DEPARTMENT D LAW AND MOTION RULINGS Case Number: 23GDCV00358 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: D TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 4 Date: 3/7/2025 Case No: 23 GDCV00358 Trial Date: April 1, 2025 Case Name: Black v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center dba Adventist Health Glendale, et al. MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Moving Party: Defendant Glendale Adventist Medical Center dba Adventist Health Glendale Responding Party: Plaintiff Jamie Black (No Opposition) Relief Requested: Summary adjudication in favor of defendant Glendale Adventist Medical Center dba Adventist Health Glendale of the second cause of action for Violations of EMTALA Causes of Action from Complaint 1) Professional Negligence 2) Violation of EMTALA, 42 USC Section 13996dd, et seq. * Request for Dismissal of the 2nd Cause of Action against defendant Alec Bradleigh Freling, M.D. filed and dismissal entered April 21, 2023. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: Plaintiff Jamie Black alleges that in October of 2022, plaintiff, who had a history of depression, bipolar disorder, ADHD and schizophrenia, for which she had previously been placed on several 5150 involuntary psychiatric holds, went for a walk, and a group of people she encountered noticed she was upset and scared and not acting appropriately and asked if she needed an ambulance, to which plaintiff replied in the affirmative. Plaintiff alleges that paramedics were summoned and she was transported to defendant Glendale Adventist Medical Center dba Adventist Health Center (the Hospital). The complaint alleges that when plaintiff arrived at the Hospital, her vital signs showed she was hypersensitive and tachycardic. While in the emergency room, when asked her name, plaintiff identified several names, which were not her correct name, and plaintiff was also unable to provide a valid social security number. Plaintiff alleges that although attempts were made to take plaintiff’s blood and urine, the attempts were not successful. Plaintiff alleges that she was eventually seen by defendant Alec Bradleigh Freling, M.D., who diagnosed plaintiff with, among other conditions, psychosis due to methamphetamine use, schizoaffective disorder, and PCP use, and concluded that plaintiff appeared in a psychotic state. Plaintiff alleges that she was given a dose of haloperidol, medication used to treat psychotic patients, and an injection of lorazepam, an anti-anxiety medication. Plaintiff repeatedly requested that the psychiatrist evaluate her, and a request was entered by Dr. Freling for plaintiff to be seen by a psychiatrist. Dr. Freling later re-evaluated plaintiff, and noted that she would not provide further information to him because he was a male, and had requested to speak with a female behavioral health individual, so that Dr. Freling noted that a female, Tracy, had previously attempted an evaluation during which plaintiff was uncooperative, and that Tracy would attempt to evaluate plaintiff again. The complaint alleges that plaintiff engaged in behavior such as telling the nursing staff she had been poisoned and requesting an ultrasound because she believed there were drugs inside her uterus, crying loudly, screaming, pulling the curtains on other patient’s beds and screaming and yelling. Plaintiff was asked to write down her social security number, but ultimately said she could not remember it. The complaint alleges that later that evening Dr. Freling noted that Tracy had evaluated plaintiff and that plaintiff had been cleared by the on-call psychiatrist, although there is no record plaintiff was seen or evaluated by a psychiatrist at any time during her presentation. It is alleged that Dr. Freling stated plaintiff was alert and oriented and had normal mood and affect, but there was no physical examination performed at that time to support such a conclusion. Dr. Freling then indicated that plaintiff would be discharged, and plaintiff requested of the nursing staff that she see someone else, but her request was denied, and she was told to call someone for a ride. Plaintiff alleges that after some further confusion, plaintiff ultimately called a friend to pick her up, and the nurses escorted plaintiff out of the hospital, essentially throwing her out of the facility, three hours after arriving, when plaintiff had never been seen or evaluated by a psychiatrist, and had never had blood or urine work done. Plaintiff alleges that after many instances of improper behavior in the car once plaintiff arrived at the friend’s house, plaintiff eventually walked to an overpass above the 15 freeway in Barstow and jumped off the overpass in an attempt to kill herself, as a result of which she suffered serious injuries. The file shows that on April 21, 2023, plaintiff filed two Requests for Dismissal as to defendant Alec Bradleigh Freling, M.D. One Request was to dismiss the second cause of action only against that defendant, the second was to dismiss the third prayer for relief only. The third prayer for relief in the Complaint seeks, “For legal interest on judgment from the filing of this complaint to the date of judgment.” Both dismissals were entered as requested on April 21, 2023. On May 17, 2024, the court granted an unopposed motion for summary judgment brought by defendant Dr. Freling, and judgment was entered in Dr. Freling’s favor the same date. On January 28, 2025, defendant Lukas Alexanian, M.D. filed a Notice of Settlement indicating that plaintiff and defendant Alexanian had entered into a settlement. That same date, defendant filed a notice of application for good faith settlement. Defendant Glendale Adventist Medical Center dba Adventist Health Glendale now brings this motion for summary adjudication of the second cause of action against it. ANALYSIS: Procedural Motion Set to be Heard Fewer Than 30 Days Before Trial CCP §437c(a)(3), pertaining to motions for summary judgment, provides, in pertinent part, “The motion shall be heard no later than 30 days before the date of trial, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise.” Here, the motion is to be heard on March 7, 2025, with a trial date of April 1, 2025, so fewer than thirty days before the date of trial. There is no indication in the file showing moving party has sought or obtained an order permitting an exception based on good cause prior to the filing of the motion, and the moving papers do not attempt to establish good cause. The 30-day requirement has been held not jurisdictional, since the court for good cause may permit the matter to be heard closer to the trial date. Beroiz v. Wahl (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 485, 493 n.4. However, in Beroiz, the Second District found that the trial court properly had considered a motion for summary judgment filed in violation of this time deadline because the trial court had determined that the moving parties had stated good cause. There is no attempt to show good cause in the moving papers here, and no factual basis upon which the court may make a finding of good cause. In Robinson v. Woods (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1268, the Second District concluded the trial court had abused its discretion by continuing a noticed hearing for summary judgment which had not been brought on 75 days’ notice for four days, rather than the statutorily required 75 day period, and then deciding at the continued hearing that good cause had been shown for hearing the motion within 30 days of the trial date, and ruling on the motion. With respect to the 30-day issue, the Second District held: “A second reason justified plaintiffs' lack of an opposition on the merits and rendered the April 12, 2007 hearing improper. Defendants noticed their motion for hearing within 30 days of the trial date without first obtaining a determination of good cause from the trial court. (See § 437c, subd. (a).) Unless and until the trial court found good cause, the notice of the hearing was invalid. The party opposing a summary judgment motion should not be under an obligation to respond on the merits—and risk wasting its resources—given that the trial court may ultimately decide that good cause does not exist. Nevertheless, as it turned out here, the trial court did eventually find good cause but not until April 16, 2007—when the parties returned to court as instructed. The court proceeded to hear the summary judgment motion at the same hearing. Thus, April 16 did not legally become the hearing date on the motion until that very day. Plaintiffs had no time to prepare an opposition on the merits after the court granted the defendants' request to hear the motion within 30 days of the trial date—another due process violation and abuse of discretion. (See Urshan, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at pp. 763, 765–766 & fn. 12, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 839; see also Matera v. McLeod, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at pp. 61–62, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 331; In re Brendan P., supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at pp. 914–916, 230 Cal.Rptr. 720.) Finally, we see no reason why plaintiffs should be forced to seek a continuance of the trial to remedy defendants' mistake in setting the hearing within 30 days of the trial date absent prior court permission.” Robinson, at 1268, italics in original. Based on Robinson, Weil & Brown observe that in connection with the 30-day cut off before the date set for trial, the “court must make separate order finding ‘good cause’ before motion filed.” The Rutter Group California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial, section 10:71, italics in original. Here, the matter is in a posture where there has been no finding of good cause sought or obtained by moving defendant to address the invalidity of the hearing date set for March 7, 2025, which is within thirty days of the April 1, 2025 trial date. It can be inferred from the lack of timely opposition filed in connection with the motion that plaintiff reasonably believed plaintiff had no obligation to respond to the motion based on this clear procedural defect, and a lack of any attempt by defendant to obtain an order which might have resulted in a valid hearing date being established. In any case, plaintiff in fact had no obligation to respond to the motion improperly set to be heard, and there has been no valid hearing date established here, or an opportunity for plaintiff to then respond to the motion. The motion accordingly is denied for failure of defendant to comply with CCP §437c(a)(3), as the motion was not set to be heard, and cannot now be heard, no later than 30 days before the date of trial. RULING: [No Opposition] Defendant Glendale Adventist Medical Center dba Adventist Health Glendale’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED. The motion was not noticed to be heard no later than 30 days before the date of trial, as required under CCP § §437c(a)(3), and no order based on a finding of good cause has been sought or obtained from the court. DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE VIDEO APPEARANCES Please make arrangement in advance if you wish to appear via LACourtConnect by visiting www.lacourt.org to schedule a remote appearance. Please note that LACourtConnect offers free audio and video appearances. Department D is now requiring either live or VIDEO appearances, not audio appearances. Please note that in the case of video appearances, ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED. If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative. Case Number:* 23GDCV00782 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: D TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 5 Date: 3/7/2025 Case No: 23 GDCV00782 Trial Date: April 6, 2026 Case Name: Khachatryan, et al. v. Lipp, et al. MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO DISCOVERY MOTIONS TO DEEM REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS ADMITTED (2) Moving Party: Plaintiff Sofya Abrahamyan Plaintiff Laert Khachatryan Responding Party: Defendant Vladislav Viktorovich Lipp RELIEF REQUESTED: Further Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One Order Compelling Defendant Vladislav Viktorovich Lipp to serve verified responses to First Set of Requests for Admissions Order Compelling Defendant Vladislav Viktorovich Lipp to serve verified responses to First Set of Requests for Admissions FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: Plaintiffs Laert Khachatryan and Sofya Abrahamyan allege that in December of 2022 defendant Vladislav Viktorovich Lipp caused a motor vehicle accident in which plaintiffs sustained personal injuries and property damage. The complaint alleges that defendant Avis Budget Group, Inc. owns the vehicle operated by defendant Lipp and negligently entrusted its vehicle to defendant Lipp, when defendant Lipp was an unlicensed driver. The form complaint alleges causes of action for motor vehicle and general negligence. The file shows that on May 19, 2023, defendant Avis Budget Group, Inc. (Avis) filed an answer to the complaint on behalf of itself only. On July 24, 2024, an answer to complaint was filed by Law Office of Joseph L. Stark & Assoc. APC, as attorneys for defendants Avis and Lipp, stating: “COMES NOW, Defendant AVIS BUDGET GROUP, Inc., answering the complaint on behalf of Defendant Vladislav Viktorovich Lipp, who was served pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure 1939.33 only, admits, denies and alleges as follows…” On February 7, 2025, the court heard an Amended Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One, brought by plaintiff Laert Khachatryan. The motion was granted and defendant Vladislav Viktorovich Lipp was ordered to serve further responses to Form Interrogatories—General, Set No. One propounded by plaintiff Laert Khachatryan, without objection, within thirty days. Monetary sanctions sought were denied. The minute order also states, “The Court will hear argument concerning whether the above order will be stayed for a reasonable period to permit the parties to explore the appropriate method to posture this action given the service on defendant Lipp pursuant to CCP section 1939.33.” [Minute Order 02/07/2025, pp. 9-10]. On February 21, 2025, the court heard a Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses brought by plaintiff Sofya Abrahamyan. The matter was called for hearing, and the minute order states, “Court and Counsel confer regarding possible case resolution and procedural stipulation.” The order then indicates that “Pursuant to oral stipulation” the motion noticed to be heard that date and a motion to deem requests for admissions admitted scheduled for February 28, 2025 were continued to March 7, 2025, when a second motion to deem requests for admissions was to be heard. No further papers or stipulation have been filed. ANALYSIS: The court has previously expressed its concern to the parties that it does not appear that defendant Avis, as the rental car company, can appropriately represent defendant Lipp in this matter, as it has been attempting to do. The parties appear to have been in agreement that the appropriate party with standing under the circumstances, given the service on defendant Lipp under CCP section 1939.33, would be the insurer of the subject vehicle, who would then need to intervene in the matter to protect its interest. The court will hear argument concerning if the parties have made any progress toward resolving the procedural issues in this matter and is inclined to continue the matters currently on calendar for a reasonable period to permit a resolution to be pursued. The court as it now stands is wary of considering any opposition papers filed on behalf of “Defendant, VLADISLAV LIPP, by and through Avis Budget Group, Inc.” Avis has no standing to oppose the motions, and unless there is some motion or stipulation concerning an intervention by the insurer or appropriate relief which is granted and the Answer of defendant Lipp appropriately withdrawn, the court will not consider the oppositions. If no relief is obtained and standing is not perfected, the court will be inclined to strike the opposition papers for lack of standing, and consider the discovery motions unopposed. The unopposed motions would then likely be granted and appropriate monetary sanctions awarded. RULING: Motion to Compel Further Interrogatory Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One, is CONTINUED to April 11, 2025. As discussed at the previous hearing on February 21, 2025, there is currently no showing that the moving party, plaintiff Sofya Abrahamyan, is a “propounding party” entitled to seek an order to compel further responses to interrogatories under CCP section 2030.300. The exhibits attached to the moving papers identify the propounding party as plaintiff Laert Khachatryan only. [Zograbian Decl., paras. 5, 6, Exs. A, B]. No further papers have yet been filed with the Court correcting that error. Moreover, the parties have not established to the satisfaction of the Court that any party with appropriate standing is opposing the motion. Amended Motion for Order that Matters in Request for Admissions be Deemed Admitted (filed by plaintiff Laert Khachatryan) is CONTINUED to April 11, 2025. The parties have not established to the satisfaction of the Court that any party with appropriate standing is opposing the motion. Amended Motion for Order that Matters in Request for Admissions be Deemed Admitted (filed by plaintiff Sofya Abrahamyan) is CONTINUED to April 11, 2025. The parties have not established to the satisfaction of the Court that any party with appropriate standing is opposing the motion. The Court will hear argument concerning the intentions of defendant Avis Budget Group, Inc. and any insurer of the subject vehicle concerning future proceedings in this matter in response to the Court’s orders of February 7, 2025, February 21, 2025 and this date. DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE VIDEO APPEARANCES Please make arrangement in advance if you wish to appear via LACourtConnect by visiting www.lacourt.org to schedule a remote appearance. Please note that LACourtConnect offers free audio and video appearances. Department D is now requiring either live or VIDEO appearances, not audio appearances. Please note that in the case of video appearances, ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED. If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative. Case Number: 23GDCV02611 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: D TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 1 Date: 3/7/2025 Case No: 23 GDCV02611 Trial Date: None Set Case Name: Yuh, et al. v. Building Worx, Inc., et al. MOTION TO INTERVENE Moving Party: Third Party CM Advantage Specialty Insurance Company Responding Party: Cross-complainants Building Worx, Inc. and Robert Artura (No Opposition) RELIEF REQUESTED: Leave to intervene in this action by filing the proposed Answer in Intervention SUMMARY OF FACTS: Plaintiffs Bertram Yuh and Janice Yuh allege that they have a primary residence located in La Canada Flintridge, and that in December of 2020, plaintiffs entered into a written contract with defendant Building Worx, Inc. (Building Worx or Defendant), whereby defendant agreed to provide construction remodeling services for $1,425,223.52 at plaintiffs’ property. The complaint alleges that it was agreed that the approximate start date of the project was to be in February 2021, and that the project would be completed within twelve months. The completion date was material as plaintiffs rented another house pending completion. The project began in June of 2021, which aligned with a June 2022 completion date. In July of 2021, Building Worx obtained a permit to demolish the existing residence only. Even though it had not applied for, or obtained, a pool demolition permit at the time, defendant nevertheless proceeded to demolish the pool as well and substantially regraded the site without a grading permit, grading plans, or City inspection. It is also alleged that the grading work went well beyond what was called for in the architect’s plans. Plaintiffs allege that the site grading work resulted in the issuance of a Citation and Stop Work Order by the City in August of 2021, which Citation notes that Building Worx had performed extensive illegal site grading without the benefit of grading plans, grading permits, or inspection as required under the Code. The Citation and subsequent inspection records also note extensive site grading of the building pad, along with the demolition of the pool and backfill, without proper permits or City inspection. Defendant was instructed in writing to obtain proper permits through the City before doing any further work, resulting in significant delay in the project. Plaintiffs allege that defendant has never provided to plaintiffs any of the City’s original paperwork related to the Citation and Stop Work Order, but instead falsely represented through its owner, defendant Robert Artura, both verbally and in writing, that the reason behind the issuance of the Citation and Stop Work Order related specifically to the pool demolition and related backfill. This work was not a part of the original construction contract but was subsequently added by a written change order. Defendant further represented that a City Public Works crew had observed the unpermitted pool demolition and grading work in progress and alerted the City. Plaintiffs allege that the representations were apparently false and intended to deceive plaintiffs about the true nature of the Citation and Stop Work Order. The complaint alleges that the true facts were that the City Building inspector was called to site by either defendant or a subcontractor to sign off on a temporary power pole installation, and that the City inspector then alerted a City compliance officer who issued the Citation and Stop Work Order the following morning, and that the reason for the Citation and Stop Work Order goes far beyond the pool work, but relates to the unpermitted grading and compaction work on the site undertaken by defendant without proper plans, permits and inspections. Defendant’s conduct created almost a year long delay in the project, requiring plaintiffs to rent another house during the duration of the delay, and face added interest costs on plaintiffs’ loans. Plaintiffs also allege that instead of revealing the true facts behind the City’s enforcement actions, defendant instructed plaintiffs to engage a civil and soils engineer to resolve the issue, which would allow the work to continue, and then without plaintiffs’ prior knowledge provided a scope of work to an outside engineering firm and advised plaintiffs to hire the firm or that the project would continue to languish, as a result of which plaintiffs engaged the engineering firm and accepted its proposal. The complaint also alleges that by the time plaintiff discovered the false representations, plaintiffs also discovered that defendant had negligently performed the work they were contracted to do, which was far below industry standards. They also discovered that defendants had breached the contract between the parties in numerous respects. Specifically, it is alleged that, among other things, defendant failed to perform the work in a timely or workmanlike manner and in compliance with the plans and specifications, failed to adequately supervise the project, failed to protect the property from weather, provided unwanted services unnecessary to the project, and demanded payment for those services, failed to obtain required permits, charged for items not required or within the scope of work, charged for services and expenses that were not provided, utilized facilities and resources for which plaintiffs paid for the benefit of other clients, failed to maintain accurate accounting, and issued numerous improper change orders. Plaintiffs also allege a cause of action against defendant American Contractors Indemnity Company, also referred to in the complaint (apparently erroneously) as Old Republic Surety Company (Surety), who allegedly issued a Bond to defendant general contractor Building Worx in the sum of $25,000, inuring to the benefit of any person damaged as a result of a violation of the Business and Professions Code governing licensed general contractors. The complaint alleges that the acts and omissions of defendant Building Worx constitute violations of Business and Professions Code sections 7000 and 7173, so that defendant Surety is indebted to plaintiffs in the full amount of the penal sum of the license bonds issued to defendant Building Worx. Defendant Building Worx and its principal Robert Artura have filed a cross-complaint for indemnity, contribution, apportionment, and declaratory relief against various subcontractors and others retained by cross-complaints to work on the subject construction project. The First Amended Cross Complaint is brought against various parties, including cross-defendant Grasmick Construction, LLC, substituted for Roe 5. Two other cross-defendants have filed cross-complaints for indemnity, contribution, and apportionment against other parties. ANALYSIS: Moving party CM Advantage Specialty Insurance Company, sometimes referred to in the moving papers as CM “Vantage” Specialty Insurance Company (CM Advantage) is an insurer which indicates it insured cross-defendant Grasmick Construction LLC (Grasmick Construction) under a General Liability Policy, and that based on the allegations in the action cross-defendant Grasmick Construction may qualify as an insured under the policy. CM Advantage argues that it has an interest in defending the action on behalf of Grasmick Construction to refute the claims alleged. CM Advantage indicates that Grasmick Construction has not appeared in the action to date and is a “terminated” entity on the California Secretary of State website, and that as such, CM Advantage is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede its ability to protect its interests through Grasmick Construction unless those interests are adequately represented in this action. CCP § 387, governing the procedure for intervention, provides, in pertinent part: “(a) For purposes of this section: (1) “Defendant” includes a cross-defendant. (2) “Plaintiff” includes a cross-complainant. (b) An intervention takes place when a nonparty, deemed an intervenor, becomes a party to an action or proceeding between other persons by doing any of the following: (1) Joining a plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint. (2) Uniting with a defendant in resisting the claims of a plaintiff. (3) Demanding anything adverse to both a plaintiff and a defendant. (c) A nonparty shall petition the court for leave to intervene by noticed motion or ex parte application. The petition shall include a copy of the proposed complaint in intervention or answer in intervention and set forth the grounds upon which intervention rests. (d)(1) The court shall, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or proceeding if either of the following conditions is satisfied: (A) A provision of law confers an unconditional right to intervene. (B) The person seeking intervention claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede that person's ability to protect that interest, unless that person's interest is adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties. (2) The court may, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or proceeding if the person has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both.” In this case, the insurer argues that it has a direct and immediate interest in the litigation for purposes of permissive intervention, because it stands to gain or lose by direct operation of the judgment against the insured. Traditionally, insurers, although they have an interest in the case, were treated like simple creditors, which had no right to intervene in actions concerning debtors absent some indication that the case was not being adequately pursued. See Fireman’s Fund v. Gerlach (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 299. However, in 2000, in response to Insurance Code § 11580, which provides that a judgment creditor may proceed directly against any liability insurance covering the defendant, insurers were permitted to intervene to prevent a default. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 383. CM Advantage here relies on Reliance in which the court of appeal set out the right to intervene rather broadly, based on the practical consequences of application of Insurance Code § 11580: “An insurer's right to intervene in an action against the insured, for personal injury or property damage, arises as a result of Insurance Code section 11580. Section 11580 provides that a judgment creditor may proceed directly against any liability insurance covering the defendant, and obtain satisfaction of the judgment up to the amount of the policy limits. (See Croskey et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation (The Rutter Group) P 15:1028 et seq. (rev. # 1, 1999).) Thus, where the insurer may be subject to a direct action under Insurance Code section 11580 by a judgment creditor who has or will obtain a default judgment in a third party action against the insured, intervention is appropriate. ( Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co. (1978) 22 Cal. 3d 865, 884-885 [151 Cal. Rptr. 285, 587 P.2d 1098].) The insurer may either intervene in that action prior to judgment or move under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 to set aside the default judgment. (22 Cal. 3d at pp. 884-885.) Where an insurer has failed to intervene in the underlying action or to move to set aside the default judgment, the insurer is bound by the default judgment. ( Id. at p. 886.)” Reliance, at 386-387. It appears that CM Advantage here is an insurer which may be subject to direct action under Insurance Code section 11580 by plaintiff if the default of CM Advantage’s insured is taken and a default judgment is ultimately entered against the insured. CM Advantage indicates it has offered to provide a defense to Grasmick Construction pursuant to a reservation of rights, and has a direct and immediate interest in this litigation as CM Advantage may be asked to satisfy a default judgment entered against Grasmick Construction if one is obtained. CM Advantage argues that Grasmick Construction has taken no steps to defend itself from the claims asserted against it because it is a terminated entity. CM Advantage also argues that intervention will not enlarge the issues in the matter, as the insurer seeks to intervene to raise solely those defenses Grasmick Construction could have raised but has not. CM Advantage submits the declaration of the claims professional responsible for the claim to CM Advantage for the defense of Grasmick Construction in the current action, Sarah Arneson. She indicates that based on Arneson’s personal knowledge or information and belief based on her review of CM Advantage’s file, “Navigators” issued a general liability policy to Grasmick Construction, effective from March 18, 2023 through March 18, 2024. [Arneson Decl., para. 2]. The court assumes this is a typographical error, unless advised otherwise. Arneson also states that “Upon tender of the litigation, CM Advantage agreed to defend Grasmick Construction pursuant to a reservation of rights,” and appointed a law firm to defend it. [Arneson Decl., para. 3]. The declaration also indicates: “I am informed that Grasmick Construction LLC (entity number 202028610627) was a California limited liability company that was terminated on January 30, 2024. The file number for the California Secretary of State is BA20240192564. The certificate of termination is attached to the Motion to Intervene as Exhibit B.” [Arneson Decl., Ex. B]. There are no exhibits attached to the motion, the Arenson Declaration, or the proposed order submitted by the moving party. Ordinarily, an insurer would submit a copy of the subject policy, and a copy of documentation confirming the status of the corporation rendering it unable to appear itself in the action. While the court is inclined to credit the testimony of the claims professional with respect to the existence of a policy, the court requires the insurer to submit, before or at the hearing on the motion, a copy of the documentation represented to be included in Exhibit B confirming the current status of Grasmick Construction LLC. Otherwise, the motion hearing will be continued for the submission of further proof. The court is also concerned that there is no indication from the court file that Grasmick Construction has been served, as there is no proof of service with respect to this cross-defendant, so it is not clear that the insured is in a position where its default will be taken. However, the court will also credit the testimony of the claims professional that the litigation was tendered to CM Advantage, and assume that the insured by tendering the litigation, had some reason to be aware of this lawsuit. [See Arneson Decl., para. 3]. The file reflects that Grasmick Construction has not been dismissed from the action, and the file contains no indication that cross-complainants intend to dismiss their claims against Grasmick Construction or decline to pursue them. There has been no opposition to this motion filed by any party to call into question the current posture of the proceedings against the insured. If satisfactory proof is submitted by the hearing concerning the status of Grasmick Construction with the Secretary of State rendering that party unable to defend the action on its own behalf, the court will find that the showing by CM Advantage is sufficient to establish recognized grounds for CM Advantage to be permitted to intervene in this matter. The motion will then be granted. Under CCP § 387, governing the procedure for intervention: “(e) If leave to intervene is granted by the court, the intervenor shall do both of the following: (1) Separately file the complaint in intervention, answer in intervention, or both. (2) Serve a copy of the order, or notice of the court's decision or order, granting leave to intervene and the pleadings in intervention as follows: (A) A party to the action or proceeding who has not yet appeared shall be served in the same manner for service of summons pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 415.10) of Chapter 4 of Title 5 of Part 2. (B) A party who has appeared in the action or proceeding, whether represented by an attorney or not represented by an attorney, shall be served in the same manner for service of summons pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 415.10) of Chapter 4 of Title 5 of Part 2, or in the manner provided by Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 1010) of Title 14 of Part 2. (f) Within 30 days after service of a complaint in intervention or answer in intervention, a party may move, demur, or otherwise plead to the complaint in intervention or answer in intervention in the same manner as to an original complaint or answer.” The moving papers make reference to a proposed Answer in Intervention accompanying this motion. As noted above, there have been no exhibits submitted with the moving papers, and the court is unable to locate a proposed Answer in Intervention in the file. Intervenor nevertheless is permitted to file any required pleadings, and is expected to fully comply with the procedural requirements set forth above once it has been permitted leave to intervene. RULING: CM Specialty Advantage Company’s Motion for Leave to Intervene: The moving papers do not include a copy of Exhibit B, referenced in the Declaration of Sarah Arneson. Moving part is ordered to file a copy of the missing exhibit with the Court at or before the hearing on this matter. If such documentation is not submitted, the motion will be CONTINUED for submission of satisfactory proof of the current corporate status of cross-defendant Grasmick Construction, LLC or DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. ONLY if Exhibit B is timely filed at or in advance of the hearing, and the Court finds the evidence satisfactory: CM Specialty Advantage Company’s Motion for Leave to Intervene is GRANTED. The Court finds that CM Advantage Specialty Insurance Company has sufficiently established pursuant to CCP § 387 that it claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of this action and that it is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede its ability to protect that interest. See also Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 383. Intervenor CM Specialty Advantage Company is ordered to efile by close of business this date a signed copy of its proposed Answer in Intervention and otherwise comply with the requirements of CCP § 387. DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE VIDEO APPEARANCES Please make arrangement in advance if you wish to appear via LACourtConnect by visiting www.lacourt.org to schedule a remote appearance. Please note that LACourtConnect offers free audio and video appearances. Department D is now requiring either live or VIDEO appearances, not audio appearances. Please note that in the case of video appearances, ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED. If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative. Case Number: 24NNCV02088 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: D TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 2 Date: 3/7/2025 Case No: 24 NNCV02088 Trial Date: None Set Case Name: Lin v. Dang, et al. DEMURRER MOTION TO STRIKE (2 Sets) MOTION TO AMEND MOTION TO INFORM THE COURT OF CONCERNS REGARGING INTERPRETER ACCURACY Moving Party: Defendant L.A. Downtown Medical Center (Demurrer and Motion to Strike) Defendants Arcadia Mental Health Center, Los Angeles General Medical Center, Wendy Dang, and Lonna Bennett (Demurrer and Motion to Strike) Plaintiff Louting Lin (Motion to Amend, Motion Regarding Interpreter) Responding Party: Plaintiff Louting Lin (Demurrers and Motions to Strike) Defendants L.A. Downtown Medical Center, Arcadia Mental Health Center, Los Angeles General Medical Center, Wendy Dang and Lonna Bennett (Motion to Amend, Motion Regarding Interpreter) RELIEF REQUESTED: Demurrers and Motions to Strike Sustain demurrer to First Amended Complaint Strike punitive damages Motion to Amend Court approval to submit an amended complaint Motion Regarding Interpreter Inform the court of concerns regarding the accuracy of interpreters provided in court proceedings and to request alternative solutions CAUSES OF ACTION: from First Amended (Form) Complaint 1) General Negligence 2) Intentional Tort 3) General Negligence FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: Plaintiff Luoting Lin alleges that in July of 2023 defendants Wendy Dang, Lonna Bennett, Arcadia Mental Health Center, Los Angeles General Medical Center and L.A. Downtown Medical Center were negligent, whereby plaintiff was harmed and suffered injuries and damages. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Bennett and Dang at Arcadia Mental Health Center negligently reported that plaintiff had a plan to kill herself and placed her on an involuntary psychiatric hold, negligently reporting false statements or opinions regarding plaintiff’s mental condition, and advising that if plaintiff wanted to receive sleeping medication, plaintiff could be sent to the emergency room. Plaintiff alleges that Los Angeles County is responsible for the negligent hiring of Bennett and Dang, and that as a result of the conduct, plaintiff has suffered psychological trauma and severe emotional distress. It is also alleged that defendant L.A. Downtown Medical Center failed to provide plaintiff with a probable cause hearing before holding plaintiff for ten days, and that the staff at the facility were rude, used curse words, made threats to force plaintiff to take medication, and when plaintiff refused, forced plaintiff to take medication without consent, and transferred plaintiff to a psychiatric facility without providing an evaluation or asking any questions by a physician. The file shows that on August 23, 2024, the court heard a demurrer brought by moving defendant L.A. Downtown Medical Center to the original complaint. The demurrer was sustained with leave to amend, as the form complaint failed to check boxes, and was otherwise uncertain. Defendant Arcadia Mental Health Center also filed a demurrer to the original complaint, which was taken off calendar as moot due to the filing of the First Amended Complaint. Defendant L.A. Downtown Medical Center filed a demurrer and motion to strike in response to the First Amended Complaint (FAC). Defendants Arcadia Mental Health Center, Los Angeles General Medical Center, Wendy Dang, and Lonna Bennett filed a separate demurrer and motion to strike in response to the FAC. The demurrer and motion to strike of defendant L.A. Downtown Medical Center were noticed to be heard on December 20, 2024. On December 20, 2024, the court’s minute order noted that the court had issued its tentative ruling via posting on LA Court.org website, which was to sustain the demurrer with leave to amend, and grant the motion to strike punitive damages without leave to amend but without prejudice to plaintiff bringing a motion under CCP section 421.13 should one be appropriate. The matter was called for hearing, and the court noted that no Mandarin language interpreter was available. The minute order indicates, “Plaintiff requests a continuance to obtain counsel.” The court continued the matter to March 7, 2025, and advised plaintiff to request a Mandarin interpreter through the court’s website, and if plaintiff had difficulty to contact the clerk. The court at the December 20, 2024 hearing also, pursuant to the request of plaintiff, advanced the hearing dates and rescheduled for hearing on March 7, 2025 the motion to amend, the motion regarding interpreter accuracy, the demurrer and motion to strike filed by the Arcadia Mental Health Center and Los Angeles General Medical Center defendants, and a Case Management Conference. ANALYSIS: Plaintiff in advance of the March 7, 2025 hearing date has filed a Request for Continuance/Extending all current and future proceedings. Plaintiff indicates in the Request that plaintiff has been actively searching for an attorney, and has found a lawyer who is willing to represent plaintiff, but the lawyer will not obtain independent practice qualifications until late September 2025. The court is not familiar with the term “independent practice qualifications.” Nevertheless, because plaintiff has represented plaintiff wants to obtain counsel and is actively pursuing finding representation, the court will continue the matters for no longer than ninety days to permit plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to engage an attorney. The court will not continue the matter until late September. If plaintiff does obtain counsel and a lawyer appears for plaintiff as counsel of record and makes a reasonable request for further time to become familiar with the case, the court will at that point consider a further continuance. RULING: Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (LA Downtown Medical Center) is CONTINUED to June 6, 2025 (no more than ninety days) to permit plaintiff time to locate and retain legal counsel. Opposition and reply papers due according to Code based on the new hearing date. Motion to Strike Portions of First Amended Complaint (LA Downtown Medical Center) is CONTINUED to June 6, 2025 (no more than ninety days) to permit plaintiff time to locate and retain legal counsel. Opposition and reply papers due according to Code based on the new hearing date. Defendants Arcadia Mental Health Center, Los Angeles General Medical Center, Wendy Dang, and Lonna Bennett’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is CONTINUED to June 6, 2025 (no more than ninety days) to permit plaintiff time to locate and retain legal counsel. Opposition and reply papers due according to Code based on the new hearing date. Defendants Arcadia Mental Health Center, Los Angeles General Medical Center, Wendy Dang, and Lonna Bennett’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is CONTINUED to June 6, 2025 (no more than ninety days) to permit plaintiff time to locate and retain legal counsel. Opposition and reply papers due according to Code based on the new hearing date. Motion to Amend or Explain the Plaintiff’s Complaint and Plaintiff’s Statement and Request for Relief is CONTINUED to June 6, 2025 (no more than ninety days) to permit plaintiff time to locate and retain legal counsel. Opposition and reply papers due according to Code based on the new hearing date. Motion to Inform the Court of Concerns Regarding Interpreter Accuracy and Motion for Flexibility to Leniency CONTINUED to June 6, 2025 (no more than ninety days) to permit plaintiff time to locate and retain legal counsel. Opposition and reply papers due according to Code based on the new hearing date. DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE VIDEO APPEARANCES Please make arrangement in advance if you wish to appear via LACourtConnect by visiting www.lacourt.org to schedule a remote appearance. Please note that LACourtConnect offers free audio and video appearances. Department D is now requiring either live or VIDEO appearances, not audio appearances. Please note that in the case of video appearances, ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED. If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative. Case Number: 24NNCV04763 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: D TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 3 Date: 3/7/2024 Case No: 24 NNCV04763 Trial Date: None Set Case Name: Euler Hermes North America Insurance Company v. City Paper Box Co. MOTION TO DISMISS Moving Party: Defendant City Box Paper Co. Responding Party: Plaintiff Euler Hermes North America Insurance Company (No Opposition) ANALYSIS: This motion is brought by defendant and cross-complainant City Paper Box Co. seeking to dismiss the complaint based on an argument that plaintiff has failed to join City Paper Box LLC as a party, on the basis that City Paper Box Co. is not the correct defendant and that the correct defendant is not currently a party to the action. The file shows that since the filing of the motion on January 15, 2025, plaintiff on February 10, 2025 filed an Amendment to Complaint, substituting the true name of City Paper Box LLC for the fictitious name of Doe 1. On February 10, 2025, plaintiff filed a Request for Dismissal without prejudice of the complaint as to moving defendant City Paper Box Co. only. The dismissal was entered as requested the same date. Evidently, moving party is satisfied that it need not further participate in this action, as on February 20, 2025, City Paper Box Co. filed a Request for Dismissal without prejudice of the entire cross-complaint filed by City Paper Box Co. The moving party has obtained a dismissal from the suit, and defendant City Paper Box Co. LLC has been added as a party. The motion to dismiss accordingly is taken off calendar as moot. RULING: Motion to Dismiss Complaint, or, in the alternative, to Compel Joinder of Party is taken off calendar as MOOT. DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE VIDEO APPEARANCES Please make arrangement in advance if you wish to appear via LACourtConnect by visiting www.lacourt.org to schedule a remote appearance. Please note that LACourtConnect offers free audio and video appearances. Department D is now requiring either live or VIDEO appearances, not audio appearances. Please note that in the case of video appearances, ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED. If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative. Case Number: 24NNCV05046 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: D TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 7 Date: 3/7/2025 Case No: 24 NNCV05046 Trial Date: None Set Case Name: Osuna v. General Motors, LLC MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION Moving Party: Plaintiff Jesus Asuna Responding Party: Defendant General Motors LLC Name of Deponent: PMQ of General Motors LLC Status of Deponent: Defendant or defendant affiliate (party) DEPO ATTENDANCE REQUIRED BY: Formal Notice [Second Amended Notice, Ex. 7]. RELIEF REQUESTED BY MOVING PARTY: Order compelling deposition of defendant General Motors LLC Person or Persons Most Qualified, with production of documents FACTUAL BACKGROUND: Plaintiffs Jesus Osuna alleges that in January of 2023 plaintiff purchased a Chevrolet bold EV, which was warranted by defendant General Motors LLC (GM), with defendant providing an express warranty and an implied warranty, including an implied warranty of fitness. Plaintiff alleges that the vehicle has suffered from nonconformity to warranties, including battery, malfunction warning indicators, charging, electrical and other defects. Plaintiff alleges that the defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable warranty period. Plaintiff alleges that plaintiff delivered the vehicle to defendant’s authorized facility for repair of the nonconformities on numerous occasions, but that defendant has been unable or has refused to conform the subject vehicle to the applicable warranties after a reasonable number of attempts. Plaintiff alleges that notwithstanding plaintiff’s entitlement to a repurchase under the Act and defendant’s knowledge of that entitlement through its internal repair and warranty records, defendant has intentionally refused to comply with its obligations under the Act to repurchase the subject vehicle and make restitution. The complaint alleges a cause of action for Restitution and Damages. ANALYSIS: Plaintiff seeks an order compelling defendant GM to produce its Person Most Qualified to appear and testify at a deposition and produce documents requested in the deposition notice. The moving papers show that plaintiff has served defendant with a series of deposition notices, beginning on November 4, 2024, and that defendant GM served written objections to the original notice, the First Amended Notice and the Second Amended Notice. [Agyeman Decl., paras. 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12; Exs. A, B, D, E, G, H]. Plaintiffs indicate that despite numerous meet and confer efforts, defendant GM continues to maintain its objections to the categories and document requests and refuses to produce its witness. [Agyeman Decl., para. 13]. The motion includes a meet and confer letter sent on December 9, 2024, requesting dates for the deposition, to which there evidently was no response. [Agyeman Decl., para. 11, Ex. F]. The most recent notice, the Second Notice of Deposition, served on December 11, 2024, setting the deposition for January 7, 2025, was responded to by objections, and no agreement to produce the witness. [Agyeman Decl., paras. 11, 12, Exs. G, H]. This motion was filed and served on January 9, 2025, and evidently no deposition dates have been provided by defendant. CCP § 2025.450 (a) provides, in pertinent part: “(a) If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party..., without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent's attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.” Under CCP section 2025.230, with respect to the deposition of the person most knowledgeable: “If the deponent named is not a natural person, the deposition notice shall describe with reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is requested. In that event the deponent shall designate and produce at deposition those of its officers, directors, managing agents, employees, or agents who are most qualified to testify on its behalf as to those matters to the extent of any information known or reasonably available to the deponent.” The moving papers sufficiently establish that defendant, a party to the action, for its person most qualified to testify, was served with deposition notices, and that the objections to those notices objected to the selected deposition dates, but defendant has failed since November of 2024 to provide mutually agreeable dates for the deposition, and has failed to appear for examinations as noticed. [Agyeman Decl., paras. 5-13]. Plaintiff is accordingly entitled to an order compelling defendant’s attendance and testimony. The motion also seeks that the court order the deponent to provide document production along with the deposition testimony. Under CCP § 2025.450 (b): “(b) A motion under subdivision (a) shall comply with both of the following: (1) The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice. (2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance.” The memorandum argues that there is good cause for production of the requested documents because they go to the essential elements of plaintiffs’ express and implied warranty and damages claim. Plaintiff argues that the document requests are directly related to plaintiff’s claims, and universally discoverable in lemon law cases, and consistent with this court’s standing order. The requests seek documents pertaining to the subject vehicle, and other documents which appear pertinent to the lawsuit. Defendant in the opposition argues that this motion was not necessary as GM already has produced documents directly responsive to plaintiff’s discovery requests and has agreed to produce a witness to testify on six or seven of the categories at issues in this motion, but plaintiff has refused to proceed and failed to meet and confer in good faith. The opposition relies on the responses to the Second Amended Notice, which states that the PMQ would be produced an a mutually agreed upon time, but did not specify a date, as well as the declaration of counsel which now states, “GM offers Plaintiff’s firm six depositions a month- more than enough for their inventory.” [Dobson Decl., paras. 9, 11]. There is no indication that any date was ever offered for a PMQ deposition in this particular action. It is not clear why defendant has not offered a single specific date in the many months before this motion was filed, and even in the opposition itself. The motion accordingly is granted and the deposition and production of documents ordered. Any argument that documents already have been produced is rejected by the court, as plaintiff is entitled to documents responsive to the current form of discovery, and so that the deponent can be examined with respect to the documents produced. Any objection that the deposition was unilaterally set has not been justified by the opposition, given the failure to provide any proposal at all for a mutually convenient date. In addition, this matter is subject to the Addendum to Case Management Conference Order (Song-Beverly Litigation) (Order) applicable to Song-Beverly Litigation, now posted and available on the Los Angeles Superior Court website in connection with this Department, Glendale Courthouse, Department D. The Order was signed and entered by the Court on January 24, 2023 and was revised, signed and entered on January 11, 2024 Pursuant to that Order, “any formal discovery propounded and currently pending or outstanding by a party in this matter prior to the date of this CMC Order is stayed pending further order of the Court.” [Order section (1)(a)]. The Order sets forth the following provision concerning discovery in Song-Beverly matters which appear to address the discovery disputes raised by the current motion. With respect to depositions, the Order provides: 4. Deposition: Within the time limits allowed by law. Defendant may depose plaintiff, and plaintiff may depose the person most knowledgeable (PMK) as to up to 5 categories of information, plus a deposition of the PMK as to why the subject vehicle was not repurchased, in addition to depositions of any experts identified by the parties, after a formal demand and exchange of expert witness information, per CCP § 2034. Parties shall meet and confer as to whether there is a need to take any additional depositions. Any additional depositions may only be noticed and taken by stipulation and/or court order (via motion upon showing of good cause). If a deponent resides out of state, the deposition may be taken by video conference or telephone. The parties will not be required to travel to California, and the attorneys will not be required to travel out of state.” [Order, section 4], emphasis added. With respect to document production, the order provides: “Production of Documents: Within 60 days of service of this Order both plaintiff and defendant shall provide copies of the following documents, which are in their respective possession, custody and/or control, to the opposing side(s): a. Purchase or lease contracts concerning the subject vehicle, including any associated documents reflecting OEM or aftermarket equipment installed at the dealership, ELWs or service contracts, and any other writings signed by the plaintiff at the point of sale. b. Work orders, repair orders, and invoices (including accounting and warranty versions) for any maintenance, service and repair activity concerning the subject vehicles. c. Rental car or loaner agreements regarding alternative transportation provided during service or repair visits concerning the subject vehicle. d. Records of communications with dealer personnel, and/or factory representatives and defendant’s call center or customer assistance personnel concerning the subject vehicle. e. Warrant claims submitted to and/or approved by defendant concerning the subject vehicle. f. Warranty Policy and Procedure Manual or similar policies or claim-handling procedures published by Defendant from the date the subject vehicle was purchased or leased to the date the lawsuit was filed. g. Defendant’s written statements of policy and/or procedures used to evaluate customer requests for repurchase or replacement pursuant to “Lemon Law” claims, including ones brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, from the date the subject vehicle was purchased or leased to the date the lawsuit was filed. h. A list of or compilation of customer complaints in defendant’s electronically stored information database that are substantially similar to the alleged defects claimed by plaintiff, in vehicles purchased in California for the same year, make and model of the subject vehicle. A substantially similar customer complaint would be the same nature of reported symptom, malfunction, dashboard indicator light, or other manifestation of a repair problem as the description listed in any work order or repair order for the subject vehicle, other than routine or scheduled maintenance items. The list provided by defendant may be in the chart or spreadsheet format, and shall include the VIN, date of repair visit, dealership or other reporting location, and text of the other customers’ reported complaint, but shall not include the other customers’ names, addresses, phone numbers, e-mail addresses, or other personal identifying information. i. Technical Service Bulletins and Recall Notices for vehicle purchased or leased in California for the same year, make and model of the subject vehicle. j. Copies of any repair instruction, bulletin, or other diagnostic/repair procedure identified in any of the repair order/invoice records for the subject vehicle. k. Receipts or other written evidence supporting any incidental or consequential damages claimed by plaintiff. If a party believes any of this information should be subject to a protective order, that party shall serve and file a proposed protective order within 5 days of this Order and the parties shall meet and confer as to agreeable language for the same. The default will be the standard Protective Order provided by the LASC in its website. The information may be provided to the opposing party in electronic form as a PDF at the option of the producing party. Plaintiff and defendant shall serve verification with the documents they produce. Any additional requests for documents may only be propounded by stipulation and/or court order (via motion upon showing of good cause). [Order section (2)(a)]. The parties are also directed to the Notice to All Counsel Re: Lemon Law Cases for Department D, entitled Customary Rulings Re Document Requests (Song Beverly Litigation) (Notice). That Notice provides: “When the court is faced with a discovery dispute in a Song-Beverly case, the court will usually order that the plaintiff and defendant provide copies of the following documents, which are in their respective possession, custody and/or control, to the opposing side: 1. Defendant shall produce the “Warranty Policy and Procedure Manual” published by Defendant and provided to its authorized repair facilities, within the State of California, for the period of [date of purchase] to present. 2. Defendant shall produce any internal analysis or investigation regarding defects alleged in plaintiff's complaint in vehicles for the same year, make and model of the subject vehicle. This includes Recall Notices and Technical Service Bulletins. Defendant is not required to do a search of emails. 3. Defendant shall produce any customer complaints relating to defects alleged in plaintiff’s complaint in vehicles purchased in California for the same year, make and model of the subject vehicle. 4. Defendant shall produce all documents evidencing policies and procedures used to evaluate customer requests for repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, for the period of [date of purchase] to present. 5. Repair orders and invoices concerning the subject vehicle. 6. Communications with dealer, factory representative and/or call center concerning the subject vehicle. 7. Warranty claims submitted to and/or approved by Defendant concerning the subject vehicle. 8. Purchase and/or lease contract concerning the subject vehicle. 9. Repair orders and invoices concerning the subject vehicle. 10. Any documents supporting plaintiff’s claim for incidental and/or consequential damages.” The court notes that the Order provides for PMK depositions for up to 5 categories of information, plus a deposition of the PMK as to why the subject vehicle was not repurchased. The Second Amended Notice of Deposition designates eight matters on which the PMQ is to be examined, but two of them appear to be directed to the repurchase or replacement issue. [See Ex. B, Matters Nos. 1, 6]. This results in one matter being beyond the scope of the court’s order. There has been no motion made by plaintiff to show good cause for more than six subjects. The court will hear at the hearing which of the five categories plaintiff will be pursuing at the deposition, along with the two issues as to why the vehicle was not repurchased. Defendant is ordered to designate a person or persons to appear and testify on the designated subjects on a date certain within the next twenty days. With respect to the documents requested, the production is to be made and the deposition conducted in accordance with the Order and Notice. If there is some further dispute concerning the production of documents or the conduct of the deposition, the parties must comply with the Order and Notice, and meet and confer in good faith concerning any outstanding discovery in light of the Order and Notice, and, if necessary, pursue a further motion which must be accompanied by a separate statement reflecting the then current status of any discovery disputes, including in that separate statement as to each request and response any applicable language of the Order and Notice. Defendant also appears to argue that plaintiff’s discovery here implicates trade secret and propriety information of GM. It does not appear from the file that the parties have yet entered into a protective order. The court notes that if either party requires a protective order, the procedures are addressed in the Order, at section 2, subdivision (k), above. The entry of such a protective order should make it unnecessary for the parties to assert any objections that the discovery seeks confidential, proprietary or trade secret information. Sanctions This leaves the issue of monetary sanctions, which are sought by the moving parties. Plaintiffs request monetary sanctions for the expense of having to bring this motion. Under CCP § 2025.450 (g)(1): “If a motion under subdivision (a) is granted, the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) in favor of the party who noticed the deposition and against the deponent or the party with whom the deponent is affiliated, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” CCP § 2023.010 (d) provides that misuse of the discovery process includes, “Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery.” CCP § 2023.030(a) authorizes the imposition of monetary sanctions against a party and its attorney for misuse of the discovery process. Under CRC Rule 3.1348(a): “The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed.” The burden is on the party subject to sanctions to show substantial justification or injustice. Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1990, 2nd Dist.) 223 Cal.App.3d 1429, 1436. Here, the motion is granted under CCP § 2025.450 subdivision (a), and the statute indicates that the court “shall” impose a monetary sanction. Defendant has failed to show how defendant was substantially justified in delaying many months and still not providing a date for the PMQ deposition. Defendant in opposition argues that the request for sanctions is groundless, as plaintiffs’ motion is baseless, which it clearly is not, but will be granted. Defendant also argues that GM has agreed to provide a PMQ deposition, and it is simply a matter of working with the witness to provide dates. There is no explanation why this could not have been done in the many months since the deposition was first noticed and avoided the need to bring this motion. Sanctions will be awarded. The sanctions sought by plaintiffs are $2,900.00. These appear high for a motion of this nature, which was largely cut and pasted from an existing template, and does not follow the procedures set forth in the standing orders in place in this matter designed to streamline this discovery. The sanctions awarded are adjusted accordingly as follows: Four hours total attorney time at $475.00 per hour for total attorney’s fee of $1,900.00. RULING: Plaintiff Jesus Osuna’s Motion to Compel the Deposition of Defendant General Motors, LLC’s Person Most Qualified and to Produce Documents is GRANTED. Defendant General Motors LLC is ordered to designate and produce witness(es) to appear for deposition and to give testimony on a mutually convenient date and time as to the matters requested in Plaintiff Jesus Osuna’s Second Amended Notice of Deposition of Defendant General Motors, LLC’s Person(s) Most Qualified, with Production of Documents served on December 11, 2024, no later than April 11, 2025, limited to the following five designated categories of information, plus deposition of the PMK as to why the subject vehicle was not repurchased (categories Nos. 1 and 6). Plaintiff Jesus Osuna’s attorney must make an election of 5 of the 6 subject matters listed in the PMK deposition notice. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Good cause appearing, the deponent(s) is (are) also ordered to produce for inspection at the deposition any and all materials described in the subject notice which are consistent with this Court’s Standing Order Re Discovery (Song-Beverly Litigation), signed and entered by the Court on January 24, 2023 as revised, signed and entered on January 11, 2024, as well as materials which are consistent with this Court’s Notice to All Counsel Re: Lemon Law Cases for Department D, Customary Rulings Re Document Requests (Song Beverly Litigation). If a party believes any of the information requested in discovery should be subject to a protective order, that party shall serve and file a proposed protective order within 5 days of this Order and the parties shall meet and confer as to agreeable language for the same. The default will be the standard Protective Order provided by the LASC in its website. Monetary sanctions requested by moving party: Utilizing a lodestar approach, and in view of the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the total and reasonable amount of attorney’s fees and costs incurred for the work performed in connection with the pending motion is $1,900.00. (4 hours @ $475 per hour and no hours at $525 per hour) [5 and 1 hours requested] [Amount Requested $2,900.00], which sum is to be awarded in favor of plaintiff Jesus Osuna and against defendant General Motors LLC, payable within 30 days. CCP §§ 2025.450 (g)(1), 2023.010 (d) and 2023.030 (a). Counsel for moving party is ordered to prepare an order for sanctions and submit it on eCourt by noon today in accordance with this order. DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE VIDEO APPEARANCES Please make arrangement in advance if you wish to appear via LACourtConnect by visiting www.lacourt.org to schedule a remote appearance. Please note that LACourtConnect offers free audio and video appearances. Department D is now requiring either live or VIDEO appearances, not audio appearances. Please note that in the case of video appearances, ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED. If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative. Case Number: 24NNCV05053 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: D TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 8 Date: 3/7/2025 Case No: 24 NNCV05053 Trial Date: None Set Case Name: Tran v. Esparza, et al. DEMURRER Moving Party: Defendant Los Angeles Regional Center for the Developmentally Disabled, Inc. Responding Party: Plaintiff Hung Tran, as conservator of Henry C. Tran RELIEF REQUESTED: Sustain demurrer to Complaint CAUSES OF ACTION: from (Form) Complaint 1) General Negligence SUMMARY OF FACTS: Plaintiff Hung C Tran, Conservator for Henry Chi Tran, brings this action against defendants Efren Esparza, Martin Vera, Exclusive Services LLC and East LA Regional Center. The form complaint alleges a cause of action for general negligence, alleging that defendants Efren Esparza of Xclusive Services LLC was responsible for Henry Tran and was the legal cause of damages to plaintiff for the reasons of lack of supervision and that neglect of duty led to Henry Tran’s neglect and abuse. The complaint also states, “See Alhambra Police Report: 22-35939.” ANALYSIS: Defendant Eastern Los Angeles Regional Center for the Developmentally Disabled, Inc. argues that the complaint appears to allege that defendants Efren Esparza and Xclusive Services LLC were somehow negligent in causing injury to Henry C. Tran, but the complaint identifies the plaintiff as Hung Tran, apparently Henry C. Tran’s conservator, and does not allege any injuries sustained by Hung Tran. Defendant also points out that the complaint’s single cause of action for negligence does not identify moving defendant Regional Center, and alleges nothing against it. Defendant argues that this makes it impossible for demurring defendant to ascertain who is the proper plaintiff and what that plaintiff is alleging, or against whom. The complaint includes no charging allegations against the moving defendant, identifying that the defendants who negligently caused damage to plaintiff were “Efren Esparza, Xclusive Services LLC.” [Complaint, para. GN-1]. There is no mention of moving defendant in the cause of action. The pleading is also confusing, as it appears that the named plaintiff Hung Tran, is not the party who suffered injury, as the complaint appears to allege that it was Henry Tran who suffered neglect and abuse. [Complaint, para. GN-1]. The pleading should more clearly allege that the matter is being brought by the injured party, Henry Tran, through a conservator or representative. Plaintiff in response to the demurrer has filed a Declaration of Marilyn M. Smith in Response to Demurrer of East LA Regional Center indicating that Smith is counsel for plaintiff Hung Tran, as conservator of Henry C. Tran, and substituted in as counsel on February 5, 2025. Plaintiff was previously self-represented. Counsel indicates that following entry into the case, counsel reviewed the pleadings and demurrers filed, and it became clear that an amended complaint needed to be filed with more substantive allegations, which counsel will be filing with sufficient allegations as to each defendant. [Smith Decl., paras. 1, 2]. Plaintiff’s counsel indicates counsel reached out to counsel for defendants to ask for the demurrer to be taken off calendar so plaintiff could file an amended complaint within thirty days. Counsel for defendants Xclusive and Esparza agreed, and took their demurrer off calendar, but counsel for defendant Regional Center would not take the demurrer off calendar, taking the position that there was plenty of time to file an amended pleading in the three weeks between the contact from counsel for plaintiff and the hearing on the demurrer. [Smith Decl., paras. 3-5]. Plaintiff’s counsel explains that during the period when a timely opposition could have been filed, new counsel was in a jury trial and all day mediation, and then, on the date opposition was due was scheduled to undergo a surgical procedure from an auto accident. [Smith Decl., para. 5]. This showing concedes that the demurrer is meritorious. The demurrer is sustained with leave to amend for the reasons set forth in the demurrer. In light of the recent involvement of counsel for plaintiff in this case, and the apparent impropriety of the conservator party proceeding on behalf of the conservatee without an attorney in the first place, the court finds that this result is the appropriate outcome. Although defendant in the reply result requests that the demurrer be sustained without leave to amend, counsel for plaintiff has represented that sufficient allegations can be made in an amended complaint as to each defendant. [Smith Decl., para. 2]. Moreover, this is the original complaint in the action, and it is held that in the case of an original complaint, plaintiff need not even request leave to amend: “unless [an original complaint] shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment, denial of leave to amend constituted an abuse of discretion, irrespective of whether leave to amend is requested or not.” King v. Mortimer (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 153, 158, citations omitted. This instant is plaintiff’s first attempt to state these causes of action, and it is not clear from the face of the complaint that it cannot be amended to state a cause of action against the moving defendant, particularly when the basis of the demurrer is the failure to allege specific facts which would likely be within the personal knowledge of Hung Tran and Henry Tran. The demurrer is sustained with leave to amend. RULING: Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND for the reasons stated in the demurrer. There are no charging allegations stated against the moving defendant Eastern Los Angeles Regional Center for the Developmentally Disabled, Inc, and it is not clear from the designation of plaintiff and the allegedly neglected and abused person what exactly is being alleged in terms of standing. Thirty days leave to amend. The parties are ordered to meet and confer in full compliance with CCP § 430.41 before any further demurrer may be filed. DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE VIDEO APPEARANCES Please make arrangement in advance if you wish to appear via LACourtConnect by visiting www.lacourt.org to schedule a remote appearance. Please note that LACourtConnect offers free audio and video appearances. Department D is now requiring either live or VIDEO appearances, not audio appearances. Please note that in the case of video appearances, ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED. If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative. Case Number: 24NNCV06598 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: D TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 9 Date: 3/7/2025 Case No: 24 NNCV06598 Trial Date: None Set Case Name: Pacific Rejuvenation Medical v. Capital One APPEARANCE PRO HAC VICE MP: Elizabeth Ireland, Esq. RP: No Opposition CONDITIONS: Association with CA attorney (name, address, phone #) Yes Verified declaration: Yes Service on State Bar at San Francisco office: Yes Fee paid to State Bar: Yes (Ex. A) Good standing and not currently suspended/disbarred: ( Yes ¶¶ 3,4,) Non-California residence and office: No residence address Admitted to practice in the following courts and the date: State of North Carolina 2014 1st, 4th, 9th, 11th Circuit Courts of Appeal 2024 USDC E.D. NC, M.D. NC, W.D EC 2017-2022 Titles of court, case number and cause in which moving party has filed an application to appear pro hac vice in this state in the last two years, dates and whether motion granted or not: Has not filed any applications to appear as counsel pro hac vice in the Superior Court of California within the past two years. (Application ¶ 7) Declaration of moving party: Application verified OPPOSITION: No Opposition ANALYSIS: There is one irregularity with this application. The application does not provide the applicant’s residence address. The application states that attorney Ireland “resides in Charlotte, North Carolina,” and provides “contact information,” consisting of the attorney’s law firm address. [Application, paras. 1, 5]. Under CRC Rule 9.40(d): “The application must state: (1) The applicant's residence and office address…” The Court accordingly requires that a declaration under oath or a verified supplement to the application be submitted at or before the hearing stating the residence address of the applicant before the application will be granted. The paperwork is otherwise in order. RULING: UNOPPOSED Verified Application of Elizabeth Ireland for Admission Pro Hac Vice as Counsel for Defendant Capital One, National Association: The Court notes that the application does not include the residence address of the applicant, as required under CRC Rule 9.40(d)(1). Applicant is ordered to submit a declaration under oath or verified supplement to the application stating the applicant’s residence address before the Court will grant the application. Once such a showing is submitted, the Verified Application of Elizabeth Ireland, member in good standing of the State Bar of North Carolina, for Admission Pro Hac Vice as Counsel for Defendant Capital One, National Association will be GRANTED. The Court finds that the application complies with all requirements of CRC Rule 9.40 and that applicant has provided sufficient proof of service on the State Bar and payment of the requisite fee. DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE VIDEO APPEARANCES Please make arrangement in advance if you wish to appear via LACourtConnect by visiting www.lacourt.org to schedule a remote appearance. Please note that LACourtConnect offers free audio and video appearances. Department D is now requiring either live or VIDEO appearances, not audio appearances. Please note that in the case of video appearances, ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED. If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative. Case Number: EC063536 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: D TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 10 Date: 3/7/2025 Case No: EC 063536 Case Name: Mellenthin, et al. v. Komisar, et al. APPLICATION TO AMEND JUDGMENT Moving Party: Judgment Creditors Eve Somer, as Trustee of the Eve Somer Living Trust dated July 1, 2020, and Gregory C. Yaitanes, as Trustee of the Gregory C. Yaitanes Family Trust Responding Party: Defendants/Cross Complainants Boris Komisar and Elvira Shut RELIEF REQUESTED: Amend Judgment of May 23, 2018 to decree (1) Judgment Debtor’s revocable licenses for Encroachment Nos. 1 and 3 are terminated; (2) Encroachment Nos. 1-4 are to be removed by date certain; and (3) Entry of the Amended Judgment is to be held in abeyance until the City of Los Angeles approves or denies the lot line adjustment application submitted by Judgment Debtors. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: Plaintiffs Michael Mellenthin and Donna Mellenthin, trustees of the Mellenthin Family Trust, brought this action alleging they were owners of real property on Oakdale Road in Studio City, against defendants Boris Komisar and Elvira Shut, the owners of real property on El Cerro Lane in Studio City, alleging that defendants’ wall, wall supporting pool deck, concrete pillar, and gas, water, drains and electric lines encroached onto the easterly portion of the Mellenthin property. Plaintiff sought a mandatory injunction requiring defendants to remove the encroachments from the disputed property and judgment quieting title in plaintiffs as of the date of the complaint. Defendants Komisar and Shut filed a cross-complaint against plaintiffs, alleging that when defendants inspected and eventually purchased the Komisar property, a large pool deck and a driveway existed on the property, with the driveway bordered by a short retaining wall and an ivy covered chain link fence on the western side of the property, which cross-complainants thought was the border between the Komisar property and the Mellenthin property. Komisar and Shut alleged that the walls, pool decks, foundation, fences, and gas, water, drain and electrical lines had been in existence at their current locations for more than five years prior to the filing of the present lawsuit, and that cross-complainants were entitled to a prescriptive easement to use the Mellenthin property for those alleged encroachments. In the alternative, cross-complainants alleged that during a remodeling project and public hearings for the remodeling project, Michael Mellenthin, an experienced residential property developer and retired licensed general contractor, reviewed the construction plans, and represented that he knew the plan included encroachments on his property but did not care about them, but that his only concern was that the project have adequate drainage so that no water would flow from the Komisar property to the Mellenthin property. After the hearing, and the approval of the plans, cross-complainants proceeded with the remodeling project. Hence, they alleged that if they were not entitled to a prescriptive easement, they were entitled to have an equitable or other easement to use that portion of the Mellenthin property containing alleged encroachments, particularly if the award of such equitable easement was conditioned on cross-complainants paying cross-defendants the reasonable value of said easements. The cross-complaint alleged that removing the retaining wall would remove the lateral support for cross-complainants’ driveway and create a soil subsidence issue on the Mellenthin property, that the removal of the pool deck would endanger the structural integrity of the structure, and that moving gas, water, drain and electrical lines would be prohibitively expensive, and of negligible harm to cross-defendants, when the lines were not interfering with the Mellenthins’ use of the ornamental landscape then being maintained. The cross-complaint sought a determination of title to prescriptive, equitable or other easements for the encroaching structures, and a judicial determination as to the rights and duties of the parties concerning those structures. The file shows that the matter went to a court trial in November of 2017 through January of 2018. Post-trial briefs and motions were filed, and on April 25, 2018, the court issued and served it Statement of Decision, which was to issue a mandatory injunction for defendants’ trespass as to a large pillar encroachment [Encroachment No. 2], and for defendants’ trespass as to the electrical and plumbing encroachment [Encroachment No. 4], and to issue a license to defendants for the driveway wall encroachment [Encroachment No. 1] and the pool deck wall encroachment [Encroachment No. 3]. The Statement of Decision provides for a damages award to plaintiffs in the amount of $14,755 for construction of a new fence and $5,498.30 for new replacement trees. On May 23, 2018, the court signed and filed the Judgment submitted jointly by the parties. This matter was originally heard on June 28, 2024. The parties submitted on the court’s tentative ruling which was posted online and at the courtroom. The court adopted its modified tentative ruling as set forth in the minute order, which was: “Counsel are ordered to meet and confer in person or by Zoom by no later than 07/26/2024 to make efforts in submitting the Joint Application and moving this case forward to a resolution. The court sets the matter on the dates indicated below. Briefs are due on September 20, 2024 which are to outline what has been done to bring compliance, what needs to be done, and what is the hold up.” A Status Conference Compliance—Briefs Due was scheduled for October 4, 2024, and the hearing on the motion was continued to December 6, 2024. On October 4, 2024, at the Status Conference Compliance—Briefs Due, after conferring with counsel, the court ordered the parties to mediate based on the court’s prior order. The parties were ordered to meet and confer and be prepared to inform the court on the next court date when mediation was set to occur and with whom. Counsel for plaintiff was ordered to submit assignee paperwork as required. A Status Conference Re: Mediation and Filing of Assignment of Judgment paperwork was scheduled for October 21, 2024. The court also that date entered a nunc pro tunc minute order to correct the minute order of 06/28/2024 to reflect the correct tentative ruling. At the Status Conference on October 21, 2024, counsel stated that they were in the process of scheduling a mediation date. After conferring with counsel, the court ordered the Status Conference continued to December 19, 2025, and the motion to amend judgment was continued to March 7, 2025. ANALYSIS: Since the previous hearing date, defendants/cross-complainants Boris Komisar and Elvira Shut have filed a Status Report Re: Property Line Adjustment, indicating that the parties agreed through counsel to attend mediation through Signature Resolution, as specified in a Lot Line Adjustment Contract prepared by Assignees/moving parties. The Status Report indicates that the Contract calls for mediation of any disputes pertaining to the Contract, but moving parties have made clear their intention to not comply with the Contract and mediate. The Status Report also indicates that the moving parties have cancelled the lot line adjustment, and so should be estopped from pursuing the remedy to amend the judgment. The attached executed Lot Line Adjustment Agreement was executed on March 11, 2024, and provides, in pertinent part: “Mediation. The Parties agree to and shall mediate any dispute or claim between them arising out of this Agreement or any resulting transaction. The mediation shall be held prior to any civil action. In the event the parties are not able to agree on a mediator within thirty days of the first party seeking mediation, the parties shall submit the matter to mediation before Signature Resolution in Los Angeles County, California, who shall appoint a mediator.” [Status Report, Ex. A, para. 17]. The Status Report attaches emails showing the parties have not been able to schedule a mediation. [Ex. B]. The Status Report also indicates that, more importantly, the moving parties/assignees have sold their interest in the property. The Status Report attaches a recorded Grant Deed, executed on July 2, 2024 and recorded on July 31, 2024, pursuant to which Eve Somer, Trustee, and Gregory C. Yaitanes, Trustee, each granted to John Blakeman, Trustee of The Whole Bottle Trust, their undivided 50% interest in the subject property at 3318 Oakdell Rd. in Studio City. [Ex. C]. It accordingly appears the motion has been rendered moot, as moving parties are no longer owners of the subject property entitled to become assignees. It would appear that the covenant at issue runs with the land, and that the new owner would have an interest in this matter and its ultimate resolution. The court notes that the moving parties have filed a Judgment Assignees’ Status Report, and various supporting documents, including a Notice of Non-Opposition to the Application to Amend Judgment, none of which address the Grant Deed or explain the impact on the application to be named as assignees the fact that the recorded ownership of the property is now in a third party. The moving parties take the position that they have been cooperating in efforts to schedule the mediation, and have not wrongfully withdrawn the Lot Line Adjustment application made to the City of Los Angeles Planning Department. The moving parties submit an undated copy of a Case Summary screen from Los Angeles City Planning, which seems to reflect that as of the unidentified date of the search the matter was still pending. [Hummer Decl., para. 21, Ex. B]. Without a date, this showing is not strong evidence that the lot line application is still pending. In any case, the court is concerned that the Grant Deed is not addressed, and that since the execution of the Grant Deed and its recording, the moving parties have submitted status reports to the court on September 20, 2024, November 4, 2024 and February 26, 2025 and attending a Status Conference before the court on October 21, 2024 without making mention of the transfer of ownership of the property in July of 2024. The matter accordingly is deemed moot. The court will hear argument concerning whether the new owners of the property have standing to file a claim as assignees. RULING: Judgment Creditors’ Application to Amend Judgment is MOOT in light of the recording on July 31, 2024 of a Grant Deed granting the property formerly held by plaintiffs from the moving parties to John Blakeman, Trustee of The Whole Bottle Trust dated July 2, 2024. DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE VIDEO APPEARANCES Please make arrangement in advance if you wish to appear via LACourtConnect by visiting www.lacourt.org to schedule a remote appearance. Please note that LACourtConnect offers free audio and video appearances. Department D is now requiring either live or VIDEO appearances, not audio appearances. Please note that in the case of video appearances, ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED. If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative.

DEPARTMENT D LAW AND MOTION RULINGS

Case Number: 23GDCV00358 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: D

TENTATIVE RULING

Calendar: 4

Date: 3/7/2025

Case No: 23 GDCV00358 Trial Date: April 1, 2025

Case Name: Black v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center dba Adventist Health Glendale, et al.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

Moving Party: Defendant Glendale Adventist Medical Center dba Adventist Health Glendale

Responding Party: Plaintiff Jamie Black (No Opposition)

Relief Requested:

Summary adjudication in favor of defendant Glendale Adventist Medical Center dba Adventist Health Glendale of the second cause of action for Violations of EMTALA

Causes of Action from Complaint

1) Professional Negligence

2) Violation of EMTALA, 42 USC Section 13996dd, et seq. *

*Request for Dismissal of the 2nd Cause of Action against defendant Alec Bradleigh Freling, M.D. filed and dismissal entered April 21, 2023.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:

Plaintiff Jamie Black alleges that in October of 2022, plaintiff, who had a history of depression, bipolar disorder, ADHD and schizophrenia, for which she had previously been placed on several 5150 involuntary psychiatric holds, went for a walk, and a group of people she encountered noticed she was upset and scared and not acting appropriately and asked if she needed an ambulance, to which plaintiff replied in the affirmative.

Plaintiff alleges that paramedics were summoned and she was transported to defendant Glendale Adventist Medical Center dba Adventist Health Center (the Hospital). The complaint alleges that when plaintiff arrived at the Hospital, her vital signs showed she was hypersensitive and tachycardic. While in the emergency room, when asked her name, plaintiff identified several names, which were not her correct name, and plaintiff was also unable to provide a valid social security number. Plaintiff alleges that although attempts were made to take plaintiff’s blood and urine, the attempts were not successful.

Plaintiff alleges that she was eventually seen by defendant Alec Bradleigh Freling, M.D., who diagnosed plaintiff with, among other conditions, psychosis due to methamphetamine use, schizoaffective disorder, and PCP use, and concluded that plaintiff appeared in a psychotic state.

Plaintiff alleges that she was given a dose of haloperidol, medication used to treat psychotic patients, and an injection of lorazepam, an anti-anxiety medication. Plaintiff repeatedly requested that the psychiatrist evaluate her, and a request was entered by Dr. Freling for plaintiff to be seen by a psychiatrist. Dr. Freling later re-evaluated plaintiff, and noted that she would not provide further information to him because he was a male, and had requested to speak with a female behavioral health individual, so that Dr. Freling noted that a female, Tracy, had previously attempted an evaluation during which plaintiff was uncooperative, and that Tracy would attempt to evaluate plaintiff again.

The complaint alleges that plaintiff engaged in behavior such as telling the nursing staff she had been poisoned and requesting an ultrasound because she believed there were drugs inside her uterus, crying loudly, screaming, pulling the curtains on other patient’s beds and screaming and yelling. Plaintiff was asked to write down her social security number, but ultimately said she could not remember it. The complaint alleges that later that evening Dr. Freling noted that Tracy had evaluated plaintiff and that plaintiff had been cleared by the on-call psychiatrist, although there is no record plaintiff was seen or evaluated by a psychiatrist at any time during her presentation. It is alleged that Dr. Freling stated plaintiff was alert and oriented and had normal mood and affect, but there was no physical examination performed at that time to support such a conclusion.

Dr. Freling then indicated that plaintiff would be discharged, and plaintiff requested of the nursing staff that she see someone else, but her request was denied, and she was told to call someone for a ride.

Plaintiff alleges that after some further confusion, plaintiff ultimately called a friend to pick her up, and the nurses escorted plaintiff out of the hospital, essentially throwing her out of the facility, three hours after arriving, when plaintiff had never been seen or evaluated by a psychiatrist, and had never had blood or urine work done.

Plaintiff alleges that after many instances of improper behavior in the car once plaintiff arrived at the friend’s house, plaintiff eventually walked to an overpass above the 15 freeway in Barstow and jumped off the overpass in an attempt to kill herself, as a result of which she suffered serious injuries.

The file shows that on April 21, 2023, plaintiff filed two Requests for Dismissal as to defendant Alec Bradleigh Freling, M.D. One Request was to dismiss the second cause of action only against that defendant, the second was to dismiss the third prayer for relief only. The third prayer for relief in the Complaint seeks, “For legal interest on judgment from the filing of this complaint to the date of judgment.” Both dismissals were entered as requested on April 21, 2023.

On May 17, 2024, the court granted an unopposed motion for summary judgment brought by defendant Dr. Freling, and judgment was entered in Dr. Freling’s favor the same date.

On January 28, 2025, defendant Lukas Alexanian, M.D. filed a Notice of Settlement indicating that plaintiff and defendant Alexanian had entered into a settlement. That same date, defendant filed a notice of application for good faith settlement.

Defendant Glendale Adventist Medical Center dba Adventist Health Glendale now brings this motion for summary adjudication of the second cause of action against it.

ANALYSIS:

Procedural

Motion Set to be Heard Fewer Than 30 Days Before Trial

CCP §437c(a)(3), pertaining to motions for summary judgment, provides, in pertinent part, “The motion shall be heard no later than 30 days before the date of trial, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise.”

Here, the motion is to be heard on March 7, 2025, with a trial date of April 1, 2025, so fewer than thirty days before the date of trial. There is no indication in the file showing moving party has sought or obtained an order permitting an exception based on good cause prior to the filing of the motion, and the moving papers do not attempt to establish good cause.

The 30-day requirement has been held not jurisdictional, since the court for good cause may permit the matter to be heard closer to the trial date. Beroiz v. Wahl (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 485, 493 n.4. However, in Beroiz, the Second District found that the trial court properly had considered a motion for summary judgment filed in violation of this time deadline because the trial court had determined that the moving parties had stated good cause. There is no attempt to show good cause in the moving papers here, and no factual basis upon which the court may make a finding of good cause.

In Robinson v. Woods (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1268, the Second District concluded the trial court had abused its discretion by continuing a noticed hearing for summary judgment which had not been brought on 75 days’ notice for four days, rather than the statutorily required 75 day period, and then deciding at the continued hearing that good cause had been shown for hearing the motion within 30 days of the trial date, and ruling on the motion.

With respect to the 30-day issue, the Second District held:

“A second reason justified plaintiffs' lack of an opposition on the merits and rendered the April 12, 2007 hearing improper. Defendants noticed their motion for hearing within 30 days of the trial date without first obtaining a determination of good cause from the trial court. (See § 437c, subd. (a).) Unless and until the trial court found good cause, the notice of the hearing was invalid. The party opposing a summary judgment motion should not be under an obligation to respond on the merits—and risk wasting its resources—given that the trial court may ultimately decide that good cause does not exist. Nevertheless, as it turned out here, the trial court did eventually find good cause but not until April 16, 2007—when the parties returned to court as instructed. The court proceeded to hear the summary judgment motion at the same hearing. Thus, April 16 did not legally become the hearing date on the motion until that very day. Plaintiffs had no time to prepare an opposition on the merits after the court granted the defendants' request to hear the motion within 30 days of the trial date—another due process violation and abuse of discretion. (See Urshan, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at pp. 763, 765–766 & fn. 12, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 839; see also Matera v. McLeod, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at pp. 61–62, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 331; In re Brendan P., supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at pp. 914–916, 230 Cal.Rptr. 720.) Finally, we see no reason why plaintiffs should be forced to seek a continuance of the trial to remedy defendants' mistake in setting the hearing within 30 days of the trial date absent prior court permission.” Robinson, at 1268, italics in original.

Based on Robinson, Weil & Brown observe that in connection with the 30-day cut off before the date set for trial, the “court must make separate order finding ‘good cause’ before motion filed.” The Rutter Group California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial, section 10:71, italics in original.

Here, the matter is in a posture where there has been no finding of good cause sought or obtained by moving defendant to address the invalidity of the hearing date set for March 7, 2025, which is within thirty days of the April 1, 2025 trial date. It can be inferred from the lack of timely opposition filed in connection with the motion that plaintiff reasonably believed plaintiff had no obligation to respond to the motion based on this clear procedural defect, and a lack of any attempt by defendant to obtain an order which might have resulted in a valid hearing date being established. In any case, plaintiff in fact had no obligation to respond to the motion improperly set to be heard, and there has been no valid hearing date established here, or an opportunity for plaintiff to then respond to the motion.

The motion accordingly is denied for failure of defendant to comply with CCP §437c(a)(3), as the motion was not set to be heard, and cannot now be heard, no later than 30 days before the date of trial.

RULING:

[No Opposition]

Defendant Glendale Adventist Medical Center dba Adventist Health Glendale’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED. The motion was not noticed to be heard no later than 30 days before the date of trial, as required under CCP § §437c(a)(3), and no order based on a finding of good cause has been sought or obtained from the court.

DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE

VIDEO APPEARANCES

Please make arrangement in advance if you wish to appear via LACourtConnect by visiting www.lacourt.org to schedule a remote appearance. Please note that LACourtConnect offers free audio and video appearances. Department D is now requiring either live or VIDEO appearances, not audio appearances. Please note that in the case of video appearances, ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED.

If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative.

Case Number: 23GDCV00782 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: D

TENTATIVE RULING

Calendar: 5

Date: 3/7/2025

Case No: 23 GDCV00782 Trial Date: April 6, 2026

Case Name: Khachatryan, et al. v. Lipp, et al.

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO DISCOVERY

MOTIONS TO DEEM REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS ADMITTED (2)

Moving Party: Plaintiff Sofya Abrahamyan

Plaintiff Laert Khachatryan

Responding Party: Defendant Vladislav Viktorovich Lipp

RELIEF REQUESTED:

Further Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One

Order Compelling Defendant Vladislav Viktorovich Lipp to serve verified responses to First Set of Requests for Admissions

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:

Plaintiffs Laert Khachatryan and Sofya Abrahamyan allege that in December of 2022 defendant Vladislav Viktorovich Lipp caused a motor vehicle accident in which plaintiffs sustained personal injuries and property damage. The complaint alleges that defendant Avis Budget Group, Inc. owns the vehicle operated by defendant Lipp and negligently entrusted its vehicle to defendant Lipp, when defendant Lipp was an unlicensed driver.

The form complaint alleges causes of action for motor vehicle and general negligence.

The file shows that on May 19, 2023, defendant Avis Budget Group, Inc. (Avis) filed an answer to the complaint on behalf of itself only.

On July 24, 2024, an answer to complaint was filed by Law Office of Joseph L. Stark & Assoc. APC, as attorneys for defendants Avis and Lipp, stating: “COMES NOW, Defendant AVIS BUDGET GROUP, Inc., answering the complaint on behalf of Defendant Vladislav Viktorovich Lipp, who was served pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure 1939.33 only, admits, denies and alleges as follows…”

On February 7, 2025, the court heard an Amended Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One, brought by plaintiff Laert Khachatryan. The motion was granted and defendant Vladislav Viktorovich Lipp was ordered to serve further responses to Form Interrogatories—General, Set No. One propounded by plaintiff Laert Khachatryan, without objection, within thirty days. Monetary sanctions sought were denied. The minute order also states, “The Court will hear argument concerning whether the above order will be stayed for a reasonable period to permit the parties to explore the appropriate method to posture this action given the service on defendant Lipp pursuant to CCP section 1939.33.” [Minute Order 02/07/2025, pp. 9-10].

On February 21, 2025, the court heard a Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses brought by plaintiff Sofya Abrahamyan. The matter was called for hearing, and the minute order states, “Court and Counsel confer regarding possible case resolution and procedural stipulation.” The order then indicates that “Pursuant to oral stipulation” the motion noticed to be heard that date and a motion to deem requests for admissions admitted scheduled for February 28, 2025 were continued to March 7, 2025, when a second motion to deem requests for admissions was to be heard.

No further papers or stipulation have been filed.

ANALYSIS:

The court has previously expressed its concern to the parties that it does not appear that defendant Avis, as the rental car company, can appropriately represent defendant Lipp in this matter, as it has been attempting to do. The parties appear to have been in agreement that the appropriate party with standing under the circumstances, given the service on defendant Lipp under CCP section 1939.33, would be the insurer of the subject vehicle, who would then need to intervene in the matter to protect its interest.

The court will hear argument concerning if the parties have made any progress toward resolving the procedural issues in this matter and is inclined to continue the matters currently on calendar for a reasonable period to permit a resolution to be pursued.

The court as it now stands is wary of considering any opposition papers filed on behalf of “Defendant, VLADISLAV LIPP, by and through Avis Budget Group, Inc.” Avis has no standing to oppose the motions, and unless there is some motion or stipulation concerning an intervention by the insurer or appropriate relief which is granted and the Answer of defendant Lipp appropriately withdrawn, the court will not consider the oppositions.

If no relief is obtained and standing is not perfected, the court will be inclined to strike the opposition papers for lack of standing, and consider the discovery motions unopposed. The unopposed motions would then likely be granted and appropriate monetary sanctions awarded.

RULING:

Motion to Compel Further Interrogatory Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One, is CONTINUED to April 11, 2025. As discussed at the previous hearing on February 21, 2025, there is currently no showing that the moving party, plaintiff Sofya Abrahamyan, is a “propounding party” entitled to seek an order to compel further responses to interrogatories under CCP section 2030.300. The exhibits attached to the moving papers identify the propounding party as plaintiff Laert Khachatryan only. [Zograbian Decl., paras. 5, 6, Exs. A, B]. No further papers have yet been filed with the Court correcting that error. Moreover, the parties have not established to the satisfaction of the Court that any party with appropriate standing is opposing the motion.

Amended Motion for Order that Matters in Request for Admissions be Deemed Admitted (filed by plaintiff Laert Khachatryan) is CONTINUED to April 11, 2025. The parties have not established to the satisfaction of the Court that any party with appropriate standing is opposing the motion.

Amended Motion for Order that Matters in Request for Admissions be Deemed Admitted (filed by plaintiff Sofya Abrahamyan) is CONTINUED to April 11, 2025. The parties have not established to the satisfaction of the Court that any party with appropriate standing is opposing the motion.

The Court will hear argument concerning the intentions of defendant Avis Budget Group, Inc. and any insurer of the subject vehicle concerning future proceedings in this matter in response to the Court’s orders of February 7, 2025, February 21, 2025 and this date.

DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE

VIDEO APPEARANCES

If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative.

Case Number: 23GDCV02611 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: D

TENTATIVE RULING

Calendar: 1

Date: 3/7/2025

Case No: 23 GDCV02611 Trial Date: None Set

Case Name: Yuh, et al. v. Building Worx, Inc., et al.

MOTION TO INTERVENE

Moving Party: Third Party CM Advantage Specialty Insurance Company

Responding Party: Cross-complainants Building Worx, Inc. and Robert Artura (No Opposition)

RELIEF REQUESTED:

Leave to intervene in this action by filing the proposed Answer in Intervention

SUMMARY OF FACTS:

Plaintiffs Bertram Yuh and Janice Yuh allege that they have a primary residence located in La Canada Flintridge, and that in December of 2020, plaintiffs entered into a written contract with defendant Building Worx, Inc. (Building Worx or Defendant), whereby defendant agreed to provide construction remodeling services for $1,425,223.52 at plaintiffs’ property.

The complaint alleges that it was agreed that the approximate start date of the project was to be in February 2021, and that the project would be completed within twelve months. The completion date was material as plaintiffs rented another house pending completion. The project began in June of 2021, which aligned with a June 2022 completion date. In July of 2021, Building Worx obtained a permit to demolish the existing residence only. Even though it had not applied for, or obtained, a pool demolition permit at the time, defendant nevertheless proceeded to demolish the pool as well and substantially regraded the site without a grading permit, grading plans, or City inspection. It is also alleged that the grading work went well beyond what was called for in the architect’s plans.

Plaintiffs allege that the site grading work resulted in the issuance of a Citation and Stop Work Order by the City in August of 2021, which Citation notes that Building Worx had performed extensive illegal site grading without the benefit of grading plans, grading permits, or inspection as required under the Code. The Citation and subsequent inspection records also note extensive site grading of the building pad, along with the demolition of the pool and backfill, without proper permits or City inspection. Defendant was instructed in writing to obtain proper permits through the City before doing any further work, resulting in significant delay in the project.

Plaintiffs allege that defendant has never provided to plaintiffs any of the City’s original paperwork related to the Citation and Stop Work Order, but instead falsely represented through its owner, defendant Robert Artura, both verbally and in writing, that the reason behind the issuance of the Citation and Stop Work Order related specifically to the pool demolition and related backfill. This work was not a part of the original construction contract but was subsequently added by a written change order. Defendant further represented that a City Public Works crew had observed the unpermitted pool demolition and grading work in progress and alerted the City. Plaintiffs allege that the representations were apparently false and intended to deceive plaintiffs about the true nature of the Citation and Stop Work Order.

The complaint alleges that the true facts were that the City Building inspector was called to site by either defendant or a subcontractor to sign off on a temporary power pole installation, and that the City inspector then alerted a City compliance officer who issued the Citation and Stop Work Order the following morning, and that the reason for the Citation and Stop Work Order goes far beyond the pool work, but relates to the unpermitted grading and compaction work on the site undertaken by defendant without proper plans, permits and inspections. Defendant’s conduct created almost a year long delay in the project, requiring plaintiffs to rent another house during the duration of the delay, and face added interest costs on plaintiffs’ loans. Plaintiffs also allege that instead of revealing the true facts behind the City’s enforcement actions, defendant instructed plaintiffs to engage a civil and soils engineer to resolve the issue, which would allow the work to continue, and then without plaintiffs’ prior knowledge provided a scope of work to an outside engineering firm and advised plaintiffs to hire the firm or that the project would continue to languish, as a result of which plaintiffs engaged the engineering firm and accepted its proposal.

The complaint also alleges that by the time plaintiff discovered the false representations, plaintiffs also discovered that defendant had negligently performed the work they were contracted to do, which was far below industry standards. They also discovered that defendants had breached the contract between the parties in numerous respects. Specifically, it is alleged that, among other things, defendant failed to perform the work in a timely or workmanlike manner and in compliance with the plans and specifications, failed to adequately supervise the project, failed to protect the property from weather, provided unwanted services unnecessary to the project, and demanded payment for those services, failed to obtain required permits, charged for items not required or within the scope of work, charged for services and expenses that were not provided, utilized facilities and resources for which plaintiffs paid for the benefit of other clients, failed to maintain accurate accounting, and issued numerous improper change orders.

Plaintiffs also allege a cause of action against defendant American Contractors Indemnity Company, also referred to in the complaint (apparently erroneously) as Old Republic Surety Company (Surety), who allegedly issued a Bond to defendant general contractor Building Worx in the sum of $25,000, inuring to the benefit of any person damaged as a result of a violation of the Business and Professions Code governing licensed general contractors. The complaint alleges that the acts and omissions of defendant Building Worx constitute violations of Business and Professions Code sections 7000 and 7173, so that defendant Surety is indebted to plaintiffs in the full amount of the penal sum of the license bonds issued to defendant Building Worx.

Defendant Building Worx and its principal Robert Artura have filed a cross-complaint for indemnity, contribution, apportionment, and declaratory relief against various subcontractors and others retained by cross-complaints to work on the subject construction project. The First Amended Cross Complaint is brought against various parties, including cross-defendant Grasmick Construction, LLC, substituted for Roe 5.

Two other cross-defendants have filed cross-complaints for indemnity, contribution, and apportionment against other parties.

ANALYSIS:

Moving party CM Advantage Specialty Insurance Company, sometimes referred to in the moving papers as CM “Vantage” Specialty Insurance Company (CM Advantage) is an insurer which indicates it insured cross-defendant Grasmick Construction LLC (Grasmick Construction) under a General Liability Policy, and that based on the allegations in the action cross-defendant Grasmick Construction may qualify as an insured under the policy. CM Advantage argues that it has an interest in defending the action on behalf of Grasmick Construction to refute the claims alleged.

CM Advantage indicates that Grasmick Construction has not appeared in the action to date and is a “terminated” entity on the California Secretary of State website, and that as such, CM Advantage is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede its ability to protect its interests through Grasmick Construction unless those interests are adequately represented in this action.

CCP § 387, governing the procedure for intervention, provides, in pertinent part:

“(a) For purposes of this section:

(1) “Defendant” includes a cross-defendant.

(2) “Plaintiff” includes a cross-complainant.

(b) An intervention takes place when a nonparty, deemed an intervenor, becomes a party to an action or proceeding between other persons by doing any of the following:

(1) Joining a plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint.

(2) Uniting with a defendant in resisting the claims of a plaintiff.

(3) Demanding anything adverse to both a plaintiff and a defendant.

(c) A nonparty shall petition the court for leave to intervene by noticed motion or ex parte application. The petition shall include a copy of the proposed complaint in intervention or answer in intervention and set forth the grounds upon which intervention rests.

(d)(1) The court shall, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or proceeding if either of the following conditions is satisfied:

(A) A provision of law confers an unconditional right to intervene.

(B) The person seeking intervention claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede that person's ability to protect that interest, unless that person's interest is adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties.

(2) The court may, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or proceeding if the person has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both.”

In this case, the insurer argues that it has a direct and immediate interest in the litigation for purposes of permissive intervention, because it stands to gain or lose by direct operation of the judgment against the insured.

Traditionally, insurers, although they have an interest in the case, were treated like simple creditors, which had no right to intervene in actions concerning debtors absent some indication that the case was not being adequately pursued. See Fireman’s Fund v. Gerlach (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 299.

However, in 2000, in response to Insurance Code § 11580, which provides that a judgment creditor may proceed directly against any liability insurance covering the defendant, insurers were permitted to intervene to prevent a default. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 383.

CM Advantage here relies on Reliance in which the court of appeal set out the right to intervene rather broadly, based on the practical consequences of application of Insurance Code § 11580:

“An insurer's right to intervene in an action against the insured, for personal injury or property damage, arises as a result of Insurance Code section 11580. Section 11580 provides that a judgment creditor may proceed directly against any liability insurance covering the defendant, and obtain satisfaction of the judgment up to the amount of the policy limits. (See Croskey et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation (The Rutter Group) P 15:1028 et seq. (rev. # 1, 1999).) Thus, where the insurer may be subject to a direct action under Insurance Code section 11580 by a judgment creditor who has or will obtain a default judgment in a third party action against the insured, intervention is appropriate. ( Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co. (1978) 22 Cal. 3d 865, 884-885 [151 Cal. Rptr. 285, 587 P.2d 1098].) The insurer may either intervene in that action prior to judgment or move under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 to set aside the default judgment. (22 Cal. 3d at pp. 884-885.) Where an insurer has failed to intervene in the underlying action or to move to set aside the default judgment, the insurer is bound by the default judgment. ( Id. at p. 886.)”

Reliance, at 386-387.

It appears that CM Advantage here is an insurer which may be subject to direct action under Insurance Code section 11580 by plaintiff if the default of CM Advantage’s insured is taken and a default judgment is ultimately entered against the insured. CM Advantage indicates it has offered to provide a defense to Grasmick Construction pursuant to a reservation of rights, and has a direct and immediate interest in this litigation as CM Advantage may be asked to satisfy a default judgment entered against Grasmick Construction if one is obtained. CM Advantage argues that Grasmick Construction has taken no steps to defend itself from the claims asserted against it because it is a terminated entity.

CM Advantage also argues that intervention will not enlarge the issues in the matter, as the insurer seeks to intervene to raise solely those defenses Grasmick Construction could have raised but has not.

CM Advantage submits the declaration of the claims professional responsible for the claim to CM Advantage for the defense of Grasmick Construction in the current action, Sarah Arneson. She indicates that based on Arneson’s personal knowledge or information and belief based on her review of CM Advantage’s file, “Navigators” issued a general liability policy to Grasmick Construction, effective from March 18, 2023 through March 18, 2024. [Arneson Decl., para. 2]. The court assumes this is a typographical error, unless advised otherwise. Arneson also states that “Upon tender of the litigation, CM Advantage agreed to defend Grasmick Construction pursuant to a reservation of rights,” and appointed a law firm to defend it. [Arneson Decl., para. 3].

The declaration also indicates:

“I am informed that Grasmick Construction LLC (entity number 202028610627) was a California limited liability company that was terminated on January 30, 2024. The file number for the California Secretary of State is BA20240192564. The certificate of termination is attached to the Motion to Intervene as Exhibit B.”

[Arneson Decl., Ex. B].

There are no exhibits attached to the motion, the Arenson Declaration, or the proposed order submitted by the moving party.

Ordinarily, an insurer would submit a copy of the subject policy, and a copy of documentation confirming the status of the corporation rendering it unable to appear itself in the action. While the court is inclined to credit the testimony of the claims professional with respect to the existence of a policy, the court requires the insurer to submit, before or at the hearing on the motion, a copy of the documentation represented to be included in Exhibit B confirming the current status of Grasmick Construction LLC. Otherwise, the motion hearing will be continued for the submission of further proof.

The court is also concerned that there is no indication from the court file that Grasmick Construction has been served, as there is no proof of service with respect to this cross-defendant, so it is not clear that the insured is in a position where its default will be taken. However, the court will also credit the testimony of the claims professional that the litigation was tendered to CM Advantage, and assume that the insured by tendering the litigation, had some reason to be aware of this lawsuit. [See Arneson Decl., para. 3]. The file reflects that Grasmick Construction has not been dismissed from the action, and the file contains no indication that cross-complainants intend to dismiss their claims against Grasmick Construction or decline to pursue them. There has been no opposition to this motion filed by any party to call into question the current posture of the proceedings against the insured.

If satisfactory proof is submitted by the hearing concerning the status of Grasmick Construction with the Secretary of State rendering that party unable to defend the action on its own behalf, the court will find that the showing by CM Advantage is sufficient to establish recognized grounds for CM Advantage to be permitted to intervene in this matter. The motion will then be granted.

Under CCP § 387, governing the procedure for intervention:

“(e) If leave to intervene is granted by the court, the intervenor shall do both of the following:

(1) Separately file the complaint in intervention, answer in intervention, or both.

(2) Serve a copy of the order, or notice of the court's decision or order, granting leave to intervene and the pleadings in intervention as follows:

(A) A party to the action or proceeding who has not yet appeared shall be served in the same manner for service of summons pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 415.10) of Chapter 4 of Title 5 of Part 2.

(B) A party who has appeared in the action or proceeding, whether represented by an attorney or not represented by an attorney, shall be served in the same manner for service of summons pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 415.10) of Chapter 4 of Title 5 of Part 2, or in the manner provided by Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 1010) of Title 14 of Part 2.

(f) Within 30 days after service of a complaint in intervention or answer in intervention, a party may move, demur, or otherwise plead to the complaint in intervention or answer in intervention in the same manner as to an original complaint or answer.”

The moving papers make reference to a proposed Answer in Intervention accompanying this motion. As noted above, there have been no exhibits submitted with the moving papers, and the court is unable to locate a proposed Answer in Intervention in the file. Intervenor nevertheless is permitted to file any required pleadings, and is expected to fully comply with the procedural requirements set forth above once it has been permitted leave to intervene.

RULING:

CM Specialty Advantage Company’s Motion for Leave to Intervene:

The moving papers do not include a copy of Exhibit B, referenced in the Declaration of Sarah Arneson. Moving part is ordered to file a copy of the missing exhibit with the Court at or before the hearing on this matter. If such documentation is not submitted, the motion will be CONTINUED for submission of satisfactory proof of the current corporate status of cross-defendant Grasmick Construction, LLC or DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

ONLY if Exhibit B is timely filed at or in advance of the hearing, and the Court finds the evidence satisfactory:

CM Specialty Advantage Company’s Motion for Leave to Intervene is GRANTED.

The Court finds that CM Advantage Specialty Insurance Company has sufficiently established pursuant to CCP § 387 that it claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of this action and that it is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede its ability to protect that interest. See also Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 383.

Intervenor CM Specialty Advantage Company is ordered to efile by close of business this date a signed copy of its proposed Answer in Intervention and otherwise comply with the requirements of CCP § 387.

DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE

VIDEO APPEARANCES

If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative.

Case Number: 24NNCV02088 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: D

TENTATIVE RULING

Calendar: 2

Date: 3/7/2025

Case No: 24 NNCV02088 Trial Date: None Set

Case Name: Lin v. Dang, et al.

DEMURRER

MOTION TO STRIKE (2 Sets)

MOTION TO AMEND

MOTION TO INFORM THE COURT OF CONCERNS REGARGING INTERPRETER ACCURACY

Moving Party: Defendant L.A. Downtown Medical Center (Demurrer and Motion to

Strike)

Defendants Arcadia Mental Health Center, Los Angeles General Medical

Center, Wendy Dang, and Lonna Bennett (Demurrer and Motion to Strike)

Plaintiff Louting Lin (Motion to Amend, Motion Regarding Interpreter)

Responding Party: Plaintiff Louting Lin (Demurrers and Motions to Strike)

Defendants L.A. Downtown Medical Center, Arcadia Mental Health

Center, Los Angeles General Medical Center, Wendy Dang and Lonna

Bennett (Motion to Amend, Motion Regarding Interpreter)

RELIEF REQUESTED:

Demurrers and Motions to Strike

Sustain demurrer to First Amended Complaint

Strike punitive damages

Motion to Amend

Court approval to submit an amended complaint

Motion Regarding Interpreter

Inform the court of concerns regarding the accuracy of interpreters provided in court proceedings and to request alternative solutions

CAUSES OF ACTION: from First Amended (Form) Complaint

1) General Negligence

2) Intentional Tort

3) General Negligence

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:

Plaintiff Luoting Lin alleges that in July of 2023 defendants Wendy Dang, Lonna Bennett, Arcadia Mental Health Center, Los Angeles General Medical Center and L.A. Downtown Medical Center were negligent, whereby plaintiff was harmed and suffered injuries and damages. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Bennett and Dang at Arcadia Mental Health Center negligently reported that plaintiff had a plan to kill herself and placed her on an involuntary psychiatric hold, negligently reporting false statements or opinions regarding plaintiff’s mental condition, and advising that if plaintiff wanted to receive sleeping medication, plaintiff could be sent to the emergency room. Plaintiff alleges that Los Angeles County is responsible for the negligent hiring of Bennett and Dang, and that as a result of the conduct, plaintiff has suffered psychological trauma and severe emotional distress.

It is also alleged that defendant L.A. Downtown Medical Center failed to provide plaintiff with a probable cause hearing before holding plaintiff for ten days, and that the staff at the facility were rude, used curse words, made threats to force plaintiff to take medication, and when plaintiff refused, forced plaintiff to take medication without consent, and transferred plaintiff to a psychiatric facility without providing an evaluation or asking any questions by a physician.

The file shows that on August 23, 2024, the court heard a demurrer brought by moving defendant L.A. Downtown Medical Center to the original complaint. The demurrer was sustained with leave to amend, as the form complaint failed to check boxes, and was otherwise uncertain. Defendant Arcadia Mental Health Center also filed a demurrer to the original complaint, which was taken off calendar as moot due to the filing of the First Amended Complaint.

Defendant L.A. Downtown Medical Center filed a demurrer and motion to strike in response to the First Amended Complaint (FAC). Defendants Arcadia Mental Health Center, Los Angeles General Medical Center, Wendy Dang, and Lonna Bennett filed a separate demurrer and motion to strike in response to the FAC.

The demurrer and motion to strike of defendant L.A. Downtown Medical Center were noticed to be heard on December 20, 2024. On December 20, 2024, the court’s minute order noted that the court had issued its tentative ruling via posting on LA Court.org website, which was to sustain the demurrer with leave to amend, and grant the motion to strike punitive damages without leave to amend but without prejudice to plaintiff bringing a motion under CCP section 421.13 should one be appropriate. The matter was called for hearing, and the court noted that no Mandarin language interpreter was available. The minute order indicates, “Plaintiff requests a continuance to obtain counsel.” The court continued the matter to March 7, 2025, and advised plaintiff to request a Mandarin interpreter through the court’s website, and if plaintiff had difficulty to contact the clerk.

The court at the December 20, 2024 hearing also, pursuant to the request of plaintiff, advanced the hearing dates and rescheduled for hearing on March 7, 2025 the motion to amend, the motion regarding interpreter accuracy, the demurrer and motion to strike filed by the Arcadia Mental Health Center and Los Angeles General Medical Center defendants, and a Case Management Conference.

ANALYSIS:

Plaintiff in advance of the March 7, 2025 hearing date has filed a Request for Continuance/Extending all current and future proceedings.

Plaintiff indicates in the Request that plaintiff has been actively searching for an attorney, and has found a lawyer who is willing to represent plaintiff, but the lawyer will not obtain independent practice qualifications until late September 2025. The court is not familiar with the term “independent practice qualifications.”

Nevertheless, because plaintiff has represented plaintiff wants to obtain counsel and is actively pursuing finding representation, the court will continue the matters for no longer than ninety days to permit plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to engage an attorney. The court will not continue the matter until late September.

If plaintiff does obtain counsel and a lawyer appears for plaintiff as counsel of record and makes a reasonable request for further time to become familiar with the case, the court will at that point consider a further continuance.

RULING:

Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (LA Downtown Medical Center) is CONTINUED to June 6, 2025 (no more than ninety days) to permit plaintiff time to locate and retain legal counsel. Opposition and reply papers due according to Code based on the new hearing date.

Motion to Strike Portions of First Amended Complaint (LA Downtown Medical Center) is CONTINUED to June 6, 2025 (no more than ninety days) to permit plaintiff time to locate and retain legal counsel. Opposition and reply papers due according to Code based on the new hearing date.

Defendants Arcadia Mental Health Center, Los Angeles General Medical Center, Wendy Dang, and Lonna Bennett’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is CONTINUED to June 6, 2025 (no more than ninety days) to permit plaintiff time to locate and retain legal counsel. Opposition and reply papers due according to Code based on the new hearing date.

Defendants Arcadia Mental Health Center, Los Angeles General Medical Center, Wendy Dang, and Lonna Bennett’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is CONTINUED to June 6, 2025 (no more than ninety days) to permit plaintiff time to locate and retain legal counsel. Opposition and reply papers due according to Code based on the new hearing date.

Motion to Amend or Explain the Plaintiff’s Complaint and Plaintiff’s Statement and Request for Relief is CONTINUED to June 6, 2025 (no more than ninety days) to permit plaintiff time to locate and retain legal counsel. Opposition and reply papers due according to Code based on the new hearing date.

Motion to Inform the Court of Concerns Regarding Interpreter Accuracy and Motion for Flexibility to Leniency CONTINUED to June 6, 2025 (no more than ninety days) to permit plaintiff time to locate and retain legal counsel. Opposition and reply papers due according to Code based on the new hearing date.

DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE

VIDEO APPEARANCES

If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative.

Case Number: 24NNCV04763 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: D

TENTATIVE RULING

Calendar: 3

Date: 3/7/2024

Case No: 24 NNCV04763 Trial Date: None Set

Case Name: Euler Hermes North America Insurance Company v. City Paper Box Co.

MOTION TO DISMISS

Moving Party: Defendant City Box Paper Co.

Responding Party: Plaintiff Euler Hermes North America Insurance Company (No Opposition)

ANALYSIS:

This motion is brought by defendant and cross-complainant City Paper Box Co. seeking to dismiss the complaint based on an argument that plaintiff has failed to join City Paper Box LLC as a party, on the basis that City Paper Box Co. is not the correct defendant and that the correct defendant is not currently a party to the action.

The file shows that since the filing of the motion on January 15, 2025, plaintiff on February 10, 2025 filed an Amendment to Complaint, substituting the true name of City Paper Box LLC for the fictitious name of Doe 1.

On February 10, 2025, plaintiff filed a Request for Dismissal without prejudice of the complaint as to moving defendant City Paper Box Co. only. The dismissal was entered as requested the same date.

Evidently, moving party is satisfied that it need not further participate in this action, as on February 20, 2025, City Paper Box Co. filed a Request for Dismissal without prejudice of the entire cross-complaint filed by City Paper Box Co.

The moving party has obtained a dismissal from the suit, and defendant City Paper Box Co. LLC has been added as a party. The motion to dismiss accordingly is taken off calendar as moot.

RULING:

Motion to Dismiss Complaint, or, in the alternative, to Compel Joinder of Party is taken off calendar as MOOT.

DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE

VIDEO APPEARANCES

If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative.

Case Number: 24NNCV05046 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: D

TENTATIVE RULING

Calendar: 7

Date: 3/7/2025

Case No: 24 NNCV05046 Trial Date: None Set

Case Name: Osuna v. General Motors, LLC

MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION

Moving Party: Plaintiff Jesus Asuna

Responding Party: Defendant General Motors LLC

Name of Deponent: PMQ of General Motors LLC

Status of Deponent: Defendant or defendant affiliate (party)

DEPO ATTENDANCE REQUIRED BY:

Formal Notice [Second Amended Notice, Ex. 7].

RELIEF REQUESTED BY MOVING PARTY:

Order compelling deposition of defendant General Motors LLC Person or Persons Most Qualified, with production of documents

FACTUAL BACKGROUND:

Plaintiffs Jesus Osuna alleges that in January of 2023 plaintiff purchased a Chevrolet bold EV, which was warranted by defendant General Motors LLC (GM), with defendant providing an express warranty and an implied warranty, including an implied warranty of fitness.

Plaintiff alleges that the vehicle has suffered from nonconformity to warranties, including battery, malfunction warning indicators, charging, electrical and other defects.

Plaintiff alleges that the defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable warranty period. Plaintiff alleges that plaintiff delivered the vehicle to defendant’s authorized facility for repair of the nonconformities on numerous occasions, but that defendant has been unable or has refused to conform the subject vehicle to the applicable warranties after a reasonable number of attempts.

Plaintiff alleges that notwithstanding plaintiff’s entitlement to a repurchase under the Act and defendant’s knowledge of that entitlement through its internal repair and warranty records, defendant has intentionally refused to comply with its obligations under the Act to repurchase the subject vehicle and make restitution.

The complaint alleges a cause of action for Restitution and Damages.

ANALYSIS:

Plaintiff seeks an order compelling defendant GM to produce its Person Most Qualified to appear and testify at a deposition and produce documents requested in the deposition notice.

The moving papers show that plaintiff has served defendant with a series of deposition notices, beginning on November 4, 2024, and that defendant GM served written objections to the original notice, the First Amended Notice and the Second Amended Notice. [Agyeman Decl., paras. 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12; Exs. A, B, D, E, G, H].

Plaintiffs indicate that despite numerous meet and confer efforts, defendant GM continues to maintain its objections to the categories and document requests and refuses to produce its witness. [Agyeman Decl., para. 13].

The motion includes a meet and confer letter sent on December 9, 2024, requesting dates for the deposition, to which there evidently was no response. [Agyeman Decl., para. 11, Ex. F].

The most recent notice, the Second Notice of Deposition, served on December 11, 2024, setting the deposition for January 7, 2025, was responded to by objections, and no agreement to produce the witness. [Agyeman Decl., paras. 11, 12, Exs. G, H].

This motion was filed and served on January 9, 2025, and evidently no deposition dates have been provided by defendant.

CCP § 2025.450 (a) provides, in pertinent part:

“(a) If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party..., without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent's attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.”

Under CCP section 2025.230, with respect to the deposition of the person most knowledgeable:

“If the deponent named is not a natural person, the deposition notice shall describe with reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is requested. In that event the deponent shall designate and produce at deposition those of its officers, directors, managing agents, employees, or agents who are most qualified to testify on its behalf as to those matters to the extent of any information known or reasonably available to the deponent.”

The moving papers sufficiently establish that defendant, a party to the action, for its person most qualified to testify, was served with deposition notices, and that the objections to those notices objected to the selected deposition dates, but defendant has failed since November of 2024 to provide mutually agreeable dates for the deposition, and has failed to appear for examinations as noticed. [Agyeman Decl., paras. 5-13]. Plaintiff is accordingly entitled to an order compelling defendant’s attendance and testimony.

The motion also seeks that the court order the deponent to provide document production along with the deposition testimony.

Under CCP § 2025.450 (b):

“(b) A motion under subdivision (a) shall comply with both of the following:

(1) The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.

(2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance.”

The memorandum argues that there is good cause for production of the requested documents because they go to the essential elements of plaintiffs’ express and implied warranty and damages claim. Plaintiff argues that the document requests are directly related to plaintiff’s claims, and universally discoverable in lemon law cases, and consistent with this court’s standing order. The requests seek documents pertaining to the subject vehicle, and other documents which appear pertinent to the lawsuit.

Defendant in the opposition argues that this motion was not necessary as GM already has produced documents directly responsive to plaintiff’s discovery requests and has agreed to produce a witness to testify on six or seven of the categories at issues in this motion, but plaintiff has refused to proceed and failed to meet and confer in good faith. The opposition relies on the responses to the Second Amended Notice, which states that the PMQ would be produced an a mutually agreed upon time, but did not specify a date, as well as the declaration of counsel which now states, “GM offers Plaintiff’s firm six depositions a month- more than enough for their inventory.” [Dobson Decl., paras. 9, 11]. There is no indication that any date was ever offered for a PMQ deposition in this particular action.

It is not clear why defendant has not offered a single specific date in the many months before this motion was filed, and even in the opposition itself. The motion accordingly is granted and the deposition and production of documents ordered. Any argument that documents already have been produced is rejected by the court, as plaintiff is entitled to documents responsive to the current form of discovery, and so that the deponent can be examined with respect to the documents produced. Any objection that the deposition was unilaterally set has not been justified by the opposition, given the failure to provide any proposal at all for a mutually convenient date.

In addition, this matter is subject to the Addendum to Case Management Conference Order (Song-Beverly Litigation) (Order) applicable to Song-Beverly Litigation, now posted and available on the Los Angeles Superior Court website in connection with this Department, Glendale Courthouse, Department D. The Order was signed and entered by the Court on January 24, 2023 and was revised, signed and entered on January 11, 2024

Pursuant to that Order, “any formal discovery propounded and currently pending or outstanding by a party in this matter prior to the date of this CMC Order is stayed pending further order of the Court.”

[Order section (1)(a)].

The Order sets forth the following provision concerning discovery in Song-Beverly matters which appear to address the discovery disputes raised by the current motion. With respect to depositions, the Order provides:

4. Deposition: Within the time limits allowed by law. Defendant may depose plaintiff, and plaintiff may depose the person most knowledgeable (PMK) as to up to 5 categories of information, plus a deposition of the PMK as to why the subject vehicle was not repurchased, in addition to depositions of any experts identified by the parties, after a formal demand and exchange of expert witness information, per CCP § 2034. Parties shall meet and confer as to whether there is a need to take any additional depositions. Any additional depositions may only be noticed and taken by stipulation and/or court order (via motion upon showing of good cause).

If a deponent resides out of state, the deposition may be taken by video conference or telephone. The parties will not be required to travel to California, and the attorneys will not be required to travel out of state.”

[Order, section 4], emphasis added.

With respect to document production, the order provides:

“Production of Documents: Within 60 days of service of this Order both plaintiff and defendant shall provide copies of the following documents, which are in their respective possession, custody and/or control, to the opposing side(s):

a. Purchase or lease contracts concerning the subject vehicle, including any associated documents reflecting OEM or aftermarket equipment installed at the dealership, ELWs or service contracts, and any other writings signed by the plaintiff at the point of sale.

b. Work orders, repair orders, and invoices (including accounting and warranty versions) for any maintenance, service and repair activity concerning the subject vehicles.

c. Rental car or loaner agreements regarding alternative transportation provided during service or repair visits concerning the subject vehicle.

d. Records of communications with dealer personnel, and/or factory representatives and defendant’s call center or customer assistance personnel concerning the subject vehicle.

e. Warrant claims submitted to and/or approved by defendant concerning the subject vehicle.

f. Warranty Policy and Procedure Manual or similar policies or claim-handling procedures published by Defendant from the date the subject vehicle was purchased or leased to the date the lawsuit was filed.

g. Defendant’s written statements of policy and/or procedures used to evaluate customer requests for repurchase or replacement pursuant to “Lemon Law” claims, including ones brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, from the date the subject vehicle was purchased or leased to the date the lawsuit was filed.

h. A list of or compilation of customer complaints in defendant’s electronically stored information database that are substantially similar to the alleged defects claimed by plaintiff, in vehicles purchased in California for the same year, make and model of the subject vehicle. A substantially similar customer complaint would be the same nature of reported symptom, malfunction, dashboard indicator light, or other manifestation of a repair problem as the description listed in any work order or repair order for the subject vehicle, other than routine or scheduled maintenance items. The list provided by defendant may be in the chart or spreadsheet format, and shall include the VIN, date of repair visit, dealership or other reporting location, and text of the other customers’ reported complaint, but shall not include the other customers’ names, addresses, phone numbers, e-mail addresses, or other personal identifying information.

i. Technical Service Bulletins and Recall Notices for vehicle purchased or leased in California for the same year, make and model of the subject vehicle.

j. Copies of any repair instruction, bulletin, or other diagnostic/repair procedure identified in any of the repair order/invoice records for the subject vehicle.

k. Receipts or other written evidence supporting any incidental or consequential damages claimed by plaintiff.

If a party believes any of this information should be subject to a protective order, that party shall serve and file a proposed protective order within 5 days of this Order and the parties shall meet and confer as to agreeable language for the same. The default will be the standard Protective Order provided by the LASC in its website.

The information may be provided to the opposing party in electronic form as a PDF at the option of the producing party.

Plaintiff and defendant shall serve verification with the documents they produce.

Any additional requests for documents may only be propounded by stipulation and/or court order (via motion upon showing of good cause).

[Order section (2)(a)].

The parties are also directed to the Notice to All Counsel Re: Lemon Law Cases for Department D, entitled Customary Rulings Re Document Requests (Song Beverly Litigation) (Notice). That Notice provides:

“When the court is faced with a discovery dispute in a Song-Beverly case, the court will usually order that the plaintiff and defendant provide copies of the following documents, which are in their respective possession, custody and/or control, to the opposing side:

1. Defendant shall produce the “Warranty Policy and Procedure Manual” published by Defendant and provided to its authorized repair facilities, within the State of California, for the period of [date of purchase] to present.

2. Defendant shall produce any internal analysis or investigation regarding defects alleged in plaintiff's complaint in vehicles for the same year, make and model of the subject vehicle. This includes Recall Notices and Technical Service Bulletins. Defendant is not required to do a search of emails.

3. Defendant shall produce any customer complaints relating to defects alleged in plaintiff’s complaint in vehicles purchased in California for the same year, make and model of the subject vehicle.

4. Defendant shall produce all documents evidencing policies and procedures used to evaluate customer requests for repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, for the period of [date of purchase] to present.

5. Repair orders and invoices concerning the subject vehicle.

6. Communications with dealer, factory representative and/or call center concerning the subject vehicle.

7. Warranty claims submitted to and/or approved by Defendant concerning the subject vehicle.

8. Purchase and/or lease contract concerning the subject vehicle.

9. Repair orders and invoices concerning the subject vehicle.

10. Any documents supporting plaintiff’s claim for incidental and/or consequential damages.”

The court notes that the Order provides for PMK depositions for up to 5 categories of information, plus a deposition of the PMK as to why the subject vehicle was not repurchased. The Second Amended Notice of Deposition designates eight matters on which the PMQ is to be examined, but two of them appear to be directed to the repurchase or replacement issue. [See Ex. B, Matters Nos. 1, 6]. This results in one matter being beyond the scope of the court’s order. There has been no motion made by plaintiff to show good cause for more than six subjects. The court will hear at the hearing which of the five categories plaintiff will be pursuing at the deposition, along with the two issues as to why the vehicle was not repurchased. Defendant is ordered to designate a person or persons to appear and testify on the designated subjects on a date certain within the next twenty days.

With respect to the documents requested, the production is to be made and the deposition conducted in accordance with the Order and Notice. If there is some further dispute concerning the production of documents or the conduct of the deposition, the parties must comply with the Order and Notice, and meet and confer in good faith concerning any outstanding discovery in light of the Order and Notice, and, if necessary, pursue a further motion which must be accompanied by a separate statement reflecting the then current status of any discovery disputes, including in that separate statement as to each request and response any applicable language of the Order and Notice.

Defendant also appears to argue that plaintiff’s discovery here implicates trade secret and propriety information of GM. It does not appear from the file that the parties have yet entered into a protective order. The court notes that if either party requires a protective order, the procedures are addressed in the Order, at section 2, subdivision (k), above. The entry of such a protective order should make it unnecessary for the parties to assert any objections that the discovery seeks confidential, proprietary or trade secret information.

Sanctions

This leaves the issue of monetary sanctions, which are sought by the moving parties.

Plaintiffs request monetary sanctions for the expense of having to bring this motion.

Under CCP § 2025.450 (g)(1):

“If a motion under subdivision (a) is granted, the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) in favor of the party who noticed the deposition and against the deponent or the party with whom the deponent is affiliated, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”

CCP § 2023.010 (d) provides that misuse of the discovery process includes, “Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery.” CCP § 2023.030(a) authorizes the imposition of monetary sanctions against a party and its attorney for misuse of the discovery process.

Under CRC Rule 3.1348(a):

“The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed.”

The burden is on the party subject to sanctions to show substantial justification or injustice. Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1990, 2nd Dist.) 223 Cal.App.3d 1429, 1436.

Here, the motion is granted under CCP § 2025.450 subdivision (a), and the statute indicates that the court “shall” impose a monetary sanction.

Defendant has failed to show how defendant was substantially justified in delaying many months and still not providing a date for the PMQ deposition. Defendant in opposition argues that the request for sanctions is groundless, as plaintiffs’ motion is baseless, which it clearly is not, but will be granted. Defendant also argues that GM has agreed to provide a PMQ deposition, and it is simply a matter of working with the witness to provide dates. There is no explanation why this could not have been done in the many months since the deposition was first noticed and avoided the need to bring this motion. Sanctions will be awarded.

The sanctions sought by plaintiffs are $2,900.00. These appear high for a motion of this nature, which was largely cut and pasted from an existing template, and does not follow the procedures set forth in the standing orders in place in this matter designed to streamline this discovery. The sanctions awarded are adjusted accordingly as follows: Four hours total attorney time at $475.00 per hour for total attorney’s fee of $1,900.00.

RULING:

Plaintiff Jesus Osuna’s Motion to Compel the Deposition of Defendant General Motors, LLC’s Person Most Qualified and to Produce Documents is GRANTED.

Defendant General Motors LLC is ordered to designate and produce witness(es) to appear for deposition and to give testimony on a mutually convenient date and time as to the matters requested in Plaintiff Jesus Osuna’s Second Amended Notice of Deposition of Defendant General Motors, LLC’s Person(s) Most Qualified, with Production of Documents served on December 11, 2024, no later than April 11, 2025, limited to the following five designated categories of information, plus deposition of the PMK as to why the subject vehicle was not repurchased (categories Nos. 1 and 6).

Plaintiff Jesus Osuna’s attorney must make an election of 5 of the 6 subject matters listed in the PMK deposition notice.

Good cause appearing, the deponent(s) is (are) also ordered to produce for inspection at the deposition any and all materials described in the subject notice which are consistent with this Court’s Standing Order Re Discovery (Song-Beverly Litigation), signed and entered by the Court on January 24, 2023 as revised, signed and entered on January 11, 2024, as well as materials which are consistent with this Court’s Notice to All Counsel Re: Lemon Law Cases for Department D, Customary Rulings Re Document Requests (Song Beverly Litigation).

If a party believes any of the information requested in discovery should be subject to a protective order, that party shall serve and file a proposed protective order within 5 days of this Order and the parties shall meet and confer as to agreeable language for the same. The default will be the standard Protective Order provided by the LASC in its website.

Monetary sanctions requested by moving party: Utilizing a lodestar approach, and in view of the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the total and reasonable amount of attorney’s fees and costs incurred for the work performed in connection with the pending motion is $1,900.00. (4 hours @ $475 per hour and no hours at $525 per hour) [5 and 1 hours requested] [Amount Requested $2,900.00], which sum is to be awarded in favor of plaintiff Jesus Osuna and against defendant General Motors LLC, payable within 30 days. CCP §§ 2025.450 (g)(1), 2023.010 (d) and 2023.030 (a).

Counsel for moving party is ordered to prepare an order for sanctions and submit it on eCourt by noon today in accordance with this order.

DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE

VIDEO APPEARANCES

If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative.

Case Number: 24NNCV05053 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: D

TENTATIVE RULING

Calendar: 8

Date: 3/7/2025

Case No: 24 NNCV05053 Trial Date: None Set

Case Name: Tran v. Esparza, et al.

DEMURRER

Moving Party: Defendant Los Angeles Regional Center for the Developmentally Disabled, Inc.

Responding Party: Plaintiff Hung Tran, as conservator of Henry C. Tran

RELIEF REQUESTED:

Sustain demurrer to Complaint

CAUSES OF ACTION: from (Form) Complaint

1) General Negligence

SUMMARY OF FACTS:

Plaintiff Hung C Tran, Conservator for Henry Chi Tran, brings this action against defendants Efren Esparza, Martin Vera, Exclusive Services LLC and East LA Regional Center. The form complaint alleges a cause of action for general negligence, alleging that defendants Efren Esparza of Xclusive Services LLC was responsible for Henry Tran and was the legal cause of damages to plaintiff for the reasons of lack of supervision and that neglect of duty led to Henry Tran’s neglect and abuse. The complaint also states, “See Alhambra Police Report: 22-35939.”

ANALYSIS:

Defendant Eastern Los Angeles Regional Center for the Developmentally Disabled, Inc. argues that the complaint appears to allege that defendants Efren Esparza and Xclusive Services LLC were somehow negligent in causing injury to Henry C. Tran, but the complaint identifies the plaintiff as Hung Tran, apparently Henry C. Tran’s conservator, and does not allege any injuries sustained by Hung Tran. Defendant also points out that the complaint’s single cause of action for negligence does not identify moving defendant Regional Center, and alleges nothing against it. Defendant argues that this makes it impossible for demurring defendant to ascertain who is the proper plaintiff and what that plaintiff is alleging, or against whom.

The complaint includes no charging allegations against the moving defendant, identifying that the defendants who negligently caused damage to plaintiff were “Efren Esparza, Xclusive Services LLC.” [Complaint, para. GN-1]. There is no mention of moving defendant in the cause of action. The pleading is also confusing, as it appears that the named plaintiff Hung Tran, is not the party who suffered injury, as the complaint appears to allege that it was Henry Tran who suffered neglect and abuse. [Complaint, para. GN-1]. The pleading should more clearly allege that the matter is being brought by the injured party, Henry Tran, through a conservator or representative.

Plaintiff in response to the demurrer has filed a Declaration of Marilyn M. Smith in Response to Demurrer of East LA Regional Center indicating that Smith is counsel for plaintiff Hung Tran, as conservator of Henry C. Tran, and substituted in as counsel on February 5, 2025. Plaintiff was previously self-represented. Counsel indicates that following entry into the case, counsel reviewed the pleadings and demurrers filed, and it became clear that an amended complaint needed to be filed with more substantive allegations, which counsel will be filing with sufficient allegations as to each defendant. [Smith Decl., paras. 1, 2].

Plaintiff’s counsel indicates counsel reached out to counsel for defendants to ask for the demurrer to be taken off calendar so plaintiff could file an amended complaint within thirty days. Counsel for defendants Xclusive and Esparza agreed, and took their demurrer off calendar, but counsel for defendant Regional Center would not take the demurrer off calendar, taking the position that there was plenty of time to file an amended pleading in the three weeks between the contact from counsel for plaintiff and the hearing on the demurrer. [Smith Decl., paras. 3-5]. Plaintiff’s counsel explains that during the period when a timely opposition could have been filed, new counsel was in a jury trial and all day mediation, and then, on the date opposition was due was scheduled to undergo a surgical procedure from an auto accident. [Smith Decl., para. 5].

This showing concedes that the demurrer is meritorious. The demurrer is sustained with leave to amend for the reasons set forth in the demurrer.

In light of the recent involvement of counsel for plaintiff in this case, and the apparent impropriety of the conservator party proceeding on behalf of the conservatee without an attorney in the first place, the court finds that this result is the appropriate outcome.

Although defendant in the reply result requests that the demurrer be sustained without leave to amend, counsel for plaintiff has represented that sufficient allegations can be made in an amended complaint as to each defendant. [Smith Decl., para. 2].

Moreover, this is the original complaint in the action, and it is held that in the case of an original complaint, plaintiff need not even request leave to amend: “unless [an original complaint] shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment, denial of leave to amend constituted an abuse of discretion, irrespective of whether leave to amend is requested or not.” King v. Mortimer (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 153, 158, citations omitted.

This instant is plaintiff’s first attempt to state these causes of action, and it is not clear from the face of the complaint that it cannot be amended to state a cause of action against the moving defendant, particularly when the basis of the demurrer is the failure to allege specific facts which would likely be within the personal knowledge of Hung Tran and Henry Tran.

The demurrer is sustained with leave to amend.

RULING:

Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND for the reasons stated in the demurrer. There are no charging allegations stated against the moving defendant Eastern Los Angeles Regional Center for the Developmentally Disabled, Inc, and it is not clear from the designation of plaintiff and the allegedly neglected and abused person what exactly is being alleged in terms of standing.

Thirty days leave to amend.

The parties are ordered to meet and confer in full compliance with CCP § 430.41 before any further demurrer may be filed.

DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE

VIDEO APPEARANCES

If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative.

Case Number: 24NNCV06598 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: D

TENTATIVE RULING

Calendar: 9

Date: 3/7/2025

Case No: 24 NNCV06598 Trial Date: None Set

Case Name: Pacific Rejuvenation Medical v. Capital One

APPEARANCE PRO HAC VICE

MP: Elizabeth Ireland, Esq.

RP: No Opposition

CONDITIONS:

Association with CA attorney (name, address, phone #) Yes

Verified declaration: Yes

Service on State Bar at San Francisco office: Yes

Fee paid to State Bar: Yes (Ex. A)

Good standing and not currently suspended/disbarred: ( Yes ¶¶ 3,4,)

Non-California residence and office: No residence address

Admitted to practice in the following courts and the date:

State of North Carolina 2014

1st, 4th, 9th, 11th Circuit Courts of Appeal 2024

USDC E.D. NC, M.D. NC, W.D EC 2017-2022

Titles of court, case number and cause in which moving party has filed an application to appear pro hac vice in this state in the last two years, dates and whether motion granted or not:

Has not filed any applications to appear as counsel pro hac vice in the Superior Court of California within the past two years.

(Application ¶ 7)

Declaration of moving party: Application verified

OPPOSITION:

No Opposition

ANALYSIS:

There is one irregularity with this application. The application does not provide the applicant’s residence address. The application states that attorney Ireland “resides in Charlotte, North Carolina,” and provides “contact information,” consisting of the attorney’s law firm address. [Application, paras. 1, 5].

Under CRC Rule 9.40(d):

“The application must state:

(1) The applicant's residence and office address…”

The Court accordingly requires that a declaration under oath or a verified supplement to the application be submitted at or before the hearing stating the residence address of the applicant before the application will be granted.

The paperwork is otherwise in order.

RULING:

UNOPPOSED Verified Application of Elizabeth Ireland for Admission Pro Hac Vice as Counsel for Defendant Capital One, National Association:

The Court notes that the application does not include the residence address of the applicant, as required under CRC Rule 9.40(d)(1). Applicant is ordered to submit a declaration under oath or verified supplement to the application stating the applicant’s residence address before the Court will grant the application. Once such a showing is submitted, the Verified Application of Elizabeth Ireland, member in good standing of the State Bar of North Carolina, for Admission Pro Hac Vice as Counsel for Defendant Capital One, National Association will be GRANTED. The Court finds that the application complies with all requirements of CRC Rule 9.40 and that applicant has provided sufficient proof of service on the State Bar and payment of the requisite fee.

DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE

VIDEO APPEARANCES

If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative.

Case Number: EC063536 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: D

TENTATIVE RULING

Calendar: 10

Date: 3/7/2025

Case No: EC 063536

Case Name: Mellenthin, et al. v. Komisar, et al.

APPLICATION TO AMEND JUDGMENT

Moving Party: Judgment Creditors Eve Somer, as Trustee of the Eve Somer Living Trust dated July 1, 2020, and Gregory C. Yaitanes, as Trustee of the Gregory C. Yaitanes Family Trust

Responding Party: Defendants/Cross Complainants Boris Komisar and Elvira Shut

RELIEF REQUESTED:

Amend Judgment of May 23, 2018 to decree

(1) Judgment Debtor’s revocable licenses for Encroachment Nos. 1 and 3 are terminated;

(2) Encroachment Nos. 1-4 are to be removed by date certain; and

(3) Entry of the Amended Judgment is to be held in abeyance until the City of Los Angeles approves or denies the lot line adjustment application submitted by Judgment Debtors.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:

Plaintiffs Michael Mellenthin and Donna Mellenthin, trustees of the Mellenthin Family Trust, brought this action alleging they were owners of real property on Oakdale Road in Studio City, against defendants Boris Komisar and Elvira Shut, the owners of real property on El Cerro Lane in Studio City, alleging that defendants’ wall, wall supporting pool deck, concrete pillar, and gas, water, drains and electric lines encroached onto the easterly portion of the Mellenthin property.

Plaintiff sought a mandatory injunction requiring defendants to remove the encroachments from the disputed property and judgment quieting title in plaintiffs as of the date of the complaint.

Defendants Komisar and Shut filed a cross-complaint against plaintiffs, alleging that when defendants inspected and eventually purchased the Komisar property, a large pool deck and a driveway existed on the property, with the driveway bordered by a short retaining wall and an ivy covered chain link fence on the western side of the property, which cross-complainants thought was the border between the Komisar property and the Mellenthin property. Komisar and Shut alleged that the walls, pool decks, foundation, fences, and gas, water, drain and electrical lines had been in existence at their current locations for more than five years prior to the filing of the present lawsuit, and that cross-complainants were entitled to a prescriptive easement to use the Mellenthin property for those alleged encroachments. In the alternative, cross-complainants alleged that during a remodeling project and public hearings for the remodeling project, Michael Mellenthin, an experienced residential property developer and retired licensed general contractor, reviewed the construction plans, and represented that he knew the plan included encroachments on his property but did not care about them, but that his only concern was that the project have adequate drainage so that no water would flow from the Komisar property to the Mellenthin property. After the hearing, and the approval of the plans, cross-complainants proceeded with the remodeling project. Hence, they alleged that if they were not entitled to a prescriptive easement, they were entitled to have an equitable or other easement to use that portion of the Mellenthin property containing alleged encroachments, particularly if the award of such equitable easement was conditioned on cross-complainants paying cross-defendants the reasonable value of said easements.

The cross-complaint alleged that removing the retaining wall would remove the lateral support for cross-complainants’ driveway and create a soil subsidence issue on the Mellenthin property, that the removal of the pool deck would endanger the structural integrity of the structure, and that moving gas, water, drain and electrical lines would be prohibitively expensive, and of negligible harm to cross-defendants, when the lines were not interfering with the Mellenthins’ use of the ornamental landscape then being maintained. The cross-complaint sought a determination of title to prescriptive, equitable or other easements for the encroaching structures, and a judicial determination as to the rights and duties of the parties concerning those structures.

The file shows that the matter went to a court trial in November of 2017 through January of 2018. Post-trial briefs and motions were filed, and on April 25, 2018, the court issued and served it Statement of Decision, which was to issue a mandatory injunction for defendants’ trespass as to a large pillar encroachment [Encroachment No. 2], and for defendants’ trespass as to the electrical and plumbing encroachment [Encroachment No. 4], and to issue a license to defendants for the driveway wall encroachment [Encroachment No. 1] and the pool deck wall encroachment [Encroachment No. 3]. The Statement of Decision provides for a damages award to plaintiffs in the amount of $14,755 for construction of a new fence and $5,498.30 for new replacement trees.

On May 23, 2018, the court signed and filed the Judgment submitted jointly by the parties.

This matter was originally heard on June 28, 2024. The parties submitted on the court’s tentative ruling which was posted online and at the courtroom. The court adopted its modified tentative ruling as set forth in the minute order, which was:

“Counsel are ordered to meet and confer in person or by Zoom by no later than 07/26/2024 to make efforts in submitting the Joint Application and moving this case forward to a resolution. The court sets the matter on the dates indicated below. Briefs are due on September 20, 2024 which are to outline what has been done to bring compliance, what needs to be done, and what is the hold up.”

A Status Conference Compliance—Briefs Due was scheduled for October 4, 2024, and the hearing on the motion was continued to December 6, 2024.

On October 4, 2024, at the Status Conference Compliance—Briefs Due, after conferring with counsel, the court ordered the parties to mediate based on the court’s prior order. The parties were ordered to meet and confer and be prepared to inform the court on the next court date when mediation was set to occur and with whom. Counsel for plaintiff was ordered to submit assignee paperwork as required. A Status Conference Re: Mediation and Filing of Assignment of Judgment paperwork was scheduled for October 21, 2024. The court also that date entered a nunc pro tunc minute order to correct the minute order of 06/28/2024 to reflect the correct tentative ruling.

At the Status Conference on October 21, 2024, counsel stated that they were in the process of scheduling a mediation date. After conferring with counsel, the court ordered the Status Conference continued to December 19, 2025, and the motion to amend judgment was continued to March 7, 2025.

ANALYSIS:

Since the previous hearing date, defendants/cross-complainants Boris Komisar and Elvira Shut have filed a Status Report Re: Property Line Adjustment, indicating that the parties agreed through counsel to attend mediation through Signature Resolution, as specified in a Lot Line Adjustment Contract prepared by Assignees/moving parties. The Status Report indicates that the Contract calls for mediation of any disputes pertaining to the Contract, but moving parties have made clear their intention to not comply with the Contract and mediate. The Status Report also indicates that the moving parties have cancelled the lot line adjustment, and so should be estopped from pursuing the remedy to amend the judgment.

The attached executed Lot Line Adjustment Agreement was executed on March 11, 2024, and provides, in pertinent part:

“Mediation. The Parties agree to and shall mediate any dispute or claim between them arising out of this Agreement or any resulting transaction. The mediation shall be held prior to any civil action. In the event the parties are not able to agree on a mediator within thirty days of the first party seeking mediation, the parties shall submit the matter to mediation before Signature Resolution in Los Angeles County, California, who shall appoint a mediator.”

[Status Report, Ex. A, para. 17].

The Status Report attaches emails showing the parties have not been able to schedule a mediation. [Ex. B].

The Status Report also indicates that, more importantly, the moving parties/assignees have sold their interest in the property. The Status Report attaches a recorded Grant Deed, executed on July 2, 2024 and recorded on July 31, 2024, pursuant to which Eve Somer, Trustee, and Gregory C. Yaitanes, Trustee, each granted to John Blakeman, Trustee of The Whole Bottle Trust, their undivided 50% interest in the subject property at 3318 Oakdell Rd. in Studio City. [Ex. C].

It accordingly appears the motion has been rendered moot, as moving parties are no longer owners of the subject property entitled to become assignees. It would appear that the covenant at issue runs with the land, and that the new owner would have an interest in this matter and its ultimate resolution.

The court notes that the moving parties have filed a Judgment Assignees’ Status Report, and various supporting documents, including a Notice of Non-Opposition to the Application to Amend Judgment, none of which address the Grant Deed or explain the impact on the application to be named as assignees the fact that the recorded ownership of the property is now in a third party. The moving parties take the position that they have been cooperating in efforts to schedule the mediation, and have not wrongfully withdrawn the Lot Line Adjustment application made to the City of Los Angeles Planning Department. The moving parties submit an undated copy of a Case Summary screen from Los Angeles City Planning, which seems to reflect that as of the unidentified date of the search the matter was still pending. [Hummer Decl., para. 21, Ex. B]. Without a date, this showing is not strong evidence that the lot line application is still pending.

In any case, the court is concerned that the Grant Deed is not addressed, and that since the execution of the Grant Deed and its recording, the moving parties have submitted status reports to the court on September 20, 2024, November 4, 2024 and February 26, 2025 and attending a Status Conference before the court on October 21, 2024 without making mention of the transfer of ownership of the property in July of 2024.

The matter accordingly is deemed moot. The court will hear argument concerning whether the new owners of the property have standing to file a claim as assignees.

RULING:

Judgment Creditors’ Application to Amend Judgment is MOOT in light of the recording on July 31, 2024 of a Grant Deed granting the property formerly held by plaintiffs from the moving parties to John Blakeman, Trustee of The Whole Bottle Trust dated July 2, 2024.

DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE

VIDEO APPEARANCES

If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative.