DEPARTMENT NCB LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
Case Number: 23BBCV01073 Hearing Date: March 14, 2025 Dept: NCB
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
North
Central District Department B
|
|
nina
beltran, Plaintiff, v. your
way tree service, inc., et al., Defendants. |
Case No.: 23BBCV01073 Hearing Date: March 14, 2025 [TENTATIVE] order RE: Motion for an order to bifurcate trial |
Background
A.
Allegations
Plaintiff Nina Beltran (“Plaintiff”)
alleges that she was employed by Defendants Your Way Tree Service, Inc.
(“YWTS”) and Jesse Montoya (“Montoya”).
She alleges that on January 24, 2023, she requested, for the first time
in her three years of employment, to take a day off from work with Defendants
to take care of a personal/family matter.
She alleges that in response to her request, Defendants told her to take
the whole week off. Plaintiff alleges
that she responded that she did not need the entire week off and that she asked
if she should return to work on Saturday, but Defendants did not respond. Plaintiff allege that at an in-person meeting
on January 29, 2023, she was informed that she was terminated from
employment. Plaintiff has filed this
lawsuit, alleging that she was wrongfully terminated for requesting a day off
from work and for resisting to partake in Montoya’s harassing conduct and advances. She alleges various Labor Code and IWC Wage
Order violations.
The complaint, filed May 15, 2023, alleges
causes of action for: (1) failure to pay timely wages; (2) failure to pay
compensation due upon termination; (3) failure to pay all wages for overtime;
(4) failure to provide accurate wage statements; (5) failure to provide rest
breaks; (6) failure to provide meal breaks; (7) hostile work environment –
sexual harassment; (8) failure to prevent harassment; (9) retaliation; (10)
wrongful termination; (11) IIED; and (12) unfair competition.
On July 1, 2024, Plaintiff dismissed
without prejudice the 9th and 10th causes of action only.
B.
Motion on Calendar
On January 8, 2025, Defendants filed a
motion for an order to bifurcate trial.
The Court is not in receipt of an
opposition brief.
LEGAL
STANDARD
CCP
§ 598 states in relevant part:
The court may, when the convenience of witnesses, the
ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation
would be promoted thereby, on motion of a party, after notice and hearing, make an order,
no later than the close of pretrial conference in cases in which such pretrial
conference is to be held, or, in other cases, no later than 30 days before the trial date,
that the trial of any
issue or any part thereof shall precede the trial of any other issue or any
part thereof in the case, except for special defenses which may be tried
first pursuant to Sections 597 and 597.5. The court, on its own motion, may make such an
order at any time. Where trial of the issue of liability as to all
causes of action precedes the trial of other issues or parts thereof, and the
decision of the court, or the verdict of the jury upon such issue so tried is
in favor of any party on whom liability is sought to be imposed, judgment in
favor of such party shall thereupon be entered and no trial of other issues in
the action as against such party shall be had unless such judgment shall be
reversed upon appeal or otherwise set aside or vacated.
(CCP
§ 598.)
CCP § 1048(b)
states in relevant part:
The
court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial
of any cause of action, including a cause of action asserted in a
cross-complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action
or issues, preserving the right of trial by jury required by the Constitution
or a statute of the state or of the United States.
(CCP § 1048(b).)
Civil
Code, § 3295(d) states:
The court shall, on application of any defendant,
preclude the admission of evidence of that defendant's profits or financial
condition until after the trier of fact returns a verdict for plaintiff
awarding actual damages and finds that a defendant is guilty of malice,
oppression, or fraud in accordance with Section 3294. Evidence of profit and
financial condition shall be admissible only as to the defendant or defendants
found to be liable to the plaintiff and to be guilty of malice, oppression, or
fraud. Evidence of profit and financial condition shall be presented to the
same trier of fact that found for the plaintiff and found one or more
defendants guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud.
(Civ. Code, § 3295(d).)
DISCUSSION
A.
Trial Date
On February 3, 2025, the Court granted
Defendants’ ex parte application to continue the trial date. The Final Status Conference is set for May
29, 2025. The Jury Trial is set for June
9, 2025. The discovery cut-off deadlines
are tied with this trial date.
B.
Discussion of Motion
Defendants move to bifurcate the issues of
liability, actual damages, and fraud, malice, or oppression before the issue of
punitive damages. Defendants argue that
Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in connection with her 7th and 8th
causes of action for hostile work environment and failure to prevent
harassment.
Defendants argue that bifurcation will
benefit the Court, the parties, and their counsel so that court time is not
wasted on Defendants’ financial condition to support an award of punitive
damages, before liability and evidence of fraud, malice, and/or oppression are
first established. They also argue that
evidence of their financial condition may prejudice the jury’s determination of
liability.
The Court finds that phasing the
trial so that issues of liability and actual damages are determined first,
prior to the presentation of evidence to support punitive damages would promote
judicial economy and efficiency. Unless
liability and actual damages are first determined, the issue of punitive
damages cannot be reached. As such, the
motion to bifurcate is granted.
CONCLUSION AND
ORDER
Defendants Your Way Tree Service, Inc. and
Jesse Montoya’s motion to bifurcate is granted.
The trial shall be phased as follows: (1) issues of liability, actual
damages, and fraud, malice, or oppression; and (2) the issue of punitive
damages and Defendants’ financials.
Defendants shall provide notice of this
order.
DATED: March 14, 2025 ___________________________
John
Kralik
Judge
of the Superior Court
Case Number: 23BBCV01500 Hearing Date: March 14, 2025 Dept: NCB
North
Central District
|
john
lafayette draper, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH VINCENT PADUA,
et al., Defendants. |
Case No.: 23BBCV01500 Hearing Date: March 14, 2025 [TENTATIVE] order RE: MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENAS |
Background
A.
Allegations
Plaintiff John Lafayette Draper
(“Plaintiff”) alleges that on February 14, 2022, he was involved in a motor
vehicle accident with Defendants Joseph Vincent Padua, Montserrat L. Padua, and
Laura J. Holguin. Plaintiff alleges that
Joseph Vincent Padua was the driver of Defendants’ vehicle and that he failed
to yield the right-of-way while turning left from a HomeGoods plaza driveway
near the intersection of Ventura Boulevard and Studio City Place.
The complaint, filed July 5, 2023, alleges
causes of action for: (1) motor vehicle; and (2) general negligence.
B.
Motion on Calendar
On December 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed a
motion to quash subpoenas.
The Court is not in receipt of an
opposition brief.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff moves to quash subpoenas for
production of business records served on Innovative Pain and SpineCenter, ProHealth Advanced Imaging/Medical,
Acclara/Billing, ProHealth Advanced Imaging/Radiology, ProMed Spine, and
Okhovat Neurological Center. Plaintiff
argues that the subpoenas violate his right of privacy in his medical,
pharmaceutical, psychological, psychiatric, and/or psychotherapy records.
The subpoenas seek any and all documents pertaining to the care, treatment,
and examination of Plaintiff; all radiology records; billing and payment
records; and all communications with Plaintiff from February 14, 2012 to the
present. (See Mot., Ex. 1.) Plaintiff objected to the subpoenas. (Mot., Ex. 2.)
While a plaintiff is not obligated to
sacrifice all privacy to seek redress for a specific physical, mental, or
emotional injury, “they may not withhold information which relates to any
physical or mental condition which they have put in issue by bringing this
lawsuit.” (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 864; City & County of San Francisco v.
Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d 227, 232.)
A plaintiff suing for personal injuries waives the physician-patient
privilege to some extent, but this does not make discoverable all of a
plaintiff’s lifetime medical history. (Britt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at 863-64.)
While some of
Plaintiff’s prior medical history may be relevant to this action to determine
if Plaintiff had suffered from preexisting conditions or had issues or pain in
certain body parts prior to the subject incident, discovery of the entirety of
his medical, billing, radiology records without limitation as to scope or the
body parts that are alleged to be at issue in this action is overbroad. The Court will accept the limitation of 10
years prior to the subject incident to the present, but will modify the
medical, billing, and radiology records sought to records regarding Plaintiff’s
back
and legs. (Mot. at p.7; Gharabighi Decl., ¶6.) If the production of these records lead to
the discovery of additional good cause, the Court will consider ordering the
production of additional records.
As such, the subpoenas will be modified
and restricted in scope and time such as to seek those medical and billing information
described in the subpoenas relevant to injuries or issues with Plaintiff’s back
and legs for the period of February 12, 2012 (10 years prior to the accident)
to the present.
CONCLUSION AND
ORDER
Plaintiff John Lafayette
Draper’s motion to quash Defendants’ subpoenas for
production of business records is granted such that the subpoenas issued on Innovative Pain and SpineCenter, ProHealth
Advanced Imaging/Medical, Acclara/Billing, ProHealth Advanced
Imaging/Radiology, ProMed Spine, and Okhovat Neurological Center shall be
limited in scope to Plaintiff’s back and legs for the period of February
12, 2012 (10 years prior to the accident) to the present.
Plaintiff shall provide notice of this
order.
DATED: March 14, 2025 ___________________________
John
Kralik
Judge
of the Superior Court
Case Number: 23BBCV01798 Hearing Date: March 14, 2025 Dept: NCB
North
Central District
|
aznive
sarkissian, as heir and representative of the estate of kourken sarkissian, Plaintiff, v. 13400 sherman
way, llc dba valley palms care center.,
et al., Defendants. |
Case No.: 23BBCV01798 Hearing Date: March 14, 2025 [TENTATIVE]
order RE: demurrer; motion to strike |
BACKGROUND
A.
Allegations
Plaintiff Aznive
Sarkissian, as heir and representative of The Estate of Kourken Sarkissian
(Plaintiff), alleges that she is Decedent Kourken Sarkissian’s (“Decedent”)
widow. Plaintiff alleges on May 9, 2022,
Kourken Sarkissian (“Decedent”) was an elder.
Plaintiff alleges that on July 31, 2018, Decedent was transferred to the
care and custody of Defendants 13400 Sherman Way, LLC dba Valley Palms Care
Center (“Facility”) and Edmond Derderian, M.D.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached their professional duty to
care for Decedent and that their acts and omissions constitute elder abuse and
neglect.
The complaint,
filed August 4, 2023, alleges a single cause of action for general negligence.
B.
Motions on Calendar
On February 13,
2025, Dr. Derderian filed a demurrer and a motion to strike portions of the
complaint.
On February 28,
2025, Plaintiff filed a single opposition brief.
On March 7, 2025,
Dr. Derderian filed a reply brief.
DISCUSSION
RE DEMURRER
Dr. Derderian demurs to the
complaint, arguing that it fails to allege sufficient facts and is uncertain as
alleged against Dr. Derderian.
First, Dr. Derderian argues that Plaintiff
has not filed a CCP § 377.60 or 377.32 declaration stating that she is the sole
heir of Decedent and that there are no other heirs. Thus, he argues that Plaintiff has not proven
there are no other heirs. However, CCP §
377.60 delineates the persons with standing to pursue a wrongful death action,
but it does not have a declaration requirement.
In contrast, survival actions require that the plaintiff provide
a statement that conforms with section 377.32.
As pointed out by Plaintiff in the opposition, a declaration is not
necessary as this is a wrongful death action and this action is not a
survival/continuation action. In the
complaint at section 12(b), she alleges that she is Decedent’s widow, which is
a proper individual with standing pursuant to CCP § 377.60(a) (including a
decedent’s surviving spouse).
Dr. Derderian also argues that Plaintiff
has not complied with Welfare & Institutions Code, § 15657.3. However, this section only applies “if a
conservator has been appointed for the plaintiff [decedent] prior to the initiation
of the action for abuse.” As pointed out
by Plaintiff, there are no allegations that Decedent was subject to a
conservatorship at the time of the complaint and there is no probate action
pending.
Next, Dr. Derderian argues that the complaint
fails to allege sufficient facts for a claim of elder abuse. He also argues that the allegations are vague
as it appears that Plaintiff is attempting to plead elder abuse, negligence,
and wrongful death in a single cause of action for general negligence.
A plaintiff must prove more than
simple or even gross negligence in the provider’s care or custody of the elder or dependent
adult. (Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley
LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, 405.)
The plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendant
was guilty of recklessness, oppression, fraud or malice in the commission of
the neglect, which applies essentially the equivalent standard to support
punitive damages. (Id.; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.) The enhanced remedies are available only for
acts of egregious abuse against elder or dependent adult. (Carter, supra, 198
Cal.App.4th at 405.) “‘Recklessness’ refers to a subjective state of
culpability greater than simple negligence, which has been described as
‘deliberate disregard’ of the ‘high degree of probability’ that an injury will
occur” and rises to the level of a conscious choice of a course of action with
knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it. (Delaney
v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 31-32.)
Unlike negligence, recklessness involves more than inadvertence,
incompetence, unskillfulness, or a
failure to take precautions. (Id. at 31.)
There are several factors that must
be pled with particularity, including: (1) defendants had
responsibility for meeting the basic needs of the elder or dependent adult,
such as nutrition, hydration, hygiene or medical care; (2) defendants
knew of conditions that made the elder or dependent adult unable to provide for
his or her own basic needs; (3) defendants denied or
withheld goods or services necessary to meet the elder or dependent adult’s
basic needs, either with knowledge that injury was substantially certain to
befall the elder or dependent adult (if the plaintiff alleges oppression, fraud
or malice) or with conscious disregard of the high probability of such injury
(if the plaintiff alleges recklessness); and (4) the neglect caused the elder
or dependent adult to suffer physical harm, pain or mental suffering. (Carter, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at 406-407.)
The allegations of the complaint are
sparse. On page 4 of the complaint, Plaintiff
alleges that Decedent was an elder (¶1); Decedent was transferred to
Defendant’s care and custody on July 31, 2018 for 24-hour care and supervision
where he was totally dependent on Defendants (¶2); Defendants breached their
duty to Decedent by failing to attend to his health and safety needs (¶3); and
Defendants’ actions and omissions constituted elder abuse and neglect
(¶4). The allegations fail to state what
each Defendant did and how Dr. Derderian specifically is liable for elder
abuse/neglect and/or negligence. The
allegations are generalized without any specifics on Defendants’ actions. The demurer is sustained with leave to amend.
DISCUSSION
RE MOTION TO STRIKE
Dr. Derderian moves to strike
paragraphs 11(g) and 14(a)(2) on page 3 of the complaint. Paragraph 11(g) seeks heightened remedies
under Welfare & Institutions Code, § 15657.
Paragraph 14(a)(@) seeks punitive damages.
In light of the ruling on the
demurrer, the motion to strike is taken off-calendar as moot.
CONCLUSION
AND ORDER
Defendant Edmond
Derderian, M.D.’s demurrer is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.
Defendant Edmond
Derderian, M.D.’s motion to strike taken off-calendar as moot.
Defendant shall provide
notice of this order.
DATED: March 14, 2025 ___________________________
John
J. Kralik
Judge
of the Superior Court
Case Number: 23BBCV02904 Hearing Date: March 14, 2025 Dept: NCB
North
Central District
|
andrew
ruelas lopez, et al., Plaintiffs, v. george
zamoraplasencia, Defendant. |
Case No.: 23BBCV02904 Hearing Date: March 14, 2025 [TENTATIVE]
order RE: motion to be relieved as counsel |
Defense counsel, Hannah A. Amor/Law
Offices of Stephen A. Shapiro (“Counsel”), moves to be relieved as counsel for Defendant
George Zamora Placensia (“Defendant”).
Counsel filed this instant motion to be
relieved as counsel on February 14, 2025. Counsel has filed the requisite forms pursuant
to CRC Rule 3.1362.
According to the declaration of Counsel,
Counsel seeks to be relieved as counsel because Counsel has not been able to
communicate with Defendant. Counsel
states that they have sent at least 6 letters to Defendant since September 2023
requesting that he call Counsel, but Defendant never called Counsel and 2
letters came back returned unopened to sender.
Counsel states that Defendant’s phone number is not in service and
Counsel does not have Defendant’s email address. Counsel states that an investigator was hired
to locate Defendant, but he was not found.
(MC-052, §2.) For these reasons,
Counsel seeks to withdraw from representing Defendant in this action.
Counsel served Defendant at his last known
mailing address, which Counsel was unable to confirm. However, Counsel made efforts to mail the
papers to Defendant’s last known mail address (return receipt requested),
calling Defendant’s last known phone number, and hiring an investigator. Plaintiffs’ counsel was also served with the
motion by e-mail.
As for future hearing dates, the Final
Status Conference is set for November 6, 2025 and the Trial is set for November
17, 2025. Thus, there is time for Defendant
to obtain substitute counsel.
Accordingly, the motion to be relieved as
counsel is granted. The order electronically
lodged by Counsel will be signed at the hearing. The order will become effective upon the
filing of a proof of service of a signed copy of the order on Defendant.
Notice to be provided by Counsel.
DATED: March 14, 2025 ___________________________
John
J. Kralik
Judge
of the Superior Court
Case Number: 24BBCV00134 Hearing Date: March 14, 2025 Dept: NCB
North
Central District
|
maria feldman, Plaintiff, v. joanna
johnson, Defendant. |
Case No.:
24BBCV00134 Hearing Date: March 14, 2025 [TENTATIVE] order RE: motion for trial preference under ccp §
36(a) |
BACKGROUND
A.
Allegations
Plaintiff Maria Feldman (“Plaintiff”)
alleges that on August 19, 2022, she was lawfully walking her leashed chihuahua
along the sidewalk when Defendant Joanna Johnson (“Defendant”) and her two dogs
were barreling down the sidewalk approaching Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s
Bernedoodle broke free from Defendant’s grasp and lunged at Plaintiff’s person,
knocking her to the ground. Plaintiff
alleges that as she fell to the ground, she attempted to break her fall by
putting out her dominant hand to avoid more severe injury to her face or head
and neck. Plaintiff alleges that she
suffered a broken bone in her dominant, right hand.
The second amended complaint (“SAC”),
filed June 24, 2024, alleges causes of action for: (1) negligence; (2) NIED; and
(3) IIED.
B.
Motion
on Calendar
On January 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed a
motion for trial preference under CCP § 36(a).
The Court is not in receipt of an
opposition brief.
LEGAL
STANDARD
According to CCP §
36(a), a party to a civil action who is over the age of 70 must be given
preference if the party has a substantial interest in the action as a whole and
the health of the party is such that a preference is necessary to prevent
prejudicing the party’s interest in the litigation. To make the findings required by CCP § 36(a),
evidence must be provided with the motion for preference establishing
Plaintiff’s age and the relevant conditions of her health warranting a
preference. Pursuant to CCP § 36.5, an
attorney affidavit offered in support of a motion for preference may be based
on information and belief as to the medical diagnosis and prognosis of a
party. If a motion for preference based
on a party’s age is granted, the matter must be set for trial not more than 120
days from the date the motion is granted.
(CCP § 36(f).)
Pursuant to CCP § 36(e), in its
discretion, the court may grant a motion for preference that is supported by a
showing that satisfies the court that the interests of justice will be served
by granting preference.
Finally, CCP § 36(c)(1) requires that all
essential parties be served with process or have appeared in the action in
order to grant a motion for preference.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff moves for trial preference so
that trial will be set within 120 days from the hearing date.
A Status Conference re: Private Mediation
is on calendar for May 20, 2025. The
Final Status Conference is set for July 9, 2026. The Jury Trial is set for July 20, 2026.
Plaintiff is currently 95 years old. (Mot., at p.2.) Further, the Court finds that Plaintiff has a
substantial interest in the action as she claims she was injured as a result of
the alleged dog attack. The remaining
issue is whether Plaintiff’s health is such that a preference is necessary to
prevent prejudicing Plaintiff’s interest in the litigation.
The motion’s memorandum of points and
authorities states: “Due to Mrs. Feldman’s advanced age, there is a substantial
risk that her health could deteriorate, making it difficult—if not impossible—for her to
participate in the trial if it is delayed. This incident has already left Mrs.
Feldman with a permanent disfigurement of her dominant hand, an injury that not
only affects her physically but has also inflicted psychological trauma. Now,
Ms. Feldman suffers frequent anxiety attacks, and this trauma has resulted in
substantial vulnerability over the Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic life functions.
Furthermore, Mrs. Feldman has a history of stroke.” (Mot. at p.2.)
Plaintiff’s motion is a bit light on the facts, but the client is
95 years old, which carries quite a bit of weight on a motion like this.
The motion to preferentially set the trial date is granted. The motion is not opposed. Plaintiff is 95 years old, and the motion
papers provide sufficient reasons to show that Plaintiff’s age and health
warrant
a preference.
CONCLUSION
AND ORDER
Plaintiff Maria Feldman’s motion
for trial preference is granted. The
trial shall be set for July 7, 2025 at 9:30 a.m. The final status conference shall be set for
June 26, 2025 at 9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff shall provide notice of
this order.
DATED: March 14, 2025 ___________________________
John
J. Kralik
Judge
of the Superior Court
Case Number: 24NNCV04271 Hearing Date: March 14, 2025 Dept: NCB
North
Central District
|
ana a. pleitez, Plaintiff, v. kia america,
inc., Defendant. |
Case No.: 24NNCV04271 Hearing Date: March 14, 2025 [TENTATIVE]
order RE: motion to compel further responses |
BACKGROUND
A.
Allegations
Plaintiff Ana A. Pleitez (“Plaintiff”) alleges
that on January 27, 2024, she purchased a 2024 Kia Sportage. She alleges that Defendant Kia America, Inc. (“Defendant”)
issued a written warranty. Plaintiff
alleges her claims arise out of the warranty and repair obligations of
Defendant. She alleges that the subject
vehicle was delivered with serous defects and nonconformities to the warranty, such
as steering, engine, electrical, emission, and suspension system defects. (Compl., ¶10.) Plaintiff alleges that she presented the
vehicle for repair three times.
The complaint, filed September 13, 2024,
alleges causes of action for: (1) breach of express warranty; (2) breach of implied
warranty; (3) violation of the Song Beverly Act, Civil Code, § 1793.2.
B.
Motion on Calendar
On
January 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel Defendant’s further
responses to Requests for Production of Documents, set one (“RPD”).
On March 3, 2025, Defendant filed an
opposition brief.
On March 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed a reply
brief.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
moves to compel Defendant’s responses to RPD Nos. 1-31.
In
opposition, Defendant states that it served verifications to its discovery
responses on March 3, 2025 (the same day as the opposition brief). It argues that there is no good cause to
grant this motion, the RPDs are overly broad, and they seek irrelevant
information.
The
Court will limit the discovery allowed in this action to conform with CCP §
871.26.
CCP § 871.26 was
recently enacted after the Legislature recognized “the massive
increase in lemon law cases” could “cripple” the (California Bill Analysis, A.B. 1755 Assem., 8/30/2024.) In Assembly Bill 1755, the Legislature
recognized:
In the years since the courts COVID-19 emergency procedures were
lifted, California has seen a dramatic increase in the number filings
litigating Californias lemon law statutes in its courts. Between 2022 and 2023,
the number of lemon law case filings in California courts nearly doubled from
14,892 filings in 2022 to 22,655 filings in 2023. Indeed, according to the
California Judges Association, nearly ten percent of all civil filings in Los
Angeles County are now related to lemon law disputes. As a result of the
massive increase in lemon law cases, Californians seeking to adjudicate their
claims related to defective motor vehicles (and other civil disputes) are now
waiting years to get their day in court. …
…
Each additional lemon law filing represents new motion hearings,
status conferences, and other actions by the court that necessitate time ona[sic]
judges calendars. As a result of the increase in filings, lemon law cases are
being severely delayed, thus limiting Californians ability to seek redress for
defective cars. Furthermore, the spillover impact from the increased lemon law
filings is now causing the general backlog for civil cases to grow once more
even after the successful deployment of technology during the pandemic to
reduce civil case backlogs. Given that California[’]s courts are projecting
that upward of 30,000 lemon law cases are likely to be filed by the end of
2024, if action is not taken to streamline the adjudication of these disputes,
lemon law filings are poised to cripple the entirety of Californias civil
justice system.
…
Given that lemon law cases are [sic] typically very document-heavy
matters and involve a limited universe of documents, many of these discovery
disputes represent little more than unnecessary litigation tactics that only
serve to delay justice.
Recognizing that litigating futile discovery motions can
significantly prolong relatively simple lemon law cases, this bill seeks to
streamline discovery in lemon law actions.
…
AB 1755 seeks to streamline civil procedure associated with lemon
law cases which will have a positive impact on court congestion[.] In
particular, the early exchange of discovery documents is an important component
as courts are seeing massive numbers of motions to compel discovery documents
in lemon law filings. AB 1755 provides a statutory list of documents each party
must provide within the cases first few months, thus eliminating the need for
parties to file motions or for the court to conduct hearings on those motions.
(California Bill Analysis, A.B. 1755 Assem., 8/30/2024.)
While A.B. 1755 shows an awareness of the
issues, it failed to address these issues with sufficient seriousness. The
legislature, having created a conflagration of litigation, appears to be
passing out squirt guns to the judiciary to combat the problem. The new
legislation fails to make any serious effort to address the real source of the
problem: the extraordinary incentives given to plaintiffs’ lawyers to file
these cases because of the opportunities to be compensated by both sides of the
litigation. Early signs are that the legislation will have little effect on the
number of cases filed. The discovery limitations contemplated by the law have
already been adopted by many courts in Los Angeles, which is the location of
nearly half of the state’s Lemon Law cases. In this courtroom alone, there are
144 Song-Beverly cases against automobile manufacturers, and more are being
filed every day. In Los Angeles County last year (2024) there were 10,545 total
filings in the Los Angeles Superior Court, and this year’s filings, after
passage of the legislation, are being made at a faster rate than last year.
Normally, contingency fee lawyers are
rational economic actors. They do not file cases where they do not expect to
make money, and they file more cases where they expect to make more money. In
Lemon Law cases, they often negotiate with the manufacturers for payment of
attorneys’ fees to themselves while simultaneously negotiating for a payout to
their client—out of which they will be paid a contingency fee. The resultant
payout to the attorney will often exceed the amount paid in even the highest
percentage contingency attorneys’ fees agreements. Neither the legislature, nor the courts, nor
the state bar have been willing to address the issues posed by this
arrangement. There are very few golden opportunities for attorneys like the
opportunities presented by Lemon Law litigation, and there are no shortage of
rational economic actors responding to these incentives.
Most lawsuits have an inherent economic
limitation in that rational parties on both sides will be reluctant to cause
the cost of the litigation to exceed the amount in issue. Lemon Law litigation,
on the other hand, provides an extraordinary and one-sided incentive to a
non-party, plaintiffs’ attorneys, to cause the cost of the litigation to far
exceed the amount at issue. As noted, the new legislation does little to
address this issue, which is the chief cause of the massive increase in
filings.
The legislative history reads as if the
lifting of the “COVID emergency procedures” has something to do with the
litigation increase. On the contrary, it is the continuation of such
procedures, such as the elimination of in-person hearings, that have generally
lowered the cost of all lawsuits, thus incentivizing the filing of additional
lawsuits, including weak and smaller cases that would not otherwise have been
filed. Whether such new procedures are considered good or bad, they alter the
cost of prosecution of a lawsuit in a way that results in additional filings of
all kinds, including Lemon Law cases. When the cost of filing and prosecuting a
lawsuit are reduced, more lawsuits will be filed.
While the limited remedies of A.B. 1755
apply only to cases filed after January 1, 2025, the Court sees no reason to
hesitate to use them as a matter of judicial discretion in the ongoing cases
that created the need for legislation.
The Court orders the parties to comply with CCP § 871.26. Pending
further order of the Court, the Court will limit discovery in this action to
the discovery outlined in section 871.26 and will require that discovery
responses and production of documents contemplated by that section be completed
by both parties by the end of the business day on April 18, 2025.
CONCLUSION AND
ORDER
Plaintiff Ana A. Pleitez’s motion to
compel Defendant Kia America, Inc.’s further responses to the RPD is granted to
the extent that the parties are ordered to comply with CCP § 871.26’s discovery
obligations. The Court will limit
discovery in this action to the discovery outlined in section 871.26 and will
require that discovery responses and production of documents be completed by
the end of the business day on April 18, 2025.
Plaintiffs or Defendants may move the Court to lift the stay as to
specified discovery after the completion of mediation.
No sanctions were requested.
Plaintiff shall
provide notice of this order.
DATED: March 14, 2025 ___________________________
John
J. Kralik
Judge
of the Superior Court