DEPARTMENT 3 LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
Case Number: 21STCV01552 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST
DISTRICT
I.
INTRODUCTION On September 30, 2024, plaintiff Ahmad
Heidari (“Plaintiff”) filed this motion seeking an order compelling defendant
SWVP Warner Center Hotel, LLC (“SWVP”) to serve further responses to Requests
for Production of Documents, Set Two, Nos. 36 through 42. SWVP filed an opposition brief and
responsive separate statement on February 24, 2025. Plaintiff filed a reply brief and
“reply separate statement” on February 28, 2025. II.
DISCUSSION RFP No. 36: All documents that refer or
relate to any inspection of the Warner Center Marriott Hotel in connection with
the purchase and sale of the Warner Center Marriott Hotel in 2018. The objections on the grounds of undue
burden and confidential business information are OVERRULED. SWVP makes no
showing that confidential business information is involved or that searching
and producing the requested documents would cause undue burden. Nevertheless, SWVP’s
objection on the ground that the request is overbroad is SUSTAINED in part.
Documents referring or relating to the inspections conducted in connection with
the purchase and sale of the hotel in 2018 are discoverable only insofar as
they refer or relate to the indoor pool deck and coping – as opposed to the
entire hotel. SWVP’s unilateral condition of a stipulated protective order is
also improper given that there is no showing that confidential information is
at stake. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion is only GRANTED IN PART as to RFP No.
36. RFP No. 37: All documents that refer or relate to
the purchase and sale of the Warner Center Marriott Hotel in 2018. Like with RFP No. 36, the Court
overrules SWVP’s objections based on undue burden and confidential business
information. The Court also overrules the objection that the request is not
particularized enough. However, the request is overbroad and therefore Plaintiff’s
motion is GRANTED IN PART as to RFP No. 37 and SWVP must produce all documents
referring or relating to the indoor pool deck and coping in connection with the
purchase and sale of the hotel in 2018. Since there is no objection based on
privilege, there is no need to provide a privilege log. RFP No. 38: All documents that refer or
relate to any representations made to any person regarding the indoor pool at
the Warner Center Marriott Hotel in connection with the purchase and sale of
the Warner Center Marriott Hotel in 2018. The motion is GRANTED as to RFP No. 38.
SWVP’s objections are OVERRULED and a further response is required. Although
SWVP claims that it is not in possession, custody or control of responsive
documents, its statement that no such documents exist is incomplete because it
does not state whether the documents “ha[ve] never existed, ha[ve] been
destroyed, ha[ve] been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or ha[ve] never been, or [are]
no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.230.) RFP No. 39: All documents that refer or
relate to permits sought by the Warner Center Marriott Hotel to perform any
construction on the pool deck for the indoor pool at the hotel. A further response is required because:
(1) SWVP improperly limits the scope of documents to the date it purchased the
hotel to the date of the underlying incident and (2) SWVP fails to identify the
reason for its inability to comply with the RFP as required by Code of Civil
Procedure section 2031.230. The objections asserted based on scope and the
availability of documents to the public are meritless and OVERRULED. Plaintiff
correctly points out that documents created prior to the incident and SWVP’s
acquisition of the hotel are relevant and determining whether SWVP possesses
those documents is relevant to determining SWVP’s notice of any dangerous
condition related to the pool. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED as to
RFP No. 39. RFP No. 40: All documents that refer or
relate to permits obtained by the Warner Center Marriott Hotel to perform any
construction on the pool deck for the indoor pool at the hotel. The Court incorporates its discussion
of RFP No. 39 and GRANTS the motion as to RFP No. 40 RFP No. 41: All documents that refer or
relate to permits sought by the Warner Center Marriott Hotel to perform any
construction on the pool coping for the indoor pool at the hotel. The Court incorporates its discussion
of RFP No. 39 and GRANTS the motion as to RFP No. 41 RFP No. 42: All documents that refer or
relate to permits obtained by the Warner Center Marriott Hotel to perform any
construction on the pool coping for the indoor pool at the hotel. The Court incorporates its discussion
of RFP No. 39 and GRANTS the motion as to RFP No. 42. III.
CONCLUSION Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED as to RFP
Nos. 38 through 42 and GRANTED IN PART as to RFP Nos. 36 and 37 as outlined
above. As each party had meritorious reasons
for bringing and opposing this motion, their requests for sanctions are DENIED.
Moving party to give notice. Dated
this
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit
on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may
nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a
submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others
might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from
the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar. Case Number: 22GDCV00881 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST
DISTRICT
I.
INTRODUCTION On November 22, 2024, defendant City of
Glendale (“Glendale”) filed this motion to continue the discovery cut-off date
and all other deadlines so that they correspond with the current trial date of
December 1, 2025. The motion is unopposed. II.
LEGAL
STANDARD “Except as otherwise provided, any
party shall be entitled as a matter of right to complete discovery proceedings
on or before the 30th day, and to have motions concerning discovery heard on or
before the 15th day, before the date initially set for trial of the action.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.020, subd. (a).) However, “[o]n motion of any party,
the court may grant leave to complete discovery proceedings, or to have a
motion concerning discovery heard, closer to the initial trial date, or to
reopen discovery after a new trial date has been set. (Code Civ. Proc., §
2024.050, subd. (b).) In deciding whether to extend or reopen the discovery
cut-off date, “[t]he court shall take into consideration any matter relevant to
the leave requested, including, but not limited to: (1) the necessity and the
reasons for the discovery, (2) the diligence or lack of diligence of the party
seeking the discovery or the hearing of a discovery motion, and the reasons
that the discovery was not completed or that the discovery motion was not heard
earlier, (3) any likelihood that permitting the discovery or hearing the
discovery motion will prevent the case from going to trial on the date set, or
otherwise interfere with the trial calendar, or result in prejudice to any
other party, and (4) the length of time that has elapsed between any date
previously set, and the date presently set, for the trial of the action. III.
DISCUSSION Glendale requests that the Court
continue the deadlines for discovery and motions so that they are based on the
newly-continued trial date of December 1, 2025. The current discovery cut-off
date is April 14, 2025, but more time is needed because co-defendant Frunzik
Sargsyan is in federal detention and criminal charges relating to the
automobile collision underlying this action remain pending. The parties’
attempts to depose Mr. Sargsyan and otherwise obtain discovery from him have
been stymied due to his criminal case, not due to a lack of diligence. (Motion,
Arias Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.) The motion is also unopposed and it does not appear that
any party will be prejudiced by the extension. Therefore, the Court extends the
discovery and motion cut-off deadlines to correspond with the trial date of
December 1, 2025. IV.
CONCLUSION Glendale’s motion is GRANTED. Dated
this
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit
on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may
nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a
submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others
might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from
the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar. Case Number: 23AHCV01446 Hearing Date: March 7, 2025 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST
DISTRICT
Counsel’s motion is deficient because
the most recently filed proposed order (filed on February 7, 2025) does not
include the upcoming hearing dates, which include a motion to compel Plaintiff’s
deposition, the final status conference, or the trial date. In fact, the proposed
order incorrectly states that the trial date has not yet been set. At the February 5, 2025, hearing, which
was attended by appearance counsel for the Plaintiff’s lawyer seeking to be relieved,
the Court explained to appearance counsel in meticulous detail the corrections
that needed to be made to the proposed order precisely to avoid having this
bouncing back and forth. Were the mistakes on the current proposed order minor,
rather than a largely wholesale disregard for the Court’s instructions, the
Court might be inclined to fix the order. But that is not the case. Therefore, the hearing on this motion
is CONTINUED to _________ at 8:30 a.m. in Department 3 of the Alhambra
Courthouse. Counsel must submit a revised proposed order at least 5 court days
before the hearing. Moving party to give notice. Dated
this
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit
on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may
nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a
submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others
might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from
the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar. |
DEPARTMENT 3 LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
Case Number: 23AHCV01644 Hearing Date: March 6, 2025 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST
DISTRICT
I.
INTRODUCTION On July 19, 2023, Plaintiff Sarah Lopez
filed her complaint against Defendants Glen John Apramian, M.D., Inc., Glen
John Apramian, and Does 1 through 10. The complaint alleges the following eight
causes of action: (1) Disability Discrimination in Violation of FEHA; (2)
Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process In Violation of FEHA; (3) Failure to
Accommodate in Violation of FEHA; (4) Retaliation in Violation of FEHA; (5)
Violation of Labor Code § 515 (Failure To Pay Minimum Salary); (6) Violation of
Labor Code § 226 (Inaccurate Wage Statements); (7) Violation of Labor Code §
201-204 (Waiting TIME PENALTIES); and (8) Violation of Labor Code § 558.1. On September 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed
the instant motion to compel the deposition of Michele Apramian and request for
sanctions. On February 24, 2025, Defendant Glen
John Apramian, M.D. filed his opposition. As of March 3, 2025, no reply has been
filed. II.
LEGAL
STANDARD California Code of Civil Procedure § 2025.450(a)
provides the following: “If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to
the action … without having served a valid objection … fails to appear for
examination, or to proceed with it, … the party giving notice may move for an
order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony …” (California Code of
Civil Procedure § 2025.450(a).) There are three marriage privileges. First, a
witness spouse has a privilege not to testify against the other spouse.
(Evid. Code § 970.) Second, a married person whose spouse is a party to a
proceeding has a privilege not to be called as a witness by an adverse party to
that proceeding without the prior express consent of the spouse having the
privilege. (Evid. Code § 971.) Finally, a spouse, whether or not a
party, has a privilege during the marriage and afterwards to refuse to disclose
and to prevent another from disclosing a communication made in confidence with
the other spouse while they were spouses. (Evid. Code § 980.) The privilege not to testify at all under Article 4
of the Evidence Code and the privilege not to testify to privileged
communications under Article 5 of the Evidence Code are two entirely separate
and distinct privileges. (People v. Dorsey (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d
706, 717.) Under Article 4, there are two types of privilege;
a spouse’s privilege not to testify against their spouse (Section 970) and a
privilege not to be called as a witness against a spouse (Section 971). (Id.
at 716.) The marital communications privilege of Evidence
Code section 980, which provides that a spouse whether or not a party, has a
privilege during the marital relationship and afterwards to refuse to disclose,
and to prevent another from disclosing, a communication if he or she claims the
privilege and the communication was made in confidence between him or her and
the other spouse while they were spouses falls, however, under Article 5.
(See Evid. Code § 980.) The privilege against disclosure
of privileged communications is vested in each spouse and consequently if a
spouse is called as a witness he or she may not testify as to confidential
communications without his or her consent and the consent of the other
spouse. (People v. Dorsey, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d at p.
717.) The privilege survives the termination of the marriage and
continues to exist even though the marriage has been terminated by divorce. (Id.) III.
DISCUSSION A. Parties’ Arguments Plaintiff moves this Court for an Order
Compelling Michele Apramian to appear for and submit to deposition set by
Plaintiff because Michele Apramian now claims spousal privilege. Plaintiff also
argues that Michele Apramian is being deposed in her capacity as an officer of
the company, not as a spouse. (Mot. at p. 3.) Plaintiff relies on the criminal
case, People v. Dorsey supra, 46 Cal.App.3d 706 and non-binding
case law to show that spousal privilege does not apply to business
communications. (Id. at p. 8-9.) In opposition, Defendant argues that
business communications are not exempt from spousal privilege as Plaintiff
failed to cite to any legal authority of that nature. (Opp. at p. 4.) Moreover,
Defendant also argues that no good cause exists to compel the deposition
because Plaintiff has already taken the depositions of defendants and its
employees. (Opp. at p. 6.) Further, Defendant argues that the delayed
invocation of the spousal privilege was not made in bad faith because she was
under extreme emotional distress as her husband was admitted to the hospital. (Id.)
B. Merits Plaintiff failed to show that the
spousal privilege is not applicable to
business communications such that Michele Apramian must testify against
her husband. Here, at all relevant times, Michele Apramian has been married to
Defendant Glen Apramian while working with her husband. (Casper Decl. ¶ 3.) Therefore,
Plaintiff’s reliance on People v. Dorsey is misguided. In People v.
Dorsey, only marital communications spousal privilege was discussed, not
business communications, or a requirement for a spouse to testify against her
husband. (People v. Dorsey (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 706, 717.) Notably,
here, Plaintiff attempts to make Michele Apramian a witness against her husband
by testifying in the deposition. Moreover, Plaintiff has already taken the
deposition of Dr. Glen Apramian in his individual capacity and capacity as
owner of his co-defendant, Glen John Apramian, M.D., Inc., Dr. Glen Apramian’s son
who also works for defendant Glen John Apramian, M.D., Inc., and employee Melissa
Nava, an employee of defendants who worked with Plaintiff. (Casper Decl. ¶ 4.) Since Plaintiff failed to show any
legal authority supporting her request to ignore the spousal privilege, the
Court DENIES the Motion to Compel Michele Apramian’s Deposition. C. Sanctions Plaintiff seeks monetary sanctions in
the amount of $4,147.20 for the costs incurred due to the deposition delays and
refusal to testify. However, since the Court denied the Motion to Compel
Michele Apramian’s Deposition, sanctions are not warranted. IV.
CONCLUSION The Court DENIES the Motion to Compel
Michele Apramian’s Deposition and Requests for Sanctions in the amount of $4,147.20.
Dated
this
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit
on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may
nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a
submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others
might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from
the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar. Case Number: 24AHCV00148 Hearing Date: March 6, 2025 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST
DISTRICT
I.
INTRODUCTION This
action arises from injuries Plaintiff sustained when Plaintiff was struck by a
trash truck while performing maintenance work on a shared driveway located
between two properties owned by Defendants TANG LANG SHUE, TSE REALTY AND
MANAGEMENT SERVICES, TIMOTHY TSE, and 916 SOUTH MARGUERITA, LLC (DOE 11) at 622
South 6th Street and 916 South Marguerita Avenue, Alhambra, California 91801
(“the Property”). On
January 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for damages alleging two causes
of action: (1) For (Vehicular) Negligence against DOE DRIVER and DOES 1-5,
inclusive; and CONSOLIDATED DISPOSAL SERVICE, LLC dba REPUBLIC WASTE SERVICES
OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, LLC, and DOES 6-10, inclusive; and (2) for Violation of
Labor Code § 3706 against TRUSTEE, TSE REALTY AND MANAGEMENT SERVICES, TIMOTHY
TSE and KENNY WAN and DOES 11-40, inclusive. (Exhibit A). On
June 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed a “Doe Amendment” to the Complaint, naming
Defendant, DOE DRIVER, RAMON MORALES. The filing was accepted by this Court on
June 28, 2024. On
September 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a “Doe Amendment” to the Complaint, naming
Defendant, DOE #1, 916 SOUTH MARGUERITA, LLC. On October 28, 2024, Plaintiff
filed an amended “Doe Amendment” to the Complaint, correctly naming Defendant,
DOE #11, 916 SOUTH MARGUERITA, LLC. The filing was accepted by this Court on
the same day. Plaintiff
now seeks to amend the Complaint to add a third cause of action for Premises
Liability against Defendants TRUSTEE, TSE REALTY AND MANAGEMENT SERVICES,
TIMOTHY TSE, and 916 SOUTH MARGUERITA, LLC. This proposed amendment arises from
Defendants’ failure to maintain a safe environment and to provide adequate
warnings about dangerous conditions on the Property. The amendment is timely
and clarifies Defendants' duty to manage and control the driveway area safely,
as the Property’s owners and managers. As
of March 3, 2025, no opposition has been filed.
II.
LEGAL
STANDARD A complainant may obtain leave from the trial court
to amend his pleading beyond the number of amendments allowed under Code of
Civil Procedure section 472 (a) by filing a noticed motion. (Cal.
Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324.) The motion must be accompanied
by a declaration stating: (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the
amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the
amended allegations were discovered; and (4) why the request was not made earlier. (Cal.
Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324 (b).) “Any judge, at any time before or after commencement
of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper,
may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order.” (Code
Civ. Proc. § 576.) In the absence of a showing of
prejudice from the opposing side, the trial court ordinarily lacks discretion
to deny a motion to amend a pleading. (Honig v. Financial Corp. of
America (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 960, 965 (Honig).) A party is permitted to amend the
complaint so long as the amendment is based on the same general set of facts,
seeks recovery against the same defendant for the same injuries, and refers to the
same subject incident. (Barrington v. A. H. Robins Co. (1985) 39 C3d
146, 150.)
III.
DISCUSSION Plaintiff seeks to add a Premises
Liability cause of action based on Defendants’ failure to ensure safe
conditions, or warn of dangerous conditions, on a shared driveway that requires
periodic maintenance. A. Plaintiff’s motion satisfies the
statutory precepts under California Rules of Court Rule 3.1324. With his motion for leave to file the First
Amended Complaint (FAC), Plaintiff submits a proposed redlined copy.(See Berry Decl., ¶¶ 8-9, Exhs. B,C.) Plaintiff’s motion indicates that the
FAC contains the following causes of action: (1) Vehicular Negligence; (2)
Negligence [Labor Code § 3706]; and (3) Premises Liability. The Court notes that other than the
new third cause of action for Premises Liability, the remaining causes of
action were alleged against Defendants in Plaintiff’s original complaint. Plaintiff
further offers his counsel’s declaration stating the effect, necessity of the
amendment, and the reason for the delay. (Berry Decl. ¶¶ 3-5.) Plaintiff meets the minimum
requirements for a motion to file an amended pleading under Rule 3.1324. Plaintiff’s
motion will be granted absent a showing of prejudice to Defendants. (See Honig, supra, 6
Cal.App.4th at p. 965.) B. Relation Back Doctrine Plaintiff’s FAC seeks to add the third
cause of action for Premises Liability. (FAC at p.1.) Here, the Court notes that the new
Premises Liability cause of action relates back to the original complaint
because it relates to the same incident on Defendants’ property which caused
Plaintiff’s lower leg amputation. (Exh. B - FAC ¶¶ 4-9,19-20,46; Exh. A –
Complaint ¶¶ 2, 6-15,17.) Therefore, the same injuries arising from the same
incident are discussed in both the complaint and the FAC. Therefore, Defendants
were put on notice of the same facts and the additional cause of action will
not prejudice them. Notably, Defendants have not filed an opposition showing
any prejudice. IV.
CONCLUSION The Court GRANTS the Plaintiff’s
request for leave to file the First Amended Complaint.
Dated
this
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar Case Number: 24NNCV01376 Hearing Date: March 6, 2025 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST
DISTRICT
I.
INTRODUCTION This is a personal injury case. On May
3, 2024, Plaintiff Arthur Alemendra Cayabyab filed the Complaint against
Defendants Melkon Vardini Davtyan, Palula Guadalupe Lopez, Castillo Bernardo,
Lyft, Inc. and Does 1 through 50 alleging (1) motor vehicle negligence and (2)
general negligence. On September 30, 2024, defendant Lyft,
Inc. (“Lyft) move this court for an order (1) compelling contractual
arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act; and (2) staying these
proceedings as to Lyft. As of March 3, 2025, no opposition has been filed. II.
LEGAL
STANDARD “[W]hen an agreement provides that its enforcement
shall be governed by the FAA, the FAA governs a party’s motion to compel
arbitration.” (Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 337, 346.) Under the FAA, “any arbitration agreement within its
scope shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” (Chiron Corp. v. Ortho
Diagnostic Systems, Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 1126, 1130.) An
arbitration agreement that is subject to the FAA will be enforced if the
following two factors are satisfied: (1) a valid agreement to arbitrate exists;
and (2) the arbitration agreement encompasses the dispute at issue. (Ibid.)
If both factors are met, the court must “enforce the arbitration agreement in
accordance with its terms.” (Ibid.) “If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the
courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an
agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is
pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or
proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on
application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such
arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement,
providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such
arbitration.” (9 U.S.C. § 3.) III.
DISCUSSION A. A Valid
Arbitration Agreement Exists and Covers the Dispute at Issue In order to use the Lyft platform, a
user must create an account and assent to the terms of service. (Simmons Decl.
¶¶ 7-8.) Within the terms of service is an arbitration agreement. (See Exh. 3.)
In fact, the very first paragraph advises the reader of the arbitration
agreement (the agreement), and in paragraph 17, the agreement is presented in
full to the reader. (Id.) Lyft has produced the agreement by attaching a
copy in a concurrently filed evidence packet. (Id.) Lyft further
provided the amended terms of service which all include the arbitration
provision that Plaintiff had to consent to before using the service. (Simmons
Decl. ¶¶12(a-e).) Next, the Court finds that the
Arbitration Agreement covers the dispute at issue in this litigation. The Complaint
arises from Plaintiff’s use of Defendant’s rideshare services. (Simmons Decl.,
¶ 13; Complaint at p. 5.) The Arbitration Agreement provides that any claims
arising from use of Defendant’s platform are subject to binding arbitration.
Thus, Plaintiff’s claims fall within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement. In sum, the Court finds that a valid
arbitration agreement exists and that such agreement covers the claims asserted
against Defendant in this action. Given that Plaintiff failed to oppose the
instant motion, the Court deems the lack of opposition as “a consent to the
granting of the motion.” (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.54(c).) IV.
CONCLUSION Based
on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and
Stay Proceedings against Lyft pending the outcome of that arbitration. The
Court STAYS this action as to defendant Lyft, Inc. only pending the completion
of arbitration pursuant to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement. (9 U.S.C. §
3.) Defendant
Lyft, Inc. is ordered to give notice. Dated
this
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit
on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may
nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a
submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others
might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from
the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar. |
DEPARTMENT 3 LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
Case Number: 21STCV01552 Hearing Date: March 12, 2025 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST
DISTRICT
I.
INTRODUCTION On October 11, 2024, plaintiff Ahmad
Heidari (“Plaintiff”) filed this motion seeking an order compelling defendant Merritt
Hospitality, LLC (“Merritt”) to serve further responses to Requests for
Production of Documents, Set Two, Nos. 36 through 42. Merritt filed an
opposition brief and responsive separate statement on February 27, 2025. Plaintiff
filed a reply brief and “reply separate statement” on March 5, 2025. II.
DISCUSSION RFP No. 36: All documents that refer or
relate to any inspection of the Warner Center Marriott Hotel in connection with
the purchase and sale of the Warner Center Marriott Hotel in 2018. The objection on the grounds of undue
burden is OVERRULED because Merritt provides no evidence of any purported
burden. The objection on the ground that the request is overbroad is SUSTAINED
in part because documents referring or relating to the inspections conducted in
connection with the purchase and sale of the hotel in 2018 are discoverable
only insofar as they refer or relate to the indoor pool deck and coping – as
opposed to the entire hotel. As for Merritt’s substantive response, Merritt
states it is uncertain whether responsive documents exist and, if they did
exist, they would be in the possession of co-defendants SWVP and/or L.A. Warner
Hotel Partners, LLC. The Court agrees that Merritt’s response
is not Code-compliant because it does not “affirm that a diligent search and a
reasonable inquiry has been made” and does not state if the documents have been
lost, destroyed, or have never been in Merritt’s possession, custody, or
control. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.230.) The response also fails to include the
“address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party
to have possession, custody, or control” of the responsive documents. (Id.) Nevertheless, the Court rejects
Plaintiff’s contention that Merritt is obligated to provide a definitive answer
regarding SWVP’s possession of documents simply because they share attorneys. Plaintiff
complains that Merritt cannot state whether it is “uncertain” that documents
exist or that SWVP possesses responsive documents because Merritt and SWVP
share the same counsel and, therefore, defense counsel, as joint agents, have
information that would allow Merritt to provide an answer with more certainty.
Here, Merritt correctly identifies the organizations it believes are in
possession of the documents that Plaintiff seeks. Further, Plaintiff’s
insistence that Merritt confirm SWVP’s possession of documents also seems
unnecessary since he already propounded identical document requests to SWVP
(which the Court granted, in part, on March 7, 2025.) Accordingly, the motion is only GRANTED
IN PART as to RFP No. 36. RFP No. 37: All documents that refer or relate to
the purchase and sale of the Warner Center Marriott Hotel in 2018. Like with RFP No. 36, the Court
overrules Merritt’s objections based on undue burden. The Court also overrules
the objection on the grounds that the request does not specifically identify
any document. However, the request is overbroad and therefore Plaintiff’s
motion is only GRANTED IN PART as to RFP No. 37. Merritt must provide a
Code-compliant response regarding all documents referring or relating to the indoor
pool deck and coping in connection with the purchase and sale of the Hotel in
2018. RFP No. 38: All documents that refer or
relate to any representations made to any person regarding the indoor pool at
the Warner Center Marriott Hotel in connection with the purchase and sale of
the Warner Center Marriott Hotel in 2018. The motion is GRANTED as to RFP No. 38.
Merritt’s objections are OVERRULED and a further response is required. Merritt’s
substantive response is not Code-compliant; it must affirm that a diligent
search and reasonable inquiry has been made and state whether the documents
“ha[ve] never existed, ha[ve] been destroyed, ha[ve] been lost, misplaced, or
stolen, or ha[ve] never been, or [are] no longer, in the possession, custody,
or control of the responding party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.230.) Merritt
also must provide the name and address of the organizations known or believed
to be in possession of responsive documents. (Id.) RFP Nos. 39-42: The Court OVERRULES
Merrit’s objections, incorporates its discussion of RFP No. 38 with respect to
the deficiencies in Merritt’s substantive response, and GRANTS the motion with
respect to RFP Nos. 39 through 42. III.
CONCLUSION Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED as to RFP
Nos. 38 through 42 and GRANTED IN PART as to RFP Nos. 36 and 37 as outlined
above. Further responses are to be served within 20 days of the date of this
Order. As each party had meritorious reasons
for bringing and opposing this motion, their requests for sanctions are DENIED.
Moving party to give notice. Dated
this
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit
on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may
nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a
submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others
might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from
the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar. |
DEPARTMENT 3 LAW AND MOTION RULINGS
Case Number: 21STCV01552 Hearing Date: March 10, 2025 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST
DISTRICT
I.
INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Ahmad Heidari moves for an
order compelling defendant SWVP Warner Center Hotel, LLC (“SWVP”) to serve
further responses to Requests for Admission, Set Two (“RFA”) Nos. 36 to 58. Plaintiff
also requests $14,300 in sanctions against SWVP and its counsel. Plaintiff’s motion was filed on September
30, 2024. SWVP filed opposition papers on February
25, 2025. Plaintiff filed reply papers on March
5, 2025. II.
DISCUSSION The RFAs at issue in this motion concern:
(1) whether a new pool deck and coping for the indoor pool in the Warner Center
Marriott Hotel (“Hotel”) was installed between 2010 and 2019 (RFA Nos. 36-39),
(2) whether permits were acquired for the installation of the deck and coping
(RFA Nos. 40-43), (3) whether SWVP knew that the pool deck and coping had been
installed without permits by unlicensed contractors when it purchased the Hotel
(RFA Nos. 43-46), (4) whether the installation violated various sections of
Title 24 of the California Administrative Code (RFA Nos. 47, 49, 51, 53, 55,
57), and (5) whether those violations caused Plaintiff to fall and sustain
injuries (RFA Nos. 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58). RFA Nos. 36-39 The Court OVERRULES SWVP’s objections
on the grounds that the RFAs are overbroad and seek information outside the
scope of discovery. The Court also OVERRULES the objections to the terms
“installed” and “new pool deck”; they are not vague or ambiguous. SWVP is also ordered to provide a
further response. Its claim that it is unable to respond to matters which
occurred before it purchased the Hotel in 2018 lacks merit. SWVP cannot limit
its admission/denial to the timeframe between its purchase of the Hotel,
October 23, 2018, and the date of Plaintiff’s incident, March 31, 2019. While
SWVP may not be required to perform “legal research” for another party, it has
a duty to make a reasonable investigation of the facts. (Doe v. Los Angeles
County Dept. of Children & Family Services (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 691.
Notably, SWVP does not state how it has undertaken a reasonable investigation,
but only claims that it is unable to respond to these RFAs because it lacks
personal knowledge, even though “RFAs are not limited to matters within the
personal knowledge of the responding party.” (Id., citing Wimberly v.
Derby Cycle Corp. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 618, 634.) SWVP concedes that the
purpose of RFAs is to “eliminate the need for proof” and “set at rest a triable
issue so it will not have to be tried.” (Murrillo v. Superior Court (2006)
143 Cal.App.4th 730, 760. As a result, cost-of-proof sanctions are available
against a party who “unreasonably fails to admit” a matter within an RFA that
is later proven to be true. (Id.; Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.420.) However,
the availability of sanctions is not Plaintiff’s only recourse for an
incomplete answer; that is why the Civil Discovery Act also provides a
mechanism for moving to compel further responses. Since SWVP improperly limits
its response to matters within its personal knowledge, the motion is GRANTED as
to RFP Nos. 36-39. RFA Nos. 40-43 Again, the
objections made on the grounds that these RFAS are overbroad, seek information
outside the scope of discovery, and are vague and ambiguous
due to the phrases “installation” and “new pool deck” are OVERRULED. The RFAs,
which ask SWVP to admit that no applications for permits were ever submitted or
that no permits were ever issued for the pool deck and coping, are also not
argumentative or compound and the objections on these grounds are OVERRULED. The Court
also rejects SWVP’s disingenuous representation that Plaintiff failed to
adequately meet and confer about any RFAs other than Nos. 37-42. RFA Nos. 43 through
58 were discussed in Plaintiff’s 27-page meet and confer letter. (Motion,
Cullen Decl., Ex. F, pp. 9-27.) Last, the Court incorporates its
discussion with respect to RFA Nos. 36-39. The motion is GRANTED as to RFA
40-43 and orders SWVP to conduct a reasonable investigation of the facts and provide
further responses. RFA Nos. 44-46 These RFAs ask SWVP to admit that it
knew, at the time it purchased the Hotel, that “both the deck and coping of the
indoor pool” had been installed without permits and by unlicensed contractors.
Since the RFAs include an admission about both the deck and coping, they are
compound and therefore, the objection on the grounds that they are compound is
SUSTAINED. SWVP’s response to these RFAs is also not evasive because they only
state, “Deny.” Accordingly, the motion is DENIED as to RFA Nos. 44-46. RFA Nos. 47-50, 53-56 These RFAs ask SWVP to admit that the installation
of the pool deck and coping were in violation of certain sections of the 2010
and 2014 California Administrative Code and that these violations caused
Plaintiff to fall. Each of these RFAs refers only to one specific Code section
and therefore they are not compound or argumentative; those objections are
OVERRULED. The other objections on grounds that the RFAs are overbroad, seek
information outside the scope of discovery, or are vague and ambiguous are also
OVERRULED. A further response is also required because SWVP cannot rely on its
lack of personal knowledge but must make a reasonable investigation of the
facts. The motion is GRANTED as to RFA Nos. 47-50 and 53-56. RFA Nos. 51-52, 57-58 These RFAs ask SWVP to admit that the
pool deck violated multiple regulations and that those violations were the
cause of Plaintiff’s fall. Unlike RFA Nos. 47-50 and 53-56, each of these RFAs
refers to two different Code Sections, making them compound. Accordingly, the
motion is DENIED as to RFA Nos. 51-52 and 57-58. III.
CONCLUSION The motion is GRANTED as to RFA Nos.
Nos. 36-43, 47-50, and 53-56. The motion is DENIED as to RFA Nos. 44-46, 51-52,
and 57-58. No sanctions are imposed against either
party. Dated
this
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit
on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may
nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a
submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others
might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from
the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar. Case Number: 23AHCV01858 Hearing Date: March 10, 2025 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST
DISTRICT
Plaintiffs Melissa Dogonyaro (aka “Lisa
Yaro”, referred to herein as “Plaintiff Yaro”)) and Music Corner (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”) apply ex parte for the entry of a default judgment against
defendant Ralph Leon Paul (“Defendant”) in the amount of $93,314, consisting of
$80,000 as demanded in the complaint, $12,600 in interest, and $714 in costs. As an initial matter, Plaintiffs
provide no basis for ex parte relief. A default prove-up hearing has been
scheduled for April 18, 2025, and it is unclear why the entry of judgment
cannot wait until then. However, even if ex parte relief were
available, Plaintiffs’ application for default judgment is deficient. First,
the only amount of money identified in the Complaint is $50,000. Plaintiff
Yaro’s request for an additional $30,000 in general damages due to emotional
distress and misrepresentations is improper because there is no evidence that a
statement of damages was ever served. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 585
[judgment cannot exceed amount stated in statement of damages].) Second, even if a statement of damages
were on file, the Complaint also does not contain any allegations demonstrating
outrageous conduct by Defendant, nor does Plaintiff Yaro provide any information
in her declaration evidencing any emotional distress she suffered. (Cochran
v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 448, 494.) Third, Plaintiffs do not show how they
calculated the amount of prejudgment interest that is due. (CRC 3.1800, subd.
(a)(3).) Fourth, the proposed judgment on Form
JUD-100 does not indicate how the default judgment will be allocated between
the two Plaintiffs. Last, the Court notes that the entry of
default against Defendant was in error because the proof of service on file
with the Court is not on the mandatory Judicial Council Form POS-010, but on
Form POS-040, which states plainly on the front page that it is not to be used
to show service of a summons or complaint. Therefore, the Court will set an OSC
re: Why Default Should Not Be Vacated for the same day as the default prove-up
hearing, April 18, 2025. The OSC shall be discharged if a correct proof of
service is on file with the Court no later than 5 court days before the
hearing. In light of the foregoing, the ex parte
application is DENIED. Dated
this
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit
on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may
nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a
submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others
might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from
the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar. Case Number: 23AHCV02038 Hearing Date: March 10, 2025 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST
DISTRICT
Defendant Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“Defendant”) moves for an order compelling
plaintiff Cheryl Aman (“Plaintiff”) to serve responses to its Form
Interrogatories, Set One, propounded on February 2, 2024. The motion is
unopposed. Where a party fails to serve timely
responses to discovery requests, the court may make an order compelling
responses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (b).) The court shall impose a
monetary sanction on the nonresponding party unless it finds that the party
acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances would make the
imposition of sanctions unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (c).) Here, Plaintiff did not oppose this
motion and it is undisputed that responses have not been served. Plaintiff’s
failure to oppose the motion also means that she has failed to show why
sanctions should not be imposed. Accordingly, the motion to compel is GRANTED. Plaintiff
is ordered to serve verified responses, without objections, to Defendant’s Form
Interrogatories, Set One within 20 days of the date of this order. Plaintiff is
also ordered to pay Defendant sanctions in the amount of $250, consisting of 1
hour at defense counsel’s reasonable hourly rate of $250. Moving party to give notice. Dated
this
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit
on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may
nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a
submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others
might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from
the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar. Case Number: 24NNCV00886 Hearing Date: March 10, 2025 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST
DISTRICT
I. INTRODUCTION On April 11,
2024, plaintiffs Paul Pinckard (“Pinckard”) and Theresa Urman (“Urman”)
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against defendants Landi
Pinckard Papazian and Jared Papazian (collectively, “Defendants”). On
June 27, 2024, Defendants filed a motion to strike and a demurrer. Defendants
move to strike the Complaint on the grounds that the Complaint fails to comply
with California Rules of Court, rule 2.112 and Code of Civil Procedure section
425.10, as well as allegations of “malice with intent”, a request for $25
million in damages (to the extent which they are alleged to be punitive
damages), and an allegation on page 3, lines 19-20, which Defendants contend is
irrelevant. Defendants also demur to all causes of action alleged in the Complaint
(with the exception of Invasion of Privacy) on the grounds that they do not
plead facts sufficient to state a cause of action and the causes of action as
alleged are uncertain, ambiguous, unintelligible, and impermissibly vague. On
November 26, 2024, the Court continued the hearing to December 16, 2024, after
Urman indicated to the Court that Pinckard was incarcerated. The Court also
ordered Defendants to serve the demurrer and motion again via e-mail. On
December 16, 2024, plaintiff Urman represented that no motions had been
received and her email address was verified in open court. Defendants were
ordered to serve Urman a second time through email and to serve Pinckard at his
most recent address. The hearing was continued one last time to March 10, 2025.
Despite
the two continuances, no opposition papers have been filed. II. LEGAL
STANDARDS Any party,
within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of
motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd.
(b)(1).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and
upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter
inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767,
782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage;
probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) The
court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in
conformity with California law, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one
that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither
pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a
demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the
complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to
strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) III. DISCUSSION Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to comply
with California Rules of Court, rule 2.112, which provides as follows: Each separately stated cause of action, count, or defense
must specifically state: (1) Its number (e.g., ‘first cause of
action’); (2) Its nature (e.g., ‘for fraud’); (3) The party asserting it if more than one party is
represented on the pleading (e.g., ‘by plaintiff Jones’); and (4) The party or parties to whom it is directed (e.g.,
‘against defendant Smith’). (California Rules of Court, rule 2.112.) Plaintiffs’
Complaint also fails to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section
425.10(a)(1), which requires a complaint to contain “[a] statement of the facts
constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.” Here,
Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not separately identify each cause of action, the
party asserting it, or the party/parties to whom it is directed. The Complaint
is also not drafted in ordinary and concise language. These failures substantially
impair the Court and Defendants’ ability to understand the allegations within
the Complaint or even ascertain the particular causes of action which are being
asserted. Accordingly, the Complaint is stricken in its entirety. As the Complaint is stricken, the
demurrer is MOOT. IV. CONCLUSION Defendants’ motion to strike is GRANTED
with 20 days’ leave to amend. Defendants may obtain dismissal of the action by
ex parte application if Plaintiffs fail to file an amended complaint within 20
days. Moving party to give notice. Dated
this
Parties who intend to submit on this
tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating
intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided
on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit
on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may
nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a
submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others
might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from
the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no
appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the
tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar. |