020(a).) Generally, objections on the ground of
burden require the objecting party to produce evidence of (a) the propounding
party's subjective intent to create burden or (b) the amount of time and effort
it would take to respond. (See West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v.
Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.)
However, no such evidence is necessary where discovery is obviously overbroad
on its face. (See Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.) Every court has the power
“[t]o compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process, and to the orders
of a judge out of court, in an action or proceeding pending therein.” (Code of
Civil Procedure § 128(a)(4).) B.
Discussion Pursuant to the Court’s June 26, 2024, minute order, Plaintiff argues
that AHM should be required to provide further responses to RFP Nos. 29-36 in
accordance with the limitations set forth in the Court’s order. However, the
Court clarifies that RFP No. 34 was not included in the partial granting of the
motions. Instead, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion as to RFP Nos. 29-31,
32, 33, 35-36, and 44 as limited by the Court. In AHM’s opposition brief, it clarifies that provided code compliance
further responses in compliance with the Court’s June 26, 2024, order to RFP
Nos. 29-33 and 44. This is also an incorrect interpretation of the Court’s
ruling as it did in fact order further responses to RFP Nos. 35-36. As such,
Plaintiff’s motion is MOOTED as to RFP Nos. 29-33 and 44. However, Plaintiff’s
Motion is GRANTED as to RFP Nos. 35-36. AHM is ordered to provide further
responses to RFP Nos. 35 and 36 on or before March 25, 2025. C.
Sanctions Plaintiff has also requested
sanctions in the amount of $1,560 be imposed against Defendant and its counsel.
This amount is based on Plaintiff’s counsel, Keishunn Johnson’s declaration
(“Johnson Decl.”) Counsel Johnson states that his hourly rate is $375, that he
spent two (2) hours drafting the instant motion, anticipates spending 1
additional hour reviewing Defendant’s opposition and drafting a reply brief,
and anticipates spending 1 hour preparing and attending the hearing. Here, the
Court finds both Counsel Johnson’s hourly rate and time spent in preparation of
said motion to be reasonable. Counsel Johnson
also asserts that cost of $60 to file the instant motion. AHM argues that sanctions should not be awarded because Plaintiff
failed to sufficiently meet and confer prior to the filing of this motion. However,
AHM’s noncompliance with the Court’s June 26, 2024, minute order necessitated Plaintiff
to file this motion. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions
in the amount of $1,560.00. Defendant
AHM and or its counsel is ordered to pay Plaintiff’s counsel on or before March
25, 2025. II.
COURT
ORDERS (1)
With respect to Plaintiff’s motion requesting RFP
for No. 29-33, 44, it is MOOT. (2)
With respect to Plaintiff’s motion
requesting RFP for No. 35-36, it is GRANTED. AHM’s further responses to RFP Nos. 35 and 36
are to be served on Plaintiff on or before March 25, 2025. (3) AHM
and/or its counsel are to pay monetary sanctions to Plaintiff’s counsel in the
amount of $1,560.00 on or before March 25, 2025. The court orders Plaintiff to give notice of this ruling. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: _____________________________ Tamara
Hall Judge
of the Superior Court |
|||||||||||||||