DEPARTMENT A LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
INSTRUCTIONS: If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance on the matter, the moving party must: 1. Contact the opposing party and all other parties who have appeared in the action and confirm that each will submit on the tentative ruling. 2. No later than 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing, call the Courtroom (310-761-4302) advising that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling and waive hearing; and 3. Serve notice of the Court's ruling on all parties entitled to receive service. If this procedure is followed, when the case is called the Court will enter its ruling on the motion in accordance with its tentative ruling. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary, and all parties should appear at the hearing. If there is neither a telephone call nor an appearance, then the matter may either be taken off calendar or ruled on. TENTATIVE RULINGS -- http://www.lacourt.org/tentativeRulingNet/u Case Number: 22CMCV00709 Hearing Date: March 6, 2025 Dept: A
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT
MOVING PARTY: Defendant
Los Angeles Unified School District RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
A.B. 1.
Background This is a childhood sexual assault revival action filed
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1. Plaintiff A.B. (“Plaintiff”)
alleges in the complaint that defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (“District”)
breached its duty of care to Plaintiff when he was a student at Alan LeRoy
Locke High School. Plaintiff alleges that District knew or should have known of
Plaintiff’s abuse by a teacher at Alan LeRoy Locke High School (“Locke”), Jack
Jacobson (“Jacobson”), and that District failed to supervise Jacobson to
prevent his abuse of Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges causes of action for
negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision against District. Plaintiff attended Locke as a student between
1978 and 1981. (Defendant’s Undisputed Facts “DUF” 3.) Locke was a District
school at the time when Plaintiff attended it. (DUF 2.) Plaintiff has no actual knowledge that any
student or school employee saw Plaintiff leave campus with Jacobson. (DUF 15.)
Four other former students of Locke have also alleged sexual abuse against
Jacobson. (DUF 18.) Three of the other former students did not tell anyone that
the abuse was occurring at the time that it occurred. (DUF 24, 29, 39.) Craig Washington was an employee of District
in 1978 and 1979. (PUF 1.) Clifford Brown Burems (“Burems”) was an employee of District
between 1973 and 1985. (PUF 4.) Burems was a physical education teacher and the
varsity basketball coach at Locke when Jacobson was principal at Locke. (PUF
5.) During the time that Burems was teaching at Locke and Jacobson was
Principal at Locke, Burems was informed that some male students had gone away
for the weekend to Palm Springs with Jacobson. (PUF 6.) Burems did not report
this information to anyone, as he was required to do under District policy.
(PUF 9-10.) Jacobson sexually abused a student at Palm Springs. (PUF 11.) In 1964, while an employee at District,
Jacobson was arrested for lewd conduct. (PUF 12.) District suspended Jacobson,
but did not investigate or otherwise discipline him. (PUF 13.) In 1978 and 1979, all District employees were
required to report suspected abuse of a student. (PUF 15.) When Jacobson was
principal at Locke High School, teachers were not allowed to seclude themselves
in a room with a student with the door closed partly in order to protect the
student from inappropriate touching. (PUF 17.) Jacobson sexually abused
Plaintiff and another student while alone in a room behind a closed door. (PUF
18-20.) The school secretary at the time witnessed Jacobson seclude himself
with a student on multiple occasions. (PUF 21.) 3.
Evidentiary
Objections Defendant
objects to Plaintiff’s statement of undisputed facts, filing its objections purportedly
as objections to Plaintiff’s evidence. Defendant’s objections fail to state the
name of the document or specific evidence which contains the material objected
to as required, and is therefore improperly filed under California Rules of
Court, rule 3.1354. As a result, the
court overrules Defendant’s evidentiary objections. 4.
Request
for Judicial Notice Plaintiff requests that the court take
judicial notice of the Appellate Court’s Opinion filed July 31, 2024, in West Contra Costa School
District v. The Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1st Appellate District Case No. A16934), as
well as the minute order filed in Compton Courthouse Department B on January 7,
2025 in J.D. v. Doe 1,
case no. 22CMCV00697. Factual
findings in prior judicial orders, opinions, or decisions are not a proper
subject of judicial notice. (Kilroy v. State of Calif. (2004) 119
Cal.App.4th 140, 148.) Nor does the court take judicial notice of matters not
relevant to the proceeding. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co.
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2.) However, pursuant to California Evidence
Code 452(c), judicial notice may be taken of “[o]fficial acts of the
legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of
any state of the United States.” The court will
take judicial notice of the Appellate Court’s opinion in West Contra Costa School
District v. The Superior Court of Contra Costa County. The court
declines to take judicial notice of the minute order filed on January 7, 2025
in J.D. v. Doe 1, case no. 22CMCV00697, as not relevant to the
proceeding. 5.
Discussion District moves for summary judgment on the grounds
that there is no credible admissible evidence that Jacobson abused students
while employed by District or that District had actual or constructive
knowledge of any abuse by Jacobson until the complaints filed in 2022. In
opposition, Plaintiff contends that the evidence gives rise to a triable issue
of fact as to whether District had actual or constructive notice of sexual
abuse committed by Jacobson. The purpose of
a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts
with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine
whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their
dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)
“Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the
trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all
inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other
inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare
Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “On a motion
for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make
a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant
or cross-defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met
his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party
has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be
established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “Once the defendant or cross-defendant
has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to
show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause
of action or a defense thereto.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “If
the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical
Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)
“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must
consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which
the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences
that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment.” (Id. at
p. 467; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the
motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau
(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) A triable issue of material fact exists only
if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying
fact in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Falcon v. Long Beach
Genetics, Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1271.) District
contends that Plaintiff has no evidence that establishes constructive or actual
notice by District, and that therefore no triable issue of fact exists, as
notice is a required element of negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and
supervision. District also contends that AB 218, the bill that permits to this
childhood sexual assault revival action, is unconstitutional as a violation of
the Gift Clause of the California Constitution. District’s
constitutional challenge was addressed in West Contra Costa Unified School
District v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 1243, in which the court found that AB 218’s retroactive waiver of
the government claims requirement is not a violation of the Gift Clause. In
accordance with the published opinion, the court finds that AB 218’s
retroactive waiver of the government claims requirement is not an
unconstitutional violation of the Gift Clause. “ ‘[A] school
district is liable for the negligence of supervisory or administrative
personnel who allegedly knew, or should have known,’ of the foreseeable risk to
students of sexual abuse by an employee and nevertheless hired, retained,
and/or inadequately supervised that employee.” (D.Z. v. Los Angeles Unified
School Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 210, 223, citation omitted.) In support of
District’s contention that Plaintiff lacks evidence that District had notice,
District has provided the testimony of Plaintiff, the testimony of four other
students who were allegedly sexually abused by Jacobson, District’s evidence
shows that Plaintiff has not produced evidence that District had actual or
constructive notice of Jacobson’s abuse of Plaintiff. District has submitted
testimony from Plaintiff and other former students of Locke that they did not tell
anyone at District that they were being abused, as well as testimony from
Burems that, while he was employed at Locke, he did not receive any complaints
or concerns about his principal. (Mot. Ex. 1-5, 11.) However, in
order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, District must show that not
only does Plaintiff not currently possess evidence establishing a triable issue
of material fact, District must show that Plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain
such evidence. District has not made a showing that Plaintiff cannot reasonably
obtain evidence that supervisory or administrative personnel had actual or
constructive notice of a foreseeable risk of sexual abuse by Jacobson. District
has therefore failed to carry its burden on the instant motion for summary
judgment. Furthermore,
even had District carried its burden, Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated the
existence of a triable issue of material fact as to whether District had actual
or constructive notice of a foreseeable risk of sexual abuse of students by
Jacobson. Plaintiff has provided the deposition testimony of Burems, in which Burems
stated that he learned that Jacobson was taking students on weekend trips to
Palm Springs, and that this gave Burems some reason to believe that Jacobson
may have been doing something sexually inappropriate with students. (Opp. Ex.
2.) Additionally, Plaintiffs have provided a control card for Jacobson,
indicating that he was arrested in 1964 for lewd conduct. (Opp. Ex. 4, 12.)
According to the deposition testimony of Marilyn Fuller, a control card
documents any review through the Office of Employee Relations. (Opp. Ex. 4.)
Although District contends that Jacobson was found not guilty, there is no
evidence that the 1964 arrest involves minors, and there is no evidence that
specifies any details about what conduct gave rise to the arrest, a reasonable
jury may conclude that District knew or had reason to know that Jacobson posed
a foreseeable risk to Plaintiff and other students, particularly considering
Marily Fuller’s testimony that an arrest for lewd conduct by a certificated
employee would not be investigated by District beyond monitoring of the case.
(Opp. Ex. 4.) 6.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s motion for summary judgment. District is ordered to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: March 6, 2025 Hon. Elizabeth L. Bradley Judge of the Superior Court Case Number: 23CMCV00632 Hearing Date: March 6, 2025 Dept: A
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT
MOVING PARTY: Defendant
Ricardo Buenrostro RESPONDING PARTY: None This is a
motor vehicle collision action. Plaintiff Takema Cox (“Plaintiff”) alleges that
defendants Ricardo Buenrostro; Buenrostro Farm, Inc.; St. Moll, Inc. dba
Integrity Tire; and Christopher B. Moll failed to use reasonable care in the
ownership, entrustment, repair, maintenance, management, control, and/or
operation of the motor vehicle, resulting in a vehicular collision with
Plaintiff’s motor vehicle. 2.
Discussion Defendant Ricardo Buenrostro (“Defendant”)
moves for terminating sanctions against Plaintiff on the grounds that Plaintiff
has failed to provide responses to Defendant’s Form Interrogatories, Set One;
Special Interrogatories, Set One; and Requests for Production of Documents, Set
One, despite a court order compelling Plaintiff to provide responses to such.
Plaintiff has not opposed this motion. The court is
authorized, after notice and an opportunity for hearing, to impose the
following sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the
discovery process: monetary sanctions, issue sanctions, evidence sanctions,
terminating sanctions, and contempt. (Code Civ. Proc., §2023.030, subds.
(a)-(e).) A terminating sanction may be imposed by an order dismissing the
action of the party that brought the action. (Id., § 2023.030, subd.
(d)(3).) “The discovery
statutes evince an incremental approach to discovery sanctions, starting with
monetary sanctions and ending with the ultimate sanction of termination.
[Citation.]” (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc.(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967,
992 (Doppes); see J.W. v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New
York, Inc.(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1169.) If a lesser sanction fails to
curb misuse, a greater sanction is warranted. (Doppes, supra, 174
Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) “Discovery sanctions ‘should be appropriate to the
dereliction, and should not exceed what is required to protect the interests of
the party entitled to but denied discovery.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “But
where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence
shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the
discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate
sanction.” (Ibid.) The court
should consider the totality of the circumstances, including conduct of the
party to determine if the actions were willful, the determent to the
propounding party, and the number of formal and informal attempts to obtain
discovery. (Lang v. Hochman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1246.)
Terminating sanctions should not be ordered lightly, but are justified where a
violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and there is evidence
that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery
rules. (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) Before any
sanctions may be imposed the court must make an express finding that there has
been a willful failure of the party to serve the required discovery responses.
(Fairfield v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County (1966) 246
Cal.App.2d 113, 118.) The party who failed to comply with discovery obligations
has the burden of showing that the failure was not willful. (Deyo v.
Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 788; Cornwall v. Santa Monica Dairy
Co. (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 250, 252-253.) Code of Civil
Procedure section 2023.010, subdivisions (d) and (f), provide that a misuse of
the discovery process includes, but is not limited to, “[f]ailing to respond or
to submit to an authorized method of discovery” and “[m]aking an evasive
response to discovery.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subds. (d), (f).) Defendant served discovery requests on April
1, 2024. (Wellen Decl. ¶ 2.) After Plaintiff requested and Defendant granted
multiple extensions of time to respond, the due date for responses was May 31,
2024. (Wellen Decl ¶¶ 3-4.) On June 10, 2024, Defendant emailed Plaintiff to
request discovery responses. (Wellen Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff failed to serve
discovery responses. (Wellen Decl. ¶ 6.) Defendant filed motions to compel
Plaintiff’s discovery responses along with a request for sanctions, which were
granted on October 17, 2024. (Wellen Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, Ex. F.) The notice of ruling
was served on Plaintiff and filed on October 23, 2024. At the February 25, 2025 hearing on the
motion, counsel for Plaintiff advised that she served Plaintiff’s verified
discovery responses the evening before the hearing. Counsel for Defendant
acknowledged receipt of those responses.
The court ordered Defendant to file a brief advising the court whether
the responses were verified and code-compliant.
Defendant’s March 4, 2025 brief does not indicate that Plaintiff’s
responses were unverified or not code-compliant. Instead, Defendant takes issues with the
responses substantively. That matter is
not before the court at this time. Because Plaintiff has finally served verified
and code-compliant responses to the discovery at issue, the court will deny the
request for terminating sanctions. b. Monetary Sanctions Plaintiff failed to comply with the court’s
October 17, 2024 order compelling compliance with discovery motions and payment
of sanctions, necessitating the filing of the motion and the instant brief. Defendant requests monetary sanctions of $780, based on attorney
Michael H. Wellen’s hourly rate of $240 across two hours spent preparing the
motion and one hour anticipated to be spent attending the hearing and preparing
a reply brief, plus a $60 filing fee. Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 provides that, “[t]o the
extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method . .
. , the court, after notice to any affected party, person, or attorney, and
after opportunity for hearing, may impose . . . [monetary, issue, evidence, or
terminating] sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of
the discovery process . . . .” Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010
provides that misuse of the discovery process includes, but is not limited to,
failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery. If a party fails to obey an order compelling answers to discovery, the
court may order sanctions as is just. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290, 2031.300.)
In such instances, in lieu of or in addition to other sanctions, the court may
impose monetary sanctions. (Ibid.) The court finds that monetary sanctions are warranted based on
Plaintiff’s failure to respond to Defendant’s discovery requests. The court
finds that Mr. Wellen’s hourly rate and hours claimed are reasonable, and will
grant Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions in the amount of $780. 3.
Conclusion
Based on the
foregoing, the court DENIES Defendant’s motion for terminating sanctions. The
court GRANTS Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions in the amount of $780.
Plaintiff is ordered to pay Defendant the aforementioned amount within thirty
(30) days of this order. Defendant is ordered to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: February 25, 2025 Hon. Elizabeth L. Bradley Judge of the Superior Court Case Number: 24CMCV00493 Hearing Date: March 6, 2025 Dept: A
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT
MOVING PARTY: Defendant
Rene Rodriguez RESPONDING PARTY: None 1.
Background 2.
Discussion Defendant moves to compel Plaintiff’s
responses to Defendant’s Special Interrogatories, Set One. Plaintiff has not
opposed the instant motion. A party must respond to interrogatories,
requests for production of documents, or requests for admission within 30 days
of service. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.260, subd. (a).) However, these time limits
are extended if served by mail, overnight delivery, fax, or electronically.
(See Code Civ. Proc., §1010.6, subd. (a)(4).) “If the last day for the
performance of any act provided or required by law to be performed within a
specified period of time is a holiday, then that period is hereby extended to
and including the next day that is not a holiday.” (Code Civ. Proc., §12a,
subd. (a).) Failure to timely respond waives all objections including privilege
or on the protection of work product. (See Code Civ. Proc., §2031.300, subd.
(a).) The party to whom the discovery requests are directed must sign the
responses under oath, unless the responses consist of only objections. (Code
Civ. Proc., §2030.250, subd. (a).) Defendant propounded Special Interrogatories,
Set One on Plaintiff on June 25, 2024. (Chang Decl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff’s verified
responses were due by July 30, 2024, but Plaintiff did not serve such
responses. (Chang Decl. ¶ 3.) On August 15, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel stated
that they were unable to contact their client. (Chang Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. C.)
Plaintiff’s counsel subsequently filed a motion to be relieved as counsel,
which was granted on December 10, 2024. (Chang Decl. ¶ 8.) As of the date of
the filing of the instant motion, Plaintiff had not served discovery responses,
nor responded to Defendant’s meet and confer efforts. (Chang Decl. ¶ 10.) There
is no indication that, as of March 6, 2025, Plaintiff has served discovery
responses. The court will grant Defendant’s motion to compel initial discovery
responses. Plaintiff requests $860 in monetary sanctions
against Plaintiff based on attorney Erica Chang’s hourly rate of $200 per hour
over four hours, plus a $60 filing fee. Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030
provides that, “[t]o the extent authorized by the chapter governing any
particular discovery method . . . , the court, after notice to any affected
party, person, or attorney, and after opportunity for hearing, may impose . . .
[monetary, issue, evidence, or terminating] sanctions against anyone engaging
in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process . . . .” Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010
provides that misuse of the discovery process includes, but is not limited to,
failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery. California
Rules of Court, rule 3.1348, subdivision (a) states: “The court may award sanctions
under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel
discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to
the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving
party after the motion was filed.” Monetary sanctions shall constitute
reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees incurred as a result of the
sanctionable conduct. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a).) Monetary
sanctions are authorized in connection with a motion to compel responses to
interrogatories, and to compel responses to and compliance with inspection
demands. (See, Code of Civ. Proc. §§ 2031.060, 2030.290.) As Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant’s
discovery requests, necessitating the filing of the instant motions, monetary
sanctions are authorized and warranted against Plaintiff. The court finds $200 per hour reasonable under
the circumstances. In light of Plaintiff’s lack of opposition, the court will
reduce the requested hours by 1. The court will order monetary sanctions
imposed against Plaintiff in the amount of $660. 3.
Conclusion
Based on the
foregoing, the court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to compel initial responses to
Special Interrogatories, Set One. Plaintiff is ordered to provide discovery
responses not later than May 6, 2025. The court GRANTS Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff in the amount of $660, to be paid not later than May 6, 2025. Defendant is ordered to give notice. DATED: March 6, 2025 Hon. Elizabeth L. Bradley Judge of the Superior Court Case Number: 24CMCV01674 Hearing Date: March 6, 2025 Dept: A
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT
MOVING PARTY: Defendants
T&I Express and Thomas Allen RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
Zhen Wen Li 1.
Background This is an assault and battery action. Plaintiff Zhen
Wen Li (“Plaintiff”) alleges that defendant James Elsey Howard (“Howard”),
while an employee of defendant T&I Express, Inc. (T&I) and acting
within the scope of his employment, threatened, slapped, struck, and beat
Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that, at the time of the incident, defendant
Thomas Ray Allen (Allen) was the CEO of T&I, along with other managerial or
executive positions within T&I, and was the direct supervisor of Howard.
Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Allen held such positions at the time
when Howard became employed by T&I. 2.
Discussion Any party,
within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of
motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.(Code of Civ. Proc., § 435,
subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).)The court may, upon
a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1)
strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading;
or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in
conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the
court.(Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954)
42 Cal.2d 767, 782.) In order to
state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the
elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section
3294.(College. Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704,
721 (College Hospital).)These statutory elements include allegations
that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code,
§ 3294, subd. (a).) “An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to
subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the
employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed
him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or
authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded
or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Id., subd.
(b).) “Malice is
defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to
the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a
willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (College
Hospital, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725 [examining Civ. Code, § 3294,
subd. (c)(1)].) “A conscious disregard of the safety of others may constitute
malice within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code. In order to
justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must
establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences
of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those
consequences.”(Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890,
895-896.) “A conscious
disregard of the safety of others may constitute malice within the meaning of
section 3294 of the Civil Code. In order to justify an award of punitive
damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was
aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he
willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.”(Taylor v.
Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896.) “In order to
survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate
facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.
[Citations.]In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike,
judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole,
all parts in their context, and assume their truth.[Citations.]In ruling on a
motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.[Citation.]”(Clauson
v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)“The mere allegation
an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of
punitive damages.[Citation.]Not only must there be circumstances of
oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to
support such a claim.[Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984)
157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.) Movants
contend that there are no facts or allegations that Howard was unfit or
incompetent to drive a truck, the work for which he was hired, and that
allegations that Movants had advance knowledge of Howard’s past criminal
history are not sufficient for a claim of punitive damages. Movants further
contend that Plaintiff has failed to state facts indicating that Movants were
aware of probable dangerous consequences of hiring Howard and willfully and
deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. In opposition,
Plaintiff argues that Movants knew, at the time of Howard’s hiring, that Howard
had criminal history including convictions for assault, battery, possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute near a school, and carrying a concealed
weapon in a vehicle. Plaintiff contends that Movant’s actions resulted in
probable dangerous consequences that were foreseeable because of Howard’s
criminal history and argument from federal authorities at the time of Howard’s
release from prison that Howard remained a danger to the public. Plaintiff
argues that Movants had knowledge of Howard’s background and yet knowingly
hired him, thereby demonstrating conscious disregard of the safety of others. Plaintiff
alleges in the complaint that Howard was unfit to perform the work for which he
was hired, based on a history of violent behavior (Complaint ¶ 10), and that
Movants knew or should have known that Howard was unfit to perform the work for
which he was hired, based on Howard’s early termination of supervised release
in part due to his employment at T&I, despite opposition by the United
States on the basis that Howard would continue to remain a danger to the public.
(Complaint ¶¶ 59, 60.) Although these
facts were not alleged in connection with Plaintiff’s intentional tort causes
of action, the court reads the complaint as a whole in ruling upon a demurrer. Assuming the truth of these factual
allegations, they are sufficient to establish that Movants had advance
knowledge of Howard’s unfitness to perform the work that he was hired and
employed him with a conscious disregard for the safety of others. The complaint
therefore contains sufficient factual allegations to support a request for
punitive damages which can be further explored during discovery. The request
for punitive damages is not irrelevant, false, or improper, or not drawn or
filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of
the court. Movants
contend that Plaintiff must meet the standard of clear and convincing evidence
to support a claim for punitive damages. While this is the correct standard at
judgment, Plaintiff need not meet such an evidentiary standard at the stage of
a motion to strike. 3.
Conclusion
Based on the
foregoing, the court DENIES Defendants T&I Express, Inc. and Thomas Ray Allen’s
motion to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. Movants are ordered to give notice. DATED: March 6, 2025 Hon. Elizabeth L. Bradley Judge of the Superior Court Case Number: 24CMCV02044 Hearing Date: March 6, 2025 Dept: A
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT
MOVING PARTY: Defendant
FCA US, LLC RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
Esgar Montes 1.
Background This is a lemon law action. Plaintiff Esgar Montes
(“Plaintiff”) alleges that on October 5, 2021, he entered into a warranty
contract with defendant FCA US, LLC (“Defendant”) concerning a 2021 Dodge
Durango with the Vehicle Identification Number 1C4SDHCTXMC803663 (the
“Vehicle”), which was manufactured and/or distributed by Defendant. Plaintiffs
allege that
the Vehicle contained or developed defects that substantially affected its use,
value, and/or safety. Plaintiffs
have alleged causes of action for violation of subdivision (d) of Civil Code §
1793.2; violation of subdivision (b) of Civil Code § 1793.2; violation of
subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code § 1793.2; breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability; fraudulent inducement – concealment;
and negligent repair. 2.
Discussion a. Demurrer Defendant demurs to the first four causes of
action in the complaint and the sixth cause of action in the complaint on the
grounds that they are time-barred. Defendant also demurs to the fifth cause of
action in the complaint, for fraudulent inducement – concealment, on the
grounds that it is time-barred and that Plaintiff has failed to allege
sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. In opposition, Plaintiff
contends that the statute of limitations on Song-Beverly claims is four years
and has therefore not run, and that the statute of limitations on a fraud claim
does not accrue and run until the discovery by the plaintiff of the facts
constituting the fraud. Plaintiff also contends that the complaint contains all
essential elements of fraudulent inducement – concealment. A demurrer for
sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v.
Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 (Hahn).)When considering
demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v.
City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216,
1228.)In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of
the pleading or via proper judicial notice.(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co.
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not
the evidence or other extrinsic matters.Therefore, it lies only where the
defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.”(SKF
Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue
involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands,
unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.”(Hahn, supra,
147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.)The ultimate facts alleged in the complaint must be
deemed true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those
expressly alleged.(Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37
Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403; see also Shields v. County of San Diego
(1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 103, 133 [stating, “[o]n demurrer, pleadings are read
liberally and allegations contained therein are assumed to be true.”]) “The
court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or
conclusions of law. [Citation.]” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183
Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s first four
causes of action, his Song-Beverly express warranty and implied warranty
claims, and his sixth cause of action, his negligent repair claim, are
time-barred because the limited warranty provided coverage for three years or
36,000 miles, whichever came first, and therefore expired by October 5, 2024;
the Powertrain Limited Warranty provided coverage for five years or 60,000
miles, whichever came first, and therefore may have expired by the filing of
the complaint on December 24, 2024; and the implied warranty provided coverage
for one year or the product’s useful life, whichever came first, and therefore
expired by October 5, 2022. However, the time for expiration of a warranty is
entirely distinct from the statute of operations for breach of an express or
implied warranty. (Mexia v. Rinker Coat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1305-1306.) The
statute of limitations for such under the Song-Beverly Act is four years. (Ibid.) As the Vehicle was purchased on October 5,
2021, and the complaint was filed on December 24, 2024, less than for years
after the purchase of the vehicle, the statute of limitations had not run as of
the filing of the complaint. Plaintiff’s first four causes of action and his
sixth cause of action are not time-barred. Defendant also contends that Plaintiff’s
fourth cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability is
barred by lack of privity. However, under Civil Code § 1792, “every sale of
consumer goods that are sold at retail in [California] shall be accompanied by
the manufacturer’s and the retail seller’s implied warranty that the goods are
merchantable.” As Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant is the manufacturer,
privity is not required to establish that Defendant extended Plaintiff an implied
warranty of merchantability alongside the sale of the Vehicle. Defendant further contends that Plaintiff’s
fifth cause of action for fraudulent inducement – concealment is time-barred
because the statute of limitations for fraud is three years, and therefore
expired on October 5, 2024. Defendant also argues that the complaint fails to
state sufficient facts to allege fraud, that Defendant owed no duty of
disclosure to Plaintiff because there was no direct transactional relationship
between the parties, and that the cause of action is barred by the economic
loss doctrine. The discovery rule permits the postponement of
a statute of limitations period due to a plaintiff’s lack of discovery of the
facts establishing the elements of their cause of action. (Daley v. Regents of the
University of California
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 595, 603-604.) Here, Plaintiff has alleged that “[d]efects
and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable
express warranty period.” (Compl. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff has also alleged that “Plaintiffs
discovered Defendant's wrongful conduct alleged herein shortly before filing
this action.” (Compl. ¶ 38.) However, Plaintiff has not alleged when Plaintiff
discovered Defendant’s alleged wrongful conduct. Plaintiff has therefore not
sufficiently alleged facts supporting tolling of the limitations period based
on the discovery rule. Equitable tolling stops the running of a
statute of limitations where a defendant fraudulently conceals from a
plaintiff’s cause of action from them. (Sagehorn v. Engle (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 452, 461.) Equitable
estoppel does not toll the statute of limitations, but instead merely prevents
a defendant from raising the statute of limitations as a defense where the
defendant’s conduct has fraudulently induced the plaintiff from bringing suit
within the limitations period. (Vaca v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 737, 745.) Defendant cites Trantafello v. Medical
Center of Tarzana
(1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 315 for the proposition that, in order to toll the
statute of limitations, Plaintiff must show that Defendant affirmatively acted
to prevent Plaintiffs from bringing the cause of action within the limitations
period. Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant affirmatively deceived
Plaintiffs in such a manner as to prevent Plaintiffs from bringing their cause
of action within the limitations period, only that Defendant fraudulently
concealed the defect in the Vehicle by failing to disclose it when Defendant
had a duty to disclose it. Plaintiff has therefore not sufficiently alleged
facts supporting tolling of the limitations period based on equitable tolling
or equitable estoppel. Accordingly, the court will sustain the
demurrer as to the fifth cause of action for fraudulent inducement –
concealment, with leave to amend. b. Motion to Strike Because the court grants Plaintiff leave to
amend, the motion to strike is moot. Based on the
foregoing, the court SUSTAINS IN PART Defendant’s demurrer, with leave to amend.
The motion to strike is moot. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint not later
than April 6, 2025. Defendant is ordered to give notice. DATED: March 6, 2025 Hon. Elizabeth L. Bradley Judge of the Superior Court Case Number: CMCV02044 Hearing Date: March 6, 2025 Dept: A
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT
MOVING PARTY: Defendant
FCA US, LLC RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff
Esgar Montes 1.
Background This is a lemon law action. Plaintiff Esgar Montes
(“Plaintiff”) alleges that on October 5, 2021, he entered into a warranty
contract with defendant FCA US, LLC (“Defendant”) concerning a 2021 Dodge
Durango with the Vehicle Identification Number 1C4SDHCTXMC803663 (the
“Vehicle”), which was manufactured and/or distributed by Defendant. Plaintiffs
allege that
the Vehicle contained or developed defects that substantially affected its use,
value, and/or safety. Plaintiffs
have alleged causes of action for violation of subdivision (d) of Civil Code §
1793.2; violation of subdivision (b) of Civil Code § 1793.2; violation of
subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code § 1793.2; breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability; fraudulent inducement – concealment;
and negligent repair. 2.
Discussion a. Demurrer Defendant demurs to the first four causes of
action in the complaint and the sixth cause of action in the complaint on the
grounds that they are time-barred. Defendant also demurs to the fifth cause of
action in the complaint, for fraudulent inducement – concealment, on the
grounds that it is time-barred and that Plaintiff has failed to allege
sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. In opposition, Plaintiff
contends that the statute of limitations on Song-Beverly claims is four years
and has therefore not run, and that the statute of limitations on a fraud claim
does not accrue and run until the discovery by the plaintiff of the facts
constituting the fraud. Plaintiff also contends that the complaint contains all
essential elements of fraudulent inducement – concealment. A demurrer for
sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v.
Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 (Hahn).)When considering
demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v.
City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216,
1228.)In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of
the pleading or via proper judicial notice.(Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co.
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not
the evidence or other extrinsic matters.Therefore, it lies only where the
defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.”(SKF
Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue
involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands,
unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.”(Hahn, supra,
147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.)The ultimate facts alleged in the complaint must be
deemed true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those
expressly alleged.(Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37
Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403; see also Shields v. County of San Diego
(1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 103, 133 [stating, “[o]n demurrer, pleadings are read
liberally and allegations contained therein are assumed to be true.”]) “The
court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or
conclusions of law. [Citation.]” (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183
Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s first four
causes of action, his Song-Beverly express warranty and implied warranty
claims, and his sixth cause of action, his negligent repair claim, are
time-barred because the limited warranty provided coverage for three years or
36,000 miles, whichever came first, and therefore expired by October 5, 2024;
the Powertrain Limited Warranty provided coverage for five years or 60,000
miles, whichever came first, and therefore may have expired by the filing of
the complaint on December 24, 2024; and the implied warranty provided coverage
for one year or the product’s useful life, whichever came first, and therefore
expired by October 5, 2022. However, the time for expiration of a warranty is
entirely distinct from the statute of operations for breach of an express or
implied warranty. (Mexia v. Rinker Coat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1305-1306.) The
statute of limitations for such under the Song-Beverly Act is four years. (Ibid.) As the Vehicle was purchased on October 5,
2021, and the complaint was filed on December 24, 2024, less than for years
after the purchase of the vehicle, the statute of limitations had not run as of
the filing of the complaint. Plaintiff’s first four causes of action and his
sixth cause of action are not time-barred. Defendant also contends that Plaintiff’s
fourth cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability is
barred by lack of privity. However, under Civil Code § 1792, “every sale of
consumer goods that are sold at retail in [California] shall be accompanied by
the manufacturer’s and the retail seller’s implied warranty that the goods are
merchantable.” As Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant is the manufacturer,
privity is not required to establish that Defendant extended Plaintiff an implied
warranty of merchantability alongside the sale of the Vehicle. Defendant further contends that Plaintiff’s
fifth cause of action for fraudulent inducement – concealment is time-barred
because the statute of limitations for fraud is three years, and therefore
expired on October 5, 2024. Defendant also argues that the complaint fails to
state sufficient facts to allege fraud, that Defendant owed no duty of
disclosure to Plaintiff because there was no direct transactional relationship
between the parties, and that the cause of action is barred by the economic
loss doctrine. The discovery rule permits the postponement of
a statute of limitations period due to a plaintiff’s lack of discovery of the
facts establishing the elements of their cause of action. (Daley v. Regents of the
University of California
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 595, 603-604.) Here, Plaintiff has alleged that “[d]efects
and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable
express warranty period.” (Compl. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff has also alleged that “Plaintiffs
discovered Defendant's wrongful conduct alleged herein shortly before filing
this action.” (Compl. ¶ 38.) However, Plaintiff has not alleged when Plaintiff
discovered Defendant’s alleged wrongful conduct. Plaintiff has therefore not
sufficiently alleged facts supporting tolling of the limitations period based
on the discovery rule. Equitable tolling stops the running of a
statute of limitations where a defendant fraudulently conceals from a
plaintiff’s cause of action from them. (Sagehorn v. Engle (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 452, 461.) Equitable
estoppel does not toll the statute of limitations, but instead merely prevents
a defendant from raising the statute of limitations as a defense where the
defendant’s conduct has fraudulently induced the plaintiff from bringing suit
within the limitations period. (Vaca v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 737, 745.) Defendant cites Trantafello v. Medical
Center of Tarzana
(1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 315 for the proposition that, in order to toll the
statute of limitations, Plaintiff must show that Defendant affirmatively acted
to prevent Plaintiffs from bringing the cause of action within the limitations
period. Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant affirmatively deceived
Plaintiffs in such a manner as to prevent Plaintiffs from bringing their cause
of action within the limitations period, only that Defendant fraudulently
concealed the defect in the Vehicle by failing to disclose it when Defendant
had a duty to disclose it. Plaintiff has therefore not sufficiently alleged
facts supporting tolling of the limitations period based on equitable tolling
or equitable estoppel. Accordingly, the court will sustain the
demurrer as to the fifth cause of action for fraudulent inducement –
concealment, with leave to amend. b. Motion to Strike Because the court grants Plaintiff leave to
amend, the motion to strike is moot. Based on the
foregoing, the court SUSTAINS IN PART Defendant’s demurrer, with leave to amend.
The motion to strike is moot. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint not later
than April 6, 2025. Defendant is ordered to give notice. DATED: March 6, 2025 Hon. Elizabeth L. Bradley Judge of the Superior Court |
DEPARTMENT A LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
INSTRUCTIONS: If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance on the matter, the moving party must: 1. Contact the opposing party and all other parties who have appeared in the action and confirm that each will submit on the tentative ruling. 2. No later than 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing, call the Courtroom (310-761-4302) advising that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling and waive hearing; and 3. Serve notice of the Court's ruling on all parties entitled to receive service. If this procedure is followed, when the case is called the Court will enter its ruling on the motion in accordance with its tentative ruling. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary, and all parties should appear at the hearing. If there is neither a telephone call nor an appearance, then the matter may either be taken off calendar or ruled on. TENTATIVE RULINGS -- http://www.lacourt.org/tentativeRulingNet/u Case Number: 24CMCV00312 Hearing Date: March 13, 2025 Dept: A
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs’
Attorney Corey Hankins RESPONDING PARTY: None 1.
Background This is
a motor vehicle collision action. Plaintiffs Theresa Meraz and Kassandra Guzman
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege that defendants Levon Arakelyan and United
Ride Medical Transportation Inc. negligently owned, operated, maintained, or
entrusted their vehicle so as to collide with Plaintiffs’ vehicle, causing
Plaintiffs personal injury and property damage. Attorney Corey
Hankins (“Counsel”) moves to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiffs, on the
grounds that there has been a breakdown in the relationship between Counsel and
Plaintiffs. Counsel’s motion to be
relieved as counsel for Plaintiff Theresa Meraz was set for hearing on March
11, 2025, while his motion to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff Kassandra
Guzman is set for hearing on March 13, 2025.
Based upon counsel’s failure to appear at the March 11, 2025 hearing, the
court continued the March 11, 2025
hearing to March 13, 2025 and rules on both motions as follows. The court has
discretion to allow an attorney to withdraw, and such a motion should be
granted provided that there is no prejudice to the client and it does not
disrupt the orderly process of justice. (See Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994) 21
Cal. App. 4th 904, 915; People v. Prince (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 398.) California
Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.16(b)(10) provides that a permissive
request for withdrawal may be properly granted where an attorney believes that
the tribunal will find good cause for withdrawal. California Rules of Court, rule 3.1362 (Motion to Be
Relieved as Counsel) requires (1) notice of motion and motion to be directed to
the client (made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as
Counsel—Civil form (MC-051)); (2) a declaration stating in general terms and
without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship
why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure, section 284, subdivision (2) is
brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure, section 284,
subdivision (1) (made on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be
Relieved as Counsel—Civil form (MC-052)); (3) service of the notice of motion
and motion and declaration on all other parties who have appeared in the case;
and (4) the proposed order relieving counsel (prepared on the Order Granting
Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel—Civil form (MC-053)). Here, Counsel has
not fully complied with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1362. The proofs of
service attached to the moving papers and associated filings indicate that
these papers were served on Counsel at 612 S. Broadway Ave. Los Angeles, CA
90014. There is no indication that either of Plaintiffs were themselves served.
As an attorney’s motion to withdraw as counsel is one that a client may wish to
oppose against the wishes of the attorney, such a motion should be served on
the client directly, rather than on the attorney as a proxy for the client. Counsel has
otherwise complied with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1362: Counsel has
provided a declaration stating why this motion has been brought instead of a
consent; filed proofs of service on all other parties who have appeared in the
case; filed a proposed order relieving Counsel; and demonstrated a reasonable
basis for withdrawal, namely a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship.
(Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.16, subd. (b)(4).) Nonetheless,
because Counsel failed to fully comply with the requirements of California
Rules of Court, rule 3.1362, the court denies Counsel’s motions. 3.
Conclusion
Based on the
foregoing, the court DENIES Attorney Corey Hankins’ motion to be relieved as
counsel for Plaintiff Theresa Meraz. The court DENIES Attorney Corey Hankins’
motion to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff Kassandra Guzman. Counsel is ordered to give notice. DATED: March 13, 2025 Hon. Elizabeth L. Bradley Judge of the Superior Court |
DEPARTMENT A LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
INSTRUCTIONS: If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance on the matter, the moving party must: 1. Contact the opposing party and all other parties who have appeared in the action and confirm that each will submit on the tentative ruling. 2. No later than 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing, call the Courtroom (310-761-4302) advising that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling and waive hearing; and 3. Serve notice of the Court's ruling on all parties entitled to receive service. If this procedure is followed, when the case is called the Court will enter its ruling on the motion in accordance with its tentative ruling. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary, and all parties should appear at the hearing. If there is neither a telephone call nor an appearance, then the matter may either be taken off calendar or ruled on. TENTATIVE RULINGS -- http://www.lacourt.org/tentativeRulingNet/u Case Number: 24CMCV00312 Hearing Date: March 11, 2025 Dept: A
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs’
Attorney Corey Hankins RESPONDING PARTY: None 1.
Background This is
a motor vehicle collision action. Plaintiffs Theresa Meraz and Kassandra Guzman
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege that defendants Levon Arakelyan and United
Ride Medical Transportation Inc. negligently owned, operated, maintained, or
entrusted their vehicle so as to collide with Plaintiffs’ vehicle, causing
Plaintiffs personal injury and property damage. Attorney Corey
Hankins (“Counsel”) moves to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiffs, on the
grounds that there has been a breakdown in the relationship between Counsel and
Plaintiffs. Counsel’s motion to be
relieved as counsel for Plaintiff Theresa Meraz is set for hearing on March 11,
2025, while his motion to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff Kassandra Guzman
is set for hearing on March 13, 2025.
The court advances the March 13, 2025 hearing to March 11, 2025 and
rules on both motions as follows. The court has
discretion to allow an attorney to withdraw, and such a motion should be
granted provided that there is no prejudice to the client and it does not
disrupt the orderly process of justice. (See Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994) 21
Cal. App. 4th 904, 915; People v. Prince (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 398.) California
Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.16(b)(10) provides that a permissive
request for withdrawal may be properly granted where an attorney believes that
the tribunal will find good cause for withdrawal. California Rules of Court, rule 3.1362 (Motion to Be
Relieved as Counsel) requires (1) notice of motion and motion to be directed to
the client (made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as
Counsel—Civil form (MC-051)); (2) a declaration stating in general terms and
without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship
why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure, section 284, subdivision (2) is
brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure, section 284,
subdivision (1) (made on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be
Relieved as Counsel—Civil form (MC-052)); (3) service of the notice of motion
and motion and declaration on all other parties who have appeared in the case;
and (4) the proposed order relieving counsel (prepared on the Order Granting
Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel—Civil form (MC-053)). Here, Counsel has
not fully complied with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1362. The proofs of
service attached to the moving papers and associated filings indicate that
these papers were served on Counsel at 612 S. Broadway Ave. Los Angeles, CA
90014. There is no indication that either of Plaintiffs were themselves served.
As an attorney’s motion to withdraw as counsel is one that a client may wish to
oppose against the wishes of the attorney, such a motion should be served on
the client directly, rather than on the attorney as a proxy for the client. Counsel has
otherwise complied with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1362: Counsel has
provided a declaration stating why this motion has been brought instead of a
consent; filed proofs of service on all other parties who have appeared in the
case; filed a proposed order relieving Counsel; and demonstrated a reasonable
basis for withdrawal, namely a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship.
(Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.16, subd. (b)(4).) Nonetheless,
because Counsel failed to fully comply with the requirements of California
Rules of Court, rule 3.1362, the court denies Counsel’s motions. 3.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES Attorney Corey Hankins’ motion to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff Theresa Meraz. The court DENIES Attorney Corey Hankins’ motion to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff Kassandra Guzman. Counsel is ordered to give notice. DATED: March 11, 2025 Hon. Elizabeth L. Bradley Judge of the Superior Court Case Number: 24CMCV00320 Hearing Date: March 11, 2025 Dept: A
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT
MOVING PARTY: Defendant
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority RESPONDING PARTY: None 1.
Background This is
a premises liability action. Plaintiff Richard Littlejon (“Plaintiff”) alleges
that defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority
(“Defendant”) negligently, recklessly, and/or wantonly owned, maintained,
managed, operated, controlled, and safeguarded the premises at or near 11667
Avalon Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90061, such that a defective, broken, and/or
deteriorating door on a train at those premises suddenly and without warning
struck Plaintiff, causing Plaintiff personal injury and property damage. 2.
Discussion A party must respond to requests for admission within 30 days of
service. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.250, subd. (a).) However, these time limits
are extended if served by mail, overnight delivery, fax, or electronically.
(See Code Civ. Proc. §1010.6, subd. (a)(4); see also Code Civ. Proc. §1013.)
“If the last day for the performance of any act provided or required by law to
be performed within a specified period of time is a holiday, then that period
is hereby extended to and including the next day that is not a holiday.” (Code
Civ. Proc. §12a, subd. (a).) Failure to timely respond waives all objections
including privilege or on the protection of work product. (See Code Civ. Proc.
§2031.300, subd. (a); see also Code Civ. Proc. §2033.280, subd. (a).) The court shall order requests for admission deemed admitted unless
proposed responses “in substantial compliance” with Code of Civ. Proc. §
2033.220 are served before the hearing. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2033.280, subd.
(c).) Where a party fails to serve responses before the hearing, the court has
no discretion but to grant the admission motion. A deemed admitted order
establishes, by judicial fiat, that a nonresponding party has responded to the
requests by admitting the truth of all matters contained therein. (Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 983.) Defendant contends that it served Plaintiff with Request for
Admissions, Set Two on December 5, 2024, that responses were due on January 9,
2025, and that Plaintiff failed to serve any response to Defendant’s Requests
for Admissions, Set Two. In support for this contention, Defendant provides the
declaration of attorney Eitan Yehoshua. Mr. Yehoshua’s declaration states that
Defendant served Plaintiff with Requests for Admissions, Set One, rather than
Set Two, on December 5, 2024. (Yehoshua Decl. ¶ 2.) However, Defendant has also
provided a proof of service indicating that Plaintiff was served with Requests
for Admissions, Set Two on December 5, 2024, which is sufficient evidence to
establish that Plaintiff was served. (Yehoshua Decl. Ex. A.) Mr. Yehoshua testifies
that Plaintiff’s responses to Defendant’s Requests for Admissions Set Two were
due on January 9, 2025, that Plaintiff failed to timely serve responses to such,
and that Defendant has not received any responses to such as of the date of
filing of the instant motion. (Yehoshua Decl. ¶ 3-5.) As of March 11, 2025,
there is no indication that Plaintiff has served responses to Defendant’s
Requests for Admissions, Set Two. 3.
Conclusion
Based on the
foregoing, the court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to deem Defendant’s Requests for
Admissions, Set Two admitted. Defendant is ordered to give notice. DATED: March 11, 2025 Hon. Elizabeth L. Bradley Judge of the Superior Court |